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Motion to Expedite 
Consideration 
SUMMARY: If this case is noted, appts ask that this appeal be 
expedited, so that it can be heard in the early part of next Term, at 
or about the same time. the Court hears City of Mobile v. Bolden, No. 77-
1844, r eargue d. 
FACTS: The 3-jc (USDC D.C.) (McGowan, · Gash, Richey), according to 
,..-------· -
appts ., determined that the electoral changes and annexations were 
-------~ 
enacted without discriminatory purpose, and without dilution, but 
refused to allow Rome, Ga. to "bailout" from coverage of the Act and 
refused to pre-clear the changes and annexations. 
CONTENTIONS: The issues involved in this case must be resolved 
before Jan. 1980, when the Ga. General Assembly meets, in order for 
the necessary legislation to be enacted in time for the next regularly 
sche duled election in Rome, Ga. 
/ 
- 2 -
This appeal raises several issued, including whether the 15th 
Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination (which is also 
raised in City of Mobile) and whether Congress can prohibit electoral 
changes which were enacted without discriminatory purpose. 
Rome, Ga., is unable to hold elections prior to the resolution 
of this appeal. 
DISCUSSION: Appts filed their js on .June 7. The U.S. has until 
July 7 to file a motion to dismiss or affirm. That means the case 
will be on List 1 for next Term. If the Court notes this case, it 
could expedite the briefing schedule if it thought it advisable. City 
of Mobile is scheduled to be reargued in November. In all events, appt 
does not make a substantial showing that expedited treatment is neces-
sary. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: September 22, 1979 
RE: City · of · Rome · v; · United States, No. 78-1840 
The SG has filed his brief and raised a few interesting 
points. I will discuss them in the order in which they are treated 
in my first memo. 
BAILOUT tlNDER - ~ · 4(a) 
The SG points out that there are over 7,000 local 
governments in the nine states subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Texas, Virginia). If only ten per cent of those 
governments were to file bailout suits, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia would be swamped beyond rescue. Indeed, if only 
one per cent of the localities filed such suits, the impact on the 
court's docket would be drastic. Congress insulated that court from 
this problem in the preclearance area by giving the Attorney General 
the power to preclear; but by not extending such power to the A/G on 
-bailouts, the SG argues, Congress demonstrated that only states were 
to have the bailout option. 
2. 
The SG also contends that the decision of the DC that 
bailout is not available to local governments may be reconciled with 
7 the broad purpose of United ·· states · v; ·-- soard ·· of ·· commissioners · of 
Sheffield, ·· Alabama, 435 u.s. 110 (1978). The Court in Sheffield 
attempted to prevent the fragment at ion of the Act 1 s coverage that 
would result if some local governments those that did not 
"register voters" under § 14 of the Act were not subject to 
preclearance while others were. Equally, the SG insists, by 
restricting bailout to states, this Court would ensure consistent 
coverage. ~5~ ~ ,4, ~ ~· 
INTENT AND THE · FIFTEENTH ·· AMENDMENT 
The SG completely ignores the DC 1 s "irrebutable presumption" 
analysis of this constitutional question. He relies first on the 
DC 1 s analogy between preclearance under the Voting Rights Act and 
literacy tests under the statute. In particular, he focusses on 
Oregon ··· v~ ·- Mitchell, 400 u.s. 112 (1971), in which, inter · alia, the 
Court upheld the national ban on literacy tests in § 201 of the 1970 
ex tens ion of the Act. I am still not especially moved by this 
~ f analog~en preclearance and u state prerogatives accomplished 
d i would point 
1 i teracy tests: The 
by each seem of 
the position of 
intrusion on 
dramatically 
Justice out Mr. 
~ point I overlooked in the earlier memo. Unlike 
that § 5 was unconstitutional, Mr. Justice BLACK approved of the 
-'L '-I 
national ban on literacy tests in the 1970 extension. He emphasized 
-;:::::::::::=- -==- - - - .. 




recognized a national problem for what it is -- a serious national 
- ----
dilemma that touches every corner of our land. In this legislation 
Congress has recognized that discrimination on account of color and 
racial origin is ngt confined to the South • • 11 400 n.s. at 133-
{L-.1 ~~~~~~~1-v- . 
t;,.;_~~- & • . _,Q..> ~~  .~ ~-
The SG- a i so argues that Congress may reach under the ~ 
~.~. ....... 
1 3 4. ) 
Fifteenth Amendment any facially neutral public action that interacts
with private discriminatory practices to cause denial or abridqmen~ 
He relies on Terry ·· v. ·· Adams, 345 U.S. 4~ of the right to vote. 
( 19 53), a case I dis cussed at some length in the City ·· of ·· Mobile memo. 
The target of the suit was a private political club which preselected 
(white) candidates who invariably won the Democratic primary and 
general elections. In three separate opinions, eight Justices agreed 
that the joint operation of the private club and state elections 
procedures constituted a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. In 
the instant case, the key question for this analysis is whether bloc 
voting, the 11 private d i scr imi natory practice, 11 is present. The leap 
that the SG suggests is that under § 2 of the Amendment Congress can 
determine when such interaction of private and public practices is so 
likely to deny or abridge voting rights that preclearance under ~ 5 
of the Act is a reasonable requirement. For me, this argument 
reduces to the SG's first claim: That, like literacy tests, voting 
changes by governments subi ect to § 5 of the A.ct are so 1 ikely to 
deny or abridge voting rights that they must be pre cleared by the 
federal government. My reservations about this claim are heightened 
because on the facts of this case, I have serious doubts as to the 
' ~----------~--~---presence of bloc voting in Rome. 
4. 
THE MERITS 
The SG stresses that in a declaratory iudgment action under 
the Voting Rights Act, the plaintiff local government has the burden 
of proving that a voting change or annexation has not diluted the -votes of racial minorities. He concludes that the City has not 
defeated this presumption of dilution that attaches after the 




Although the record does not establish the presence of 
I ( '' 
bloc voting in Rome, it also does not establish beyond peradventure .. ~ ... 
the absence of bloc voting. The question comes down to the weight of~~ 
the presumption that the A/G is correct. Still, I might distinguish 
~----------
between the burden of going forward, which the City clearly bears, 
and the burden of persuasion, which I would think would proper! y be 
on both parties. Indeed, what is the point of a full evidentiary 
trial if there is a strong presumption in favor of the A/G's 
findings? Review could simply be on the administrative record 
instead of de - novo. 
In a welcome contribution, the SG explains the role of the 
disputed residency requirement in the City Commission portion of this 
case. (I was unable to penetrate this question in my first memo.) 
Under the DC's ruling, the voting changes of 1966 were disallowed and 
voting procedures reverted to the pre-1966 system: commissioners 
elected at-large by plurality vote, with one commissioner living in 
each of nine wards. ~he SG concedes that a residency requirement 
ordinarily works in favor of minorities n argues that the effect 
is the opposite here "by reducing the number of potential candidates 
from any one of the nine wards, thereby promoting head-to-head 
.. ' 
5. 
contests in which racial bloc votinq would guarantee the success of 
the white candidate." Brief for SG, at 41. This is not entirely 
convincing. It assumes racial bloc votinq, which I still find 
uncertain on this record. Moreover, the nine wards miqht be small 
enouqh so that blacks would be a sizable minority -- or even maiority 






DATE: Sept. 17, 1979 
RE: 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED: 
1) Whether municipalities located in states 
covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can independently 
"bailout" from the Act's coverage through a declaratory 
judgment action under § 4(b) of the Act. 
2) Whether the Voting Rights Act 
unconstitutionally expanded the Fifteenth Amendment by 
banning discrimination regardless of intent. -------------.. 
3) Whether § 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
unconstitutionally intrudes upon basic notions of 
federalism. 
4) Whether the changes in voting procedures in 
this case were "precleared" by the Attorney General of the 
United States. 
adopted 
5) Whether these voting changes and annexations, 
~ ~htC/1~~ 





L11 tnu- ~J_'/!,wrq&.. ~· 
'1 7 J.. ~ ~.J.u- .• , 
Rome is a city of 30,000 ~acks make--Jp 23 per cent of -
the population and 15 per cent of the voters. The city government 
after 1918 consisted of a seven-man commission, elected at-large with 
one commissioner from each of seven wards. The Board of Education 
was elected entirely on an at-large basis. --- Beginning in 1966, the --------
Georgia General Assembly modified the city's election procedures in 
several material respects: a majority vote requirement was 
established for primary and general elections for the Commission and 
Board of Education; the number of wards was reduced to three, with 
three commissioners from each ward elected to numbered "posts"; two 
Board of Education members were slated from numbered posts in each 
ward. Between 1964 and 1973, the city also completed sixty 
I~'-- - - - -r 
~t:> a.--~~~ .... ~. annexations of neighboring land. 
The racial situation in Rome does not sound bad, at least in 
comparison to that described in City of Mobile v. Bolden (No. 77-
~ 1844). The three-judge court found that "no literacy test or other 
~~device has been employed in Rome as a prerequisite to voter 
~ registration during the past seventeen years," and that black voter 
~r registration was relatively high throughout the period. 
';1 rrl at 5b-6b. 
Juris. St. 
Although elected the City black has been to ever no 
~--------~-------------------------
Commission or the Board of Education, the DC found that "whites, 
including City officials, have encouraged blacks to run for elective 
posts in Rome" and that ~ne black was appointed to fill a vacancy on 
the Board of Education. Id. at 7b. The DC also concluded that the 
white elected officials in Rome are "responsive to the needs and 
interests of the black community" in providing services and hiring 
I 
3. 
blacks for public jobs. Id. Most striking, the DC stated, "In Rome 
politics, the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can 
probably determine the outcome of many if not most [electoral] 
contests." p~~~~~~~-~. ~a._ ~ A. ~
;-(' < tt.!<. ~­
Two blacks ran for the Board of Education in the 19~0s and -- - -· 
Id. at 8b. 
early 1960s, and one in the Republican primary for City Commission in 
1972; none received much support. In 1970, however, Rev. Clyde 
Hill, a black minister, won a plurality in a contest for the Board of 
Education. He lost the runoff 55-45, but his percentage of the vote 
was three times the percentage of black voters in the city. Despite - ·- ------------~---·------ --~----......-_______.. 
these figures, the DC found "a substantial measure of racial bloc 
voting" in Rome. Id. at 13b. The DC's conclusions relied on 
statements by blacks that votes were most frequently cast on the 
basis of race, and testimony by a sociologist who analyzed the votes 
in Floyd County in a race between incumbent Sen. Herman Talmadge and 
then-unknown Maynard Jackson, now the first black mayor of Atlanta. 
On June 15, 1974, the City submitted an annexation to the 
Attorney General for preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
(No explanation has been offered for the delay in submission of the 
other annexations and changes in voting procedures.) After an 
I 
investigation by the A-G, the City also submitted for his approval 
the voting changes and other annexations. The A-G did not object to 
or withdrew his objections to all changes except: l) Twelve of the 
~ 
sixty annexations, but only as they effected the City Commission 
elections; 2) the majority vote, runoff, numbered post and staggered 
term provisions for the Commission and Board of Education; and 3) 
the absence of a ward residency requirement for the Board of 
7 
i 
Education. The City 
of the District of Columbia to reverse the A-G's decision. "-----_......._ ______ _........__.--- , __ _ 
Judge McGowan, writing for Judge Richey with Judge Gasch ~IJJ)<:.. 
concurring in the judgment, ruled against the City. 
-4 ulelf 
He argued that JwL.,( 
~ 
Voting Rights Act indicated that~; the legislative history of the 
m~icip~s we~ntitle!_:o "bailout" from § 5 so long as ~f 
parent State is still subject to that provision; that § S is ./l6-
--------~ .-~ -- w~------------------------------- -constitutional; that the A-G had not precleared the changes in this 
suit when he approved the 1968 Georgia Election Code; and that the -
changes and annexations abridged the right to vote on the basis of 
color. This Court granted cert and adopted an expedited briefing and -hearing schedule. No local elections have been held in Rome since LJbl.tr 
1974. --
II. BAILOUT UNDER §4: 
Section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act permits a jurisdiction 
subject to the preclearance requirement of §5 to seek a delcaratory 
judgment in the District of Columbia DC that it has not maintained a ----discriminatory voting test or device for the preceding seventeen 
years. 
~
Upon such a finding, the jurisdiction need not submit any 
future voting changes for preclearance. When this Court upheld the 
constitutionality of § 5 in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 331 ( 1966), the "bailout" provision was cited specifically as 
averting the "possibility of overbreadth" in the ambitious 
legislative scheme. 
This Court's decision in United States v. Board of -------
Commissioners of Sheffield, 435 u.s. 110 (1978) (Sheffield), created 
a difficult problem for the DC on this issue. Sheffield, in which 
you concurred in part and in the judgment, held that § 5 applies to - -all political subdivisions in a state covered by the Act. The reach 
of § 5 is defined in § 4(a) as including "States" and "political 
subdivisions" subject to the Act. Although § 14(c)(2) of the Act 
defines political subidivisions as entities that register voters, the 
Sheffield Court thought that definition did not restrict the 
applicability of§ 5 to local governments that register voters. 
Rather, the Court said, the reference to "State" should be 
interpreted as extending to all political subdivisions within the 
state. The Court emphasized that its interpretation drew on the 
close "interrelationship" · between § 5 and §4. Because of that 
interrelationship, the preclearance requirement was found to apply to 
all entities exercising control over the electoral process. 
The Court also derived somewhat tenuous support for its 
outcome from the legislative history of the Act and from the A-G's 
practice under the statute. Perhaps most important, a clear policy 
concern underlay the majority's analysis of the tortuous statutory -
language: A contrary result would permit states to delegate 
r responsibilitiy for voting practices to localities and thereby open the back door to discriminatory practices. Id. at 124-125. 
-. .--: J). ,..,... ~~ ,.,..- Whatever the wisdom of Sheffield, it certainly complicates 
case. Since the Sheffield Court concluded that the reference to 
~"State" in§ 4(a) extends§ 5 to all political subdivisions within a 
a logical matter the bailout procedure specified in § 4(a) 
be available to those political subdivisions. But, as the 
i 
state, as 
~~~ must also 
'--.--..........-'---"'"- ---.. 
DC noted, it might not be that simple. First, both the Senate and 
~{5 
{[House Reports on 
L bailout provision 
20b-21 b. Second, 
the 1965 Act state in unequivocal 
is to be available ONLY to states. 
such a case-by-case approach 
6. 
terms that the 
Juris. St. at 
could sap the 
effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act, which "shift[s] the advantage 
of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its 
victims." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
Third, permitting bailout suits by all political subdivisions could 
create a litigation nightmare that would tax the resources of the A-
G. Juris. St. at 21b. Finally, the DC feared that once a locality 
~ successfully bailed out of the Voting Rights Act, it could be subject 
~o .strong pressure from state officials to adopt discriminatory 
~ollcles.The DC's last three arguments have little force~n~~e 
r · J.t/ City's view of the bailout provision, the burden of instituting 
~- litigation is still on the local government, leaving the advantage of 
time and inertia with the Attorney General. Bringing a bailout suit 
in the District of Columbia would probably be sufficiently difficult 
for local governments that it would not be attempted frequently. 
Moreover, it might be less expensive in the long run to have local 
governments bail out of § 5 and thereby save the A-G the trouble of 
preclearing all future changes in voting-related practices. There 
seems little ground for fearing that a locality, once bailed out, 
~ r- would reintroduce discrminatory practices at the behest of state 
officials. The state itself would still be subject to § 5, so no 
state action could be taken without preclearance. Consequently, any 
pressure would have to be behind-the-scenes and informal. Perhaps I 
am naive, but this seems an unlikely turn of events. 
Nevertheless, 
-crystal clear: No local governments are to be free to bail out. The ___....., 
DC did not feel free to ignore that legislative history, and ruled 
that the bailout mechanism is not available to political 
subdivisions. Petrs stress the logical inconsistency between 
Sheffield and the result below, but I find that less disturbing than 
the problem of overbreadth, alluded to in South Carolina v. ~ 
(~· 
Katzenbach, that may arise if local governments are independe
covered by § 5 (per Sheffield) but cannot bail out of coverage. The 
bailout provision is especially important because the application of 
§ 5 by the Attorney General is completely unreviewable under§ 4(b). 
~ The best way out of this situation that occurs to me now -- short of 
~~ reversing Sheffield -- is to contrast structural features of the Act 
~ith the mechanics of its implementation. If Section 5 is applied to y states, then states should be the entities to initiate bailout. The 
applicability of preclearance requirements to all political 
subdivisions (Sheffield) must be viewed as a mechanical question of 
how the Act works. And the resolution of such a mechanical issue, 
~ regardless of any loose language in Sheffield about the 
~ "interrelationship" of Sections 4 and 5, should certainly not control 
~~~ 
the " outcome on an important structural question like the availability /)./ ,_ r 
~ of bailout. ~ 
~ 
I II. INTENT: 
The City argues that there is no violation of § 5 unless 
there is a finding of purposeful discrimination. The text of the 




have the gur~~e and will not have the effect of denying or abridging __, --
the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 u.s.c. § l973c 
I<. 




If the A-G or DC of the District of Columbia finds no 
discriminatory intent, the inquiry ends; if intent is present, the 
inquiry must consider whether there is discriminatory impact. The 
City's reading is exactly wrong. The use of the conjunction "and" 
~--
between the references to purpose and effect means that a voting 
change may be approved only if there is NEITHER discriminatory intent 
NOR impact. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 570 (1969). 
The City presents a more difficult question when it argues ~ ~ 
ll~l. 
that if § 5 extends to voting changes taken without discriminatory 
intent, Congress exceeded the limits of the Fifteenth Amendment. J $"'-f!: 
(The role of intent under the Fifteenth Amendment is also implicated 
in the City of Mobile cases, while Fullilove v. Kreps, No. 78-l007C 
involves the acceptability under the Fourteenth Amendment of not 
requiring intent in Title VII actions.) The City cites CA 5's 
holding in Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978) that the 
Fifteenth Amendment reaches only discriminatory purpose, and repeats 
that court's theory that the emphasis on intent in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases (Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 u.s. 
252 ( 1977)) should also apply to the voting rights amendment. In 
addition, the City points out that some proposed wordings of the 
Fifteenth Amendment would have completely excluded any intent 




I find no intent requirement in the 
~~-k.J~~ 
~~--~~ 
text of the Fift enth ;~ltv -------
Amendment: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Indeed, 
the phrase "shall not be denied or abridged" looks to the effect of 
'---------------------- ------------------------ -----------
government action, without concern for the intent behind it. As I 
---~
discussed in my memo on the City of Mobile cases, Judge Wisdom in 
Nevett v. Sides, supra, presented a strong argument for not extending 
to Fifteenth Amendment law the intent requirement of Washington and 
Arlington Heights: The right of political participation is 
fundamental to all other rights in the polity; and the Fifteenth 
Amendment is specific to race discrimination in voting matters, so 
the absence of an intent requirement there would have little impact 
on other substantive areas. There is little probabtive value in the 
wordings of the Amendment that Congress did not adopt. 
The DC, however, did not approach this question directly, 
but assumed arguendo that the Amendment required intent. Judge 
McGowan then asked if Congress could constitutionally enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment (under its § 2 power to make "appropriate 
legislation") by establishing an intent-or-impact standard. His 
answer was "Yes," and drew on South Carolina v. Katzenbach's approval 
of the drastic measures of the Voting Rights Act. He concluded that 
"Congress can be said to have instructed the courts that t-he )=. · 
existence of racially disproportionate impact raises an irrebuttab~e ~·~ 
~resu~ti~o~o~ ~~u!-Eu;:~se." Another ex:mple of this approach, ~ 





Katzenbach despite this Court's earlier ruling that such tests are 
not unconstitutional per se. Lassiter v. Northamp~County Board of 
Elections, 360 u.s. 45 (1959). 
The DC ~ I find Judge McGowan' s appr_o_a_c_h __ s_o_m_~_a_t _ _ p_e_c_u_l i ar. 
~ j f' _ ..:J..i zed on " i rrebu table presumption" analysis in order to avoid the 
~.f'('r question whether Congress could "extend the substantive content of 
Fifteenth Amendment protections so as to proscribe voting 
discrimination in effect as well as in purpose." Juris. St. at 37b 
n.74. But an irrebutable presumption is usually analyzed in terms of 
denial of due process, and remains an uncertain doctrine even in that 
limited field. See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
63 2, 6 (1974) ((cwell, J., concurring). Most frequently, of 
course, the analysis has been used to strike down a law, not uphold 
it. E.g., LaFleur, supra (forced leave for women teacher five months 
pregnant); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (presumption of 
nonresidency at state university); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972) (unmarried fathers presumed unfit parents). Even under Title 
VII, which is authorized by the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the presumption of discrimination following a statistical 
showing is subject to rebut tal. Moreover, the analogy to 1 i teracy 
tests is poorly drawn. In upholding the Act, the South Carol ina 
Court emphasized the empirical correlation between the use of 
literacy tests and voting discrimination against blacks. 383 U.S. at 
330-331. The literacy test prohibition was thus supported in "both 
practice and theory." This seems a far more modest exercise of 
congressional power than imposing a disparate-impact standard to 
~
11. 
enforce a constitutional ban on intentional discrimination. 
I 
~he wisest course, in my view, would be to decide t~e 
on statutory grounds and not reach the constitutional issues. Should 
the Court reach this question, I would not endorse the DC's approach, 
but would follow Judge Wisdom and find no intent element in the 
Fifteenth Amendment.* 
IV. FEDERALISM PROBLEMS: 
On several occasions you have expressed concern over Section J~ 
l:,..,e.,~ 
5's intrusion on state and local sovereignty. E.g., Dougherty County 
·v 
Board of Education v. White, 99 S.Ct. 368, 380 (1978) (Powell, J., 
v 
dissenting); Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 200-201 (1978) (Powell, 
J., concurring in the judgment); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 
t/ 
526, 545 n. (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). The City urges reversal 
of South Carolina v. Katzenbach on this issue, pointing in particular 
to this Court's concern for the integrity of the federal 
system in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
Although the basic claim by the City proceeds under the Tenth 
Amendment, it also claims support from the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, 
*The mayor and city manager of Rome argue that their 
constitutional rights have been denied by the absence of elections 
during this litigation. The DC pointed out that such a five-year 
suspension of elections, although lamentable, is not uncommon in 
voting rights cases. 
Amicus State of Mississippi contends somewhat hysterically 
that this Court must find § 5 unconstitutional. Mississippi asks 
this Court to take judicial notice of the "insurmountable 
difficulties" of conducting a § 5 suit in Washington, D.C. The 
result has been, according to Mississippi, that the A-G can dictate 
the terms of settlement to penurious localities. Mississippi also 
claims that the A-G's implementation of the Act has been so inept and 
cavalier as to violate due process. 
7.5 L; ~ M~ 1/ZJ<LJ ~ aA..; 44--4-~0-/ 
J.Av Sb~ 1'2-la~ .a.......~~ 
§ 4' and diverse other amendments. Because this is familiar ground 
for you, I will not belabor the argument. 
The only new contention (to me) presented on this score is 
~Cva,.....A-~ 
that South Carolina approved § 5 strictly as emergency legislation. 
1\ 
The relevant passage of that opinion states that "exceptional 
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise 
appropriate," and cites Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (upholding 
legislative imposition of eight-hour day to settle railroad dispute) 
and Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 
(1934) (upholding state mortgage moratorium during Depression). 383 
u.s. at 330. According to the City, Congress enacted § 5 because 
discrimination against blacks had reached a crisis stage that 
required unusual remedial measures. The 
that voting statistics show that blacks in 
vote at or above national levels. A table 
City emphasizes, however, 
states covered by § 5 now ! p~ 
at page 73 of appellants' 
-brief supports that claim. In the 1976 presidential election, 58.5 
per cent of all voting-age blacks in this country cast ballots; the 
figures in the § 5 states were: Alabama, 58.1 per cent; Georgia, 56.3 
per cent; Louisiana, 63.9 per cent; Mississippi, 67.4 per cent; South 
Carolina, 60.6 per cent; and Virginia, 60.7 per cent. The City 
claims that in view of the dramatic increase in black voting in the 
South, there can be no further justification for § 5, much as 
Blaisdell's mortgage moratorium could not have been sustained under 
the Constitution in 1947. 
Judge McGowan answered by invoking Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 
427 U.S. 445 (1976), which upheld legislation permitting retroactive 
monetary relief against the states in order to enforce the Fourteenth 
1 3. 
Amendment. He stressed language in that opinion that describes the 
"Civil War Amendments" as sanctioning intrusions "into the judicial, 
executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to 
the States." Juris. St. at 40b. Although Fitzpatrick involved the 
Eleventh Amendment's shield of the states in the courts, the DC found 
that provision, like the Tenth Amendment, grounded in principles of 
state sovereignty. The DC said: "[W]e see no reason to suppose that 
in this context the states' Tenth Amendment immunities should be 




went on to find § 5 
Fifteenth Amendment. 
an "appropriate" method for 
The DC also rejected the 
Guarantee Clause argument as involving a political question. Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 
(1849). 
I think there is substantial force to the City's argument on 
this point. Although the DC ably defended § 5 on the basis of 
Fitzpatrick, the concerns raised in that case were far more narrow 
----.... 
than the issues here, where the integrity of the state's lawmaking 
process is arguably undermined. I would point out, however, that as 
recently as Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977), eight members of 
the Court joined an opinion expressly stating that by enacting § 5, 
"Congress acted within its 'power to enforce' the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments 'by appropriate legislation.'" Id. at 414-415 
vi( you concurred in the judgment). Some unhappiness with the nearly 
continuous expansion of the Act was evident in Dougherty County last 
term, when the Chief, Rehnquist, and Stewart joined your dissent. 
And in Sheffield, Stevens, Rehnquist and the Chief dissented to the 
1 4. 
extension of preclearance to all political subdivisions. Still, in 
view of the uncertain breakdown of the Court, the l i_kely _pol.J.!.~al 
impact of striking down § 5, and the presence of other grounds for 
~
overturning the DC in this case, I am not sure that the Tenth 
Amendment argument would be the best ground of decision. 
V. PRECLEARANCE BY ATTORNEY GENERAL: 
The City argues that several of the voting changes at issue 
here the majority vote requirement, runoff elections, and numbered 
post provision -- were precleared by the Attorney General when he 
approved revisions in the 1968 Georgia Municipal Election Code. 
Under those revisions, the City continues, Rome had to conduct its 
elections with majority votes, runoff elections and numbered posts, 
so the A-G has no right to re-preclear the changes. The DC 
sensibly rejected this contention. Realistically, impact of voting 
changes in particular communities cannot be predicted on a statewide 
basis. The presence of bloc voting, a history of discrimination, or 
peculiar political practices in a community may convert a neutral 
election device into a discriminatory one. This Court has held that 
under § 5 a voting change must be submitted to the A-G in "an 
unambiguous and recordable manner." Allen v. State Board of 
Elections, 393 u.s. at 571. See Sheffield, 435 u.s. at 136. The DC 
concluded that in 1968 Georgia had submitted to the A-G only its 
decision to grant municipalities wide discretion in structuring local 
elections; the actual provisions of each municipal charter could not 
be deemed precleared by acceptance of the statewide action. 
The City also claims that the Attorney General precleared 
its voting changes and annexations by failing to act within the 
•, 
1 5. 
statutorily prescribed 60-day period. On May 24, 1976 Rome asked the 
A-G to reconsider his objection to the changes; on July 14, 1976, the 
City spontaneously submitted two brief affidavits in support of its 
petition for reconsideration; the A-G declined to withdraw his 
objection on August 12, 1976, almost eighty days after the City first 
asked for reconsideration. The question is whether the 60-day period 
began anew when the City submitted supplemental affidavits on July 
14. In Morris v. Gresette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977), you wrote an opinion 
for the Court holding, inter alia, that if the A-G returns a 
submission for insufficient information, the 60-day period does not 
commence until the preclearance request is resubmitted. But in the 
instant case, the supplementation was volunteered by the City, and, 
according to the DC, was "hardly of a nature to impose a significant 
additional burden on the Attorney General." Juris. St. at 28B n.63. 
The DC found no violation of the 60-day rule, stating that 
it was "unwilling to second-guess the Attorney General on an issue 
implicating his unreviewable judgment on the merits of a § 5 
application." Id. at n.64. Judge McGowan also observed that since 
the voting changes at issue were not submitted to the A-G until ten 
years after their enactment, "the City's hands are not scrupulously 
clean when it comes to timeliness." Id. at n.65. v.;here is no clear 
answer to this question in the statute or in the Justice Department's 
rules. See 28 C. F. R. § 51.18 (a). ~e best reason I see for the 
DC's position is that otherwise a local government might try to swamp 
the A-G with information near the end of the 60-day period. Of 
course, the 60-day period was established in order to ensure swift 
action on preclearance and thereby minimize the disruption to the 
,; 
•,. 
1 6 0 
local government. This concern fades if the locality itself 
initiates the delay by submitting more data. 
The City directs this Court's attention to United States v. 
Georgia, No. C76-1531A (N.D. Ga., Sept. 30, 1977) (three-judge 
court), aff'd mem. 98 S. Ct. 2840 (1978), where the DC found that 
preclearance of the entire Georgia election code in 1970 barred the 
A-G from preclearing two provisions involving county elections. The 
City reasons that this case requires a finding that the A-G 
precleared Rome's election practices in 19 68. This case should be 
distinguished, however, because it concerned state provisions that 
had simply not been highlighted when the entire code was submitted to 
the A-G, while the instant litigation involves charter requirements 
that were not directly before the A-G at all. 
VI. WAS § 5 
/i~-r~~~~~~~ 
?~~,Ld_~ ~. 
VIOLATED. ..J..,.u~ - •. - ~. J. ... J ~I • ·d (.'./. 
--~~~,~- ;:::::('~/~~--, ,, "' 
DC found that "[a]lthough ttie i he The 
1 
"burden of showing that 
7 
its non-annexation voting 
----------~,------------------------~--------------------· 1
C~s 
changes were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose." Juris. St. 
at 4 Sb. And the Attorney General did not even allege that the 
annexations were undertaken with a discriminatory purpose. The City 
did not, however, establish to the DC's satisfaction that the effects 
of those changes were not discriminatory. The defeat of Rev. Hill in 
his 1970 race for the Board of Education "exemplifie[d] the dilutive 
effect on black voting strength of these rules," since under a 
plurality-win system Rev. Hill would have prevailed. Id. at 48b. 
The DC expressed dissatisfaction with the Government's "conclusory" 
argument against the voting changes, but stated that "the City has 
shown us nothing at all that might refute the Government's argument." 
Id. at 49b 
With respect to the annexations, the DC attempted to walk a 
.....,_________~ ............... -------·----~ ·-------------------.....· 
thin line. Judge McGowan found that as a result of the 13 challenged -----annexations, white voting strength in the city had increased by 
<....... 
almost 10 per cent (actually 7.5 per cent), while black voters 
increased by less than one per cent. (This statistical analysis, as 
I will discuss below, was misleading.) Having found a negative 
impact on black voting strength, the DC asked if blacks would have a 
commensurate voice in the city after the annexations, comparing the 
situation in Rome to that in City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 
F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 
(1973). In Petersburg, the DC found a history of discrimination and 
government unresponsiveness to the black community, and that 
annexation would convert a 55/45 black majority to a 54/46 white 
majority. The Petersburg Court said that so long as the city 
retained its at-large voting system, the annexations would inevitably 
dilute the black vote. In the instant case, Judge McGowan 
acknowledged the "relatively benign racial atmosphere" in Rome and 
that "Rome's elected officials have been quite responsive to the 
interests of the black community." Juris. St. at 55b. He concluded 
that blacks would still "have a fair opportunity to obtain 
representation reasonably commensurate with their post-annexation 
voting strength." Id. Nevertheless, in a move that baffles me, the 
---------------~-------DC conditioned preclearance of the annexations on abandonment of the ?'(? 
requirement that three city commissioners reside in each of three 
wards. Id. at 58b. 
18. 
The standard for evaluating voting changes under § 5 was 
articulated in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. at 141: 
[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that 
no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to 
a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
reference to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise. 
This "non-retrogression" principle has been satisfied in this case. 
The DC's finding on the voting changes was based on the City's 
failure to refute the Government's claim that they "promote head-to-
head contests between white and black candidates and deprive the 
black community of the opportunity to elect a candidate of their 
choice through single-shot voting." Id. at 48b. This seems pretty 
lame. h II . . . "' . T e ma]or1ty v'-o_t_e~ ... a_n_~. ~~nts serve the val1d 
purpose of ensuring that elected officials receive the approval of a 
majority of the voters. 
/( ,, 
The place requirement ensures that all ... 
regions in the city will be represented on the council and avoids the 
confusion caused by a lengthy ballot listing many candidates. 
Indeed, the combination of the place requirement with a residency 
requirement can be viewed as a pro-minority measure that ensures that 
the richer parts of town will not produce all the elected officials. 
See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975). (My confusion 
over the DC • s view of the impact of a residency requirement also 
arises with respect to the annexations.) 
Moreover, the evidence in this case did not support the 
Government's position. Of course, there had been no black elected 
officials in Rome, but there was little evidence of racial bloc 
voting. Indeed, a large share of Rev. Hill's votes had to come from 
whites. The countervailing testimony 
voting, and of blacks that there is, would seem to cancel each other 
out. And the evidence as to the 1968 senatorial primary is 
inconclusive at best, since the black challenger was an unknown and 
the white was a long-time incumbent. Moreover, the District Court 
found that the city government was sensitive to black needs. 
(Although I suspect that this litigation has somewhat impaired 
relations between the races in Rome.) Minorities are not entitled to 
elect representatives in proportion to their numbers, but must have 
"a fair opportunity" to do so. The DC found that "blacks often hold 
the balance of power in Rome elections," and due to the at-large 
election system, "they are situated to exert considerable influence 
over many elected officials, not simply those representing an 
exclusively black constituency." Juris. St. at 55b. This sounds 
pretty good to me. 
On the annexation question, the DC strained even harder.* 
At time of annexation, nine of the thirteen plots of land annexe 
were completely vacant, while 288 white voters 1 ived on the other 
four plots. By 1978, the thirteen plots held 823 white and nine 
black voters, while in 1975, the city as a whole had 10,982 white 
voters (84.4 per cent) and 2,026 black voters (15.6 per cent). If 
you subtract all of the voters living in the thirteen annexed 
regions, the City in 1975 would have had 10,159 white voters and 
*The discussion in the amicus brief by the Pacific Legal Foundation 
was illuminating on this 1ssue. 
20. 
I see no asis for finding that the votes of blacks in Rome have been 
---....,____ 
diluted by the annexations. ~ ~ F ~./1 ... ""1 ?4. .G"-'~ .... 
2,017 black voters, or a ratio of 83.4 per cent to 16.6 per 
cent. Thus the actual loss in black voting power was one per cent. 
This contrasts with the shifts in voting power resulting from 
municipal annexations in Petersburg (55/45 black to 54/46 white) and 
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (52/48 black to 58/42 
white). In partial recognition of the weakness of the Government's 
case, the court below eschewed the more drastic remedy in Petersburg 
that the city adopt a single-member districting plan. Instead, the 
DC conditioned its preclearance of the annexations on abandonment of 
the residency requirement. There seems little advantage to the black 
community of dispensing with this requirement. If, as in most 
American cities, Rome's neighborhoods are not very well integrated, 
the ward requirement would most likely enhance the opportunity for 
blacks to be candidates from a ward where blacks were concentrated. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that housing patterns are not 
racially segregated in Rome, or that the black community is dispersed 
in small pockets so that none of the three wards has a substantial 
black population, the residency requirement should have no more 
adverse effect on black voting strength than that caused by pure at-
large voting, which the DC would restore. Perhaps I am missing 
something here. 
VII. RECOMMENDATION 
My inclination would be to reverse the DC's ruling on the 
merits of the § 5 claim because there was no showing of racial bloc --------
21. 
voting or retrogression of black voting strength. Although I would 
·---·---_...,... 
sidestep the constitutional questions, the federalism claim is 
'---------------------~ 
tenable. --- I would resist the contention that the Fifteenth Amendment requires a showing of intent, since the text of the Amendment does 
not support such a reading and there is no practical reason -- as 
there is in the equal protection context -- for injecting such a 
restrictive standard. I think the DC should be affirmed on the 60-
day preclearance issue, and would let the bailout ruling stand for 
lack of a better alternative. As must be clear, there is a lot of 
room in this case for strategic maneuvering. 
David 
78-1840 City of Rome v.U.S. Argued 10/10/79 
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OC'rOBER TERl\I, 1972 
No. 72-865 
CITY OF PE'rERSBURG, VIRGINIA, A.PI'ELLANT 
v. 
u NI1'ED STATES OF AlVIEIUCA. 
ON APPEAL FROM TIIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT .COURT FOil 
TilE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA . . 
s~J 
.1\ MOTION TO AFFIRM 
. ~ . ' 
The Solicitor General, on behalf .of the United 
States, moves, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 16 
(1) (c), that the judgment of the district court in this 
case he affirrned. . . . .. 
OPINION BELOW 0 • •• • • • 
The opmwn of the district court (J:S. App. 5a-
24a) is not yet r eported. 
·· .. : 
JURISDICTION 
The order of the district court (J.S. App;·24a-26a) 
was entered on November 22, 19·72. A notice ·of appenl 
was filed on December 6, 1972, and the, Jurisdictional 
~.tatenient \vas filed on December 12, 1p_72 . . Tli~ juris-





\Vhether the district court properly found that ap-
pellant had failed 'to demonstrate satisfactorily in its 
declaratory judgment suit under Section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1973c) that the annexation 
of surrounding territory by the City of Petersburg, 
Virginia, would not have a racially discriminatory 
effect on the election of City Councilmen under the 
City's at-la1·ge electoral system. 
STATEMENT 
The relevant facts are recounted in the opinion of 
the district court (J.S. App. 5a-13a). The City of 
Petersburg is an independent city in Virginia, which, 
prior to the present annexation, covered an eight-
square-mile area and had a 1970 population of 36,103; 
approximately 55 percent of the 1970 population was 
black and 45 percent was white (J.S. App. 9a). The 
City is g<?verned by a five-member City Council.1 Each 
member is ·chosen in at-large elections, which are non-
partisan, and serves for four years; elections are stag-
gered at two-year intervals, with three members elected 
in each presidential year and two members elected in 
each off year (J.S. App. 11a). 
In 1971, Petersburg expanded the city limits by 
annexing 14 square miles of surrounding area. The 
annexation added approximately 7,323 persons to the 
City's population, 7,000 of w'hom (a group nearly half 
the size of the pre-annexation white population ( J.S. 
1 In 1972, the Virginia Legislature by speci~tl act increased 




App. 6a)) \vcre wbite (.J.S. 4); th'is reduced the 55 
percent black majority to a 46 11ercent millOI·ity (.T.S. 
App. 9a-10a). An attempt hy the only black mcmbcr 
of the Council to compen:atc for tbis alteration in 
the City's racial makeup by having Council members 
elected from single-member districts, rather than 
at-large, was rejected by the Council ( J.S. App. 1f5a). 
In December 1971, the City submitted its annexa-
tion plan to the Attorney General }_)ursnant to Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act. On February 22, 1972, 
the Attorney General, acting through the Assistant 
Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, inter-
posed an objection, ach-ising Petersburg that (J.S. 
App. Sa, n. 2): 
Unquestionably, the above facts indicate 
that the proportional voting strength .. of blacks 
has been reduced. r_rhe issue is whether this re-
duction amounts to a discriminatory effect on 
voting within the meaning of the Voting Rights 
Act. vVe conclude that it does. The reason lies 
not in the fact of annexation-Congress cer-
tainly did not intend for all southern cities to be 
prevented from annexing any tenitory. Ratliei·, 
in re-adopting the at-large election system in 
the context o.f a significant change of popula-
tion-from black to white ma,iority-ancl si-
multaneously re,iccting a proposed wm·cl system, 
the potential for an adverse ancl discriminatory 
voting effect l1as been \\Titten into the Petrrs-
burg clcdion Jaw. \Yhile the l'Casons the c-ity 
advances fol' using an at-ln1:gt· systrm an' crcLl-
ihle and would normally prcscnt no SJX'rial. 
pl'ohlem, in the particular context oE Prtr.rs-
4 
burg we arc unable to conclude that the at-large 
feature will not have a discriminatory effect on 
voting rights. * * * 
On ~larch 17, 1972, the City filed the present Sec-
tion 5 snit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that its annexation of the pl'edominantly white sur-
rounding areas, to " ·hich it extended the at-large 
method of electing City Cotmcilmen, "does not have 
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on 'account of race or 
color * * ·X·" ( 42 u.s.a. 1973c). The matter was heard 
by three judges, as requiTed by statute ( 42 U.S.C. 
1973b). 
On October 24, 1972, the district cou1·t ruled against 
'appellmit, holding that it had failed to carry its 
burden of proving that "the Petersburg annexation 
in the context of an at-large voting system" ''~ill not 
have ' tbe effect prohibited by ihe Act" (.J.S. App. 
20a). In so concluding, the court made clrm· that the 
objectionable aspect of the City's decision to enlarge 
its electorate did not lie in the "ntel'e bom1<.lal'y 
change," but rather Tesultecl from "an expansion of 
an at-large system" to the ne,Yly-annexecl c.n·c:.1s (J.S. 
App. 22a). It thus ruled that the annexation could 
"be approYcd only on tl1e condition that modifications 
calculated to neutralize to the extent possible any 
adverse effect upon the political participation of hlaek 
voters nrc adopted, i.P., that the [appellant] sh] ft 
from an ·at-1~u-gc to a \Htl·d ~>ystcm of clcctitJg its city 




The district cou1-t carefully examined the Peters-
burg annexation p1·oposa1, both in its historical per-
spective and in terms of the impact that it would have 
.· on the voting po,Yer of Negroes residing within the 
enlarged city limits. Far from annotmcing any per se 
rule with respect to municipal annexations where local 
officials are elected at large (see J.S. App. 21a), asap-
pellant seems to suggest ( J.S. 8) ,Z the court correctly 
held that in the pa1ticular circtm1stances })resented in 
this case the change in the Petersburg election proce-
dures, although "fairly intended to accomplish a legiti-
mate governmental purpose" (J.S. App. lOa), would 
have the prohibited effect of diluting "the weight, 
strength and povver of the votes of the black voters in the 
· City * * *" (J.S. App. 18a). Its decision not to ap-
prove the annexation if at-large voting was retained is 
entirely consistent with the decisions of this Cotut and 
other federal courts safeguarding the voting rights of 
"millions of non-white Americans" ( So1tth Camz.ina v. 
Ka.tzen lHlch, 383 U.S. 301, 337), and presents no issue 
warranting plenary review by this Court.3 
2 Appellant specnlntes that tho Petersburg annexation is no 
different from any other municipal annexation in the context of 
an at.-la.1·ge voting system. But the nnusnal nature of the Peters-
burg annexation is indicated by the fact that the Attorney Gen-
eral has found it necessary to object only to it and two other 
annexations of the 527 submitted to him from 105 cities elect-
ing local officials at large. See .\ppendix to ).Iotion to Dismiss 
or Affirm filed by Charles P. Tioyall, et al. 
3 Contrary to appellant's suggestion, the dc•cision be]on· is not 
in c:oni!id with Lipscomb Y. Jon sson, -:l-50 F. 2cl 835 (C.A. 5) , or 
fl ol t Y. 0 ity of Riehm our1~ 459 F. 2cl 1003 ( C.A. 4), certiomri. de-
6 
1. AppelJant argues that because the court below 
found "nothing in the annexation which indicated 
that it had a racial pu1·pose" (J.S. App. lla), judicial 
inc1uiry in a suit of this natn1·e into the effect on the 
Negro voter of an extension of the city limits into 
whtte suburbia is foreclosed. The plain language of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, howC\·er, rc.fntes 
this argument. It requires a covered State or political 
strb'clivision seeking •clearance of its proposed change 
in election procedures to demonstrate that the change 
"does not have the pnrpose and will not lwve the effect 
of denyjng Ol' abridging the right to vote on accotmt of 
raceorcolor * * *"(42U.S.C. l973c;emphasisaclded). 
The distriet court therefore properly did not end 
its inquiry upon finding that the Petersburg annexa-
tion was ''a necessary measure to allow the Cj ty to 
nied, 408 U.S. 931. Neithn Lipscomb nor Holt was a suit 
for declaratory relief under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
In neither case was the burden on the city to demonstrate "by 
the prC'pondera11ce of evidence" that its change in election pro-
cedure was not racially discriminatory. \Vhilc the changC's in-
volved in !Jolt and Lipscomb "·ere upheld as constitutional, 
neithC'r case involved a change that would efl'ectinly Pxcludc 
blacks from the political process. Here, by contrast, the conrt 
found that the evidence with respect to this annexation in the 
context of at-large voting created "the clear possibility of 
totally excluding black citizens from participation in the city 
government'' (J.S. App. 22a). Unlike Ifolt and Lipscomb, the 
burden here was on the City o:f Petersburg to proYe otherwise. 
Nor is there any reason for the Comt to hear this case in 
light of Hullocl~ Y. R cgestm·. X o. 72-147, probable jmi::;cliction 
lloted, October 10, 1072. Bullock is not. n. SC'ction ;) snit. l\IorC'-
m·er, as apprllant acknowledges (.J.S. 11- 12). that casP a ri sl'::i 






expand its tax base and its potential for growth and 
development" (J.S. App. lOa). It looked fnrther, to 
ascertain whether, as this Court stated in a related con-
text in Fo1·tson v. Dor::;ey) 379 U.S. 433, 439, "designedJy 
or otherwise," the extension of the city limits, "tmclel' 
the circumstances of [tl1is] particular case, would 
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength 
o·f racial * * ·:+ elements of the voting population." See 
also Btwns v. R'l'cha.nlson, 384 U.S. 73, 88.4 
The record fu]]y djscloses, and appellant does not 
dispute, that "there has been a long history of racial 
segregation and discrimination in the City of Petel's-
bnrg" (J.S. App. lla). The result has been, as pointed 
out by the court below, "a dramatic polarization of 
the races ·* * ·Y.- 'vith respect to voting * * *" ( id. at 
11a-12a), and "almost total bloc voting by race has 
been the well estabJished pattern * -:f *" (id. at 12a). 
4 Contrary to appellant's assertion, this Coutt did not hold 
in Whitcomb v. Chavis: 403 U.S. 12±, that such an inquiry is 
lmnecessary if a. lrgitimate purpose can be shown. Indeed, the 
Court there made an exhaustive examination of the "eileci" 
that the change from single-member to mult.i-mcmLer districts 
would have on minority ,-oting rights (403 U.S. at 148-155). 
In ally event, appellant can deri,·e no support in this case 
from dicta in Whitcomb for its argument that the court below 
should have pretermitted consideration of the "efi'ec.t'' of the 
Petersburg annexation once it \\·as satisfied with the legislative 
"purpose." lVMtcomb " ·as not a snit for declaratory judg-
ment under Section 5, and tlms did not inYoke the explicit 
statutory command that the jmiscliction seeking Section 5 
clearance demonstrate to the court that its ,·oting change woultl 
not be racially discriminatory in either purpo:-:1:', or eJiect. In 
lVkitc01nb, the lmrclen of proof was, moreover, on the party 
challenging the election change, not on the party seeking to 




The City Councilmen are eleetecl on a non-paTtisan 
basis, having no political party identification Ud. at 
lla), and "the vote in precincts which are racially 
identifiable as being almost completely black or y;;hite 
llas he en overwhelmingly along racial lines" (id. at 
12a). As might be expected, the majority-white Coun-
cil 5 "has been generaJly unresponsive to some of the 
expressed needs and desires of the blacl\: community 
and has on some occasions rejected or failed to adopt 
programs, employment policies and appointments l'ec-
ommenclecl by blacks" (icl. at 14a). 
It is from this perspective that the court below 
consideTed the effect on mtmicipal elections of an in-
crease in the number of whites in Petersburg by al-
most half while retaining an at-large voting system.6 
5 The Council has only once since HlG4 had t\\-o black mem-
bers (lDGG-1968); at the present time it has one black member 
(J.S. :App. 14a). 
6 Appellant seeks to remon~ from the Conrfs consideration of 
the Petel'sburg annexation under Section 5 the City's decision 
to retain an at-large voti11g system. But a boundary change of 
the sort im-olwd here cannot be so easily isolated. Any time 
there is "a change in the composition of the electorate afl'ectecl 
Ly the election" there is "a potential for racial discrimin:1 tion 
in Yoting" (Perldns v. Matthmus, 400 U.S. 379, 380). And that 
potential inheres as much in the manner in which the ne"\Y 
voters elect their reprcsentatins as it clocs in their numerical 
impact on the racial Lalance in the affected community. An at-
largo system of voting in the context of a city co\-cring- 8 sqnare 
miles differs fl'om at-large representation in a city tlwt, by an-
nexation, is almost three times that size. The annexation not 
only adds tenitory and people, but, as obsetTed by the c1istrict 
comt ( .T.S. App. '20a), al so expands the at-large Yoting sys-
tem. Such a "change" in the Plrctoral process is no more 





As it pointed ont Ud. at 12a): "'I'he simple trans-
formation of a potential black voting majority into a 
c:Jear minority has no effect on relative voting 
strengths unless votes are cast along racial lines." But 
whe1·e race is the "dominant factor" (id. at 14a) in 
electjons, as in Petcrshnrg, the sudden injection into 
the electorate of a Jarge numbe1· of white voters, which 
concededly has the effect of ''dilut[ing] the 'Yeight, 
strength and power of the votes of the black voters 
in the City * ·:+ *" (J.S. App. 18a), does in a very 
real sense deny the black segn1ent of the municipal 
population access to the political system. Compare 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U.S. at 155.7 
age than is the change in boundary lines. See Allen Y. State 
Boet?Yl of Electiorw, 3!)3 U.S. 5"14, 5G7; Pe1·kins v. 1.ll atthe~vs, 
supm, 400 U.S. at 390. 
7 In Whitcomb, by contrast, the question concerning possiuJe 
racial discrimination in voting arose in the context of partisan 
elections along party, not racial, lines. The Court there found 
from the evidence that "tlw failure of the ghetto to h:wc legis-
lative seats in proportion to its population emerges more as a 
function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor 
Negroes" (403 U.S. at 153). It concluded that the poor blacks 
"·ere not "any more underrepresented than poor ghetto whites 
" ·ho also voted Democratic ancl lost, or any more discriminated 
against than other interest groups or Yoters in :Marion County 
with allegiance to the Democratic Party, or, conversely, any 
lPss represented than Republican areas or voters in years of 
Republican defeat" ( 403 U.S. at 154). It "·as in that context-
i.e., partisan elections along party lines- that the Conrt rejected 
the argument that "im·idious discrimination "-' * * results \Yhen 
the ghetto, along w·ith all otlwr Democrats, suffers the disastl'r 
of losing too many elections" (403 U.S. at 153). But. the deci-
sion in 1Vllitcomb, enn assuming arguendo its applicahilit~· 
here (sl'c n. 4, S1tJ11'o), has little b0aring on the pr0sent case 
invoh·ing non-partisan elections where the voting hus Lccn along: 
rncial lines . 
10 
Consequc'ntly, in holding that the Petersbm·g an-
nexation in the context of at-large elections and block-
voting by race Cl'eatrs "the clear possibility of totally 
excluding black citizens from participation in the city 
government" (J.S. App. 22a), the district court d~cl 
not invoke "a mere cnphemism for political defeat at 
the polls" (lVhitcomu Y. Cluc.vis, sup1·a, 4.03 U.S. at 
153), as appellant seem:s to argnc. Here the dilutive 
effect is far more fundamental. Contrary to appel-
lant's contentions, it cannot be disregarded on grounds 
that the admitted racial discrimination in voting was 
"lawfnlly motivated" (J.S. 17),8 was "incidental" to 
legitimate legislative goals (J.S. 20-21),9 or ·was only 
"temporary" (J.S. 26).10 Nor is it a proper answer 
to the responsibilities that the Act places in the court? 
to say that the extent to which the Negro vote has 
been impaired by the present annexation is an inquiry 
for "social scientists" and "beyond the ken of the 
judiciary" ( J.S. 27-28). 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act imposes on the 
jurisdiction seeking dcclarat01-y 1·rlicf the burd('ll of 
proving that its change in election procedures is not 
8A similar arg-ument \Yas rejected Ly this Comt in Allen v. 
State Board of Elections, wpN; as there noted, it is not the 
motiYe behind the election law change that is relenmt under 
Sectioi1 5, but only whether the change has a racially discrimi-
natory pnrpose or effect (:-3D3 CS. at 5G:\ n. 2rl). 
9 See pp. \r--7, supro. 
10 Appellant s uggests tlwt \Yhatenr the c11lution o f the X<'gro 
1·ot c as a result. of this :umrxntion in tlw context of at-large 
c l0ctions, it soon " 'ill he l'<'ll ll'diccl "bcC'allSC [the] lll't rep rod llC'-
tion rate [of blacks] is 2:1.0'> g reatrr tha11 that of ''hitcs ::: '~ ':':' 











racially discriminato1-y m purpose or effect. South 
Ccwol-ina v. Katzenbach, supnt, 383 "G.S. at 335.11 In 
non-partisan elections where the voting "has been 
overwhelmingly along racial lines" (J.S. App. 12a), 
as is the case here, that burden is not met simply by 
seeking to "justify" the admitted dilution of the 
Negro vote as an inevitable "by-product of other leg-
islative action" (J.S. 20). An erosion of the blacks' 
voting power which "effectively exclude[s] [them] 
from participation in the process of selecting city 
council members" (Lipscomb v. Jonsson, 459 F.2d 
335, 339 (C.A. 5)) is no more permissible when accom-
plished indirectly, "designedly or otherwise," than 
when it results from direct legislative action. As this 
Court stated in Lane v. 1iVilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275, and 
reiterated in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342, 
the Fifteenth Amendment condemns "sophisticated as 
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." 
11 Contrary to appellant's contention, the district court. proper-
ly imposed on Petersburg the burden of proving "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that its change in election pro-
cedures" would not have a racially discriminatory purpose or 
effect (J.S. App. 16a-17a). See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U.S. at 331-332. The fact that the court acknowl-
edged in its opinion that, with respect to the matter of legisla-
tive pnrpose, appellant had gone beyond that requirement and 
introduced "compelling evidence demonstrating the necessity for 
this annexation" ( J.S. App. 21a-22a), in no way suggests that 
it was holding the City to a standard of proof higher than the 
one it stated \YaS applieable here. Since, as pointed out by ap-
pellee Royall in his Motion to Dismiss or Affirm (p. 11), no 
effort \\as made by the City of Petersburg "to meet its burden 
of proving that the at-large system would not discriminate 
against black voters in Petersbw·g" (emphasis in original), the 




For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the dis-
trict court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
FEBRUARY 1973. 
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD_,. 
Solicitor Geneml. 
DAviD L. NoRMAN, 
Assistant Attorney Genentl. 
W lVI. BRADFORD REYNOLDS, 
Assistant to the Solicitor General. 




The unreality of Wallace's argument today persuades 
me even more strongly than before that I would like to find a 
way to relieve Rome from the absurdities of §5. 
I do not foreclose the possibility of concluding 
that under Sheffield, a city, as a governmental unit required 
to preclear with the Attorney General, also has the riqht to 
seek a "bail out". I recognize there are some analytical 
difficulties, and yet they may not be quite as severe as 
those we overcame in reachinq our judgment in Sheffield. ~:~~·$ "' ,_ ~ i. J ii 
'" 
I would prefer, however, to find a somewhat 
different approach. Perhaps the most appealinq idea -
subject to further thinking - would be an arqument qenerally 
alonq the followinq lines: 
The provisions of the Act that do not permit a 
local qovernmental unit to bail out are an invalid 
infringement of the riqhts of localities under principles of 
federalism and the lOth Amendment. The Solicitor General 
concedes that if a sinqle local unit of government, however 





years, the entire state - and every other subdivision -
remains subject to the onerous preclearance provisions of the 
Act. Congress could not have intended this, and it is a 
severe intrusion upon the automony of local governments and, 
as has been arqued, upon individual riqhts. 
It also is counterproductive to the purposes of the 
Act, as t~operation could lessen the incentive of 
localities to comply with the Act - as Rome has done in every 
substantive way. 
I have had no opportunity to think this throuqh. 
would appreciate your qivinq it careful reflection, and 
talkinq with me Thursday morninq. You may devise some other 
,, theory that would enable us to decide, in a principled way, 
~~
that the Act as applied to a city that has a lonq record of 
"' 
no discrimination, and of constructive policies towards black 
citizens. Congress could not have intended the bizarre 
result of this kind of case. I wonder what Justice Huqo 
Black would say about this! 
CADC, several years aqo (about 1974, I think), 
decided that Virqinia was not entitled to bail out. Take a 
look at that case. Mv recollection is that arquable 
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upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not 
to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently 
appeared. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, and cases 
cited therein. 
Coverage formula . 
We now consider the related question of whether the 
specific States and political subdivisions within § 4 (b) of 
the Act '?'ere an appropriate target for the new remedies. 
South Carolina contends that the coverage formula is 
awkwardly designed in a number of respects and that it 
I disregards various local conditions which have nothing to do with racial discrimination. These arguments, how-
ever, are largely beside the point.87 Congress began 
work with reliable evidence of actual voting discrimina-
tion in a great majority of the States and political sub-
divisions affected by the new remedies of the Act. The 
formula eventually evolved to describe these areas was 
relevant to the problem of voting discrimination, and 
Congress was therefore entitled to infer a significant 
danger of the evil in the few remaining States and polit-
ical subdivisions covered by § 4 (b) of the Act. No more 
was required to justify the application to these areas of 
Congress' express powers under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Cf. North American Co. v. S. E. C., 327 U.S. 686, 
710-711; Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 582-583. 
To be specific, the new remedies of the Act are imposed 
on three States-Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi-
in which federal courts have repeatedly found substantial . 
voting discrimination.88 Section 4 (b) of the Act also 
embraces two other States-Georgia and South Caro-
lina-plus large portions of a third State-North Caro-
lina-for which there was more fragmentary evidence of 
3 7 For Congress' defense of the formula, see House Report 13-14; 
Senate Report 13-14. 
38 House Report 12; Senate Report 9-10. 
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recent voting discrimination mainly adduced by the Jus-
tice Department and the Civil Rights Commission.39 All 
of these areas were appropriately subjected to the new 
remedies. In identifying past evils, Congress obviously 
may avail itself of information from any probative source. 
See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 
241, 252--253; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S., at 
299- 301. 
The areas listed above, for which there was evidence of 
actual voting discrimination, share two characteristics in-
corporated by Congress into the coverage formula: the 
use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a vot-
ing rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 
points below the national average. Tests and devices are 
relevant to voting discrimination because of their long 
history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting 
rate is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread 
disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of 
actual voters. Accordingly, the coverage formula is r·a-
tional in both practice and theory. It was therefore per-
missible to impose the new remedies on the few remain-
ing States and political subdivisions covered by the 
formula, at least in the absence of proof tha.t they have 
been free of substantial voting discrimination in recent 
years. Congress is clearly not bound by the rules· relat-
ing to statutory presumptions in criminal cases when it 
prescribes civil remedies against other organs of govern- ' 
ment under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Compare 
United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136; Tot v. United 
States, 319 U. S. 463. 
) It is irrelevant that the coverage formula excludes cer-
/ tain localities which do not employ voting tests and 
39 Georgia : House Hearings 160-176; Senate Hearings 1182-1184, 
1237, 1253, 1300-1301, 133&-1345. North Carolina : Senate Hear-
ings 27-28, 39, 246-248. South Carolina : House Hearings 114-116, 
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devices but for which there is evidence of voting dis-
crimination by other means. Congress had learned that 
widespread and persistent discrimination in voting dur-
ing recent years has typically entailed the misuse of tests 
and devices, and this was the evil for which the new 
remedies were specifically designed!0 At the same time, 
through §§ 3, 6 (a), and 13 (b) of the Act, Congress 
strengthened existing remedies for voting discrimination . 
in other areas of the country. Legislation need not deal 
with all phases of a problem in the same way, so long as 
the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical ex-
perience. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 
483, 488-489; Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 
U. S. 106. There are no States or political subdivisions 
exempted from coverage under § 4 (b) in which the rec-
ord reveals recent racial discrimination involving tests 
and devices. This fact confirms the rationality of the 
formula. 
/Acknowledging.the.~ibilit:r, of overbr~th, the Act 
provides for termmatwn oT spec1ai statutory coverage at /t\ 
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which {_V 
the danger of s~~~~~r:g ...... discn ·na 'on has ~ot 
materialized during the precedmg-}ive years. Despite 
South Carolina's argument to the contrary, Congress 
might appropriately limit litigation under this provision 
to a single court in the District of Columbia, pursuant 
to its constitutional power under Art. III, § 1, to "ordain 
and establish" inferior federal tribunals. See Bowles v. 
Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 510-512; Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U. S. 414, 427-431; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 
U. S. 182. At the present time, contractual claims 
against the United St;!tes for more than $10,000 must be 
brought in the Court of Claims, and, until 1962, the Dis-
trict of Columbia was the sole venue of suits against 
40 House Hearings 7fr77; Senate Hearings 241-243 . 
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federal officers officially residing in the Nation's Cap-
ital.41 We have discovered no suggestion that Congress 
exceeded constitutional bounds in imposing these limita-
tions on litigation against the Federal Government, and 
the Act is no less reasonable in this respect. 
South Carolina contends that these termination pro-
cedures are .a nullity because they impose an impossible 
burden of proof u~n States and political subdivisions 
entitled to relief.~s the Attorney General pointed out 
during hearings on the Act, however, an area need do no 
more than submit affidavits from votingofficials, as-
serting that they have not been guilty of racial discrimi-
n~through the use of tests and devices ~uring the past 
five years, and then refute whatever evidence to the 
contrary may be adduced by the Federal Government.42 
Section 4 (d) further assures that an area need not dis-
prove each isolated instance of voting discrimination in 
order to obtain relief in the termination proceedings. 
The burden of proof is therefore quite bearable, particu-
larly since the relevant facts relating to the conduct of 
1 voting officials are peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
\ States and political subdivisions themselves. See United 
I States v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 
\
256, n. 5; cf. S. E. C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 
' 119, 126. 
' The Act bars direct judicial review of the findings by 
the Attorney General and the Director of the Census 
which trigger application of the coverage formula.· We 
reject the claim by Alabama as amicus curiae that this 
provision is invalid because it allows the new remedies of 
41 Regarding claims against the United StatP.s, see 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 1491, 1346 (a) (1964 ed.). Concerning suits against federal offi-
cers, see Stroud v. Benson, 254 F. 2d 448; H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.; 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1391 (e) (1964 ed.); 2 Moore, Federal Practice,- 4.29 (1964 ed.). 
·J 2 House Hearings 92-93; Senate Hearings 26-27. 
DOS 
MEM6:RANDtJM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: October 11, 1979 
RE: No. 78-1840, eity - of - Rome · v; · United · States 
The following outline, closely related to what we discussed 
earlier today, argues that in order to avoid constitutional 
infirmities, § 4 of the Voting Rights Act must be read to permit 
bailout suits by subdivisions of states covered by the Act. 
As this Court acknowledged in South - Carolina - v; - Katzenbach, 
the coverage of the Voting Rights Act might be challenged on 
overbreadth grounds because it is insensitive to "various local 
conditions that have nothing to do with racial discrimination," and 
also "excludes certain localities which do not employ voting tests 
and devices but for which there is evidence of voting discrimination 
by other means." 383 u.s. at 329, 330-331. Thus the coverage 
formula could be characterized as both overinclusive and 
underinclusive. The South ·- earol ina Court upheld the legislation, 
however, because the coverage formula 1) has "some basis in practical 
experience" and 2) the "possibility of overbreadth" is reduced by the 
bailout provisions of § 4. 
The bailout option must therefore be seen as central to the 
·' 
~ .. ·~ 
2. 
constitutionality of the Act. This view flows from the belief that 
Section S's gross intrusion on the self-determination of local 
governments cannot be justified in the absence of some particularized 
conclusion that the local government has abused its independence in 
the past by indulging in voting discrimination. The Voting Rights 
Act establishes a presumption of such discrimination for States and 
subdivisions meeting certain criteria. This presumption, in the 
words of the Sooth --earol ina Court, "shift [ s] the advantage of time 
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." Id. 
at 328. But the presumption is subject to challenge in a bailout 
suit. Without such an option, local governments can be stripped of 
their sovereign prerogatives even though they have never 
discriminated. I would argue that in our federal system, Congress 
can usurp the lawmaking functions of political subdivisions only to 
vindicate a constitutional value of comparable magnitude that it has 
been proved that the political subdivision cannot or will not 
protect. As a matter of administrative necessity, Congress may shift 
the burden of going forward and force the locality to prove its 
innocence in a bail out suit. But Congress may not destroy the 
subdivision's independence without some opportunity for the 
subdivision to vindicate its own policies and establish its 
integrity. It is important to note the District Court's express 
finding in this case that "no literacy test or other device has been 
employed in Rome as a prerequisite to voter registration during the 
past seventeen years." Juris. St. at Sb. 
The District Court's construction of § 4, which coincides 
with that offered by Congress in its 1965 Committee reports, bars the 
3. 
City of Rome from bailing out until the entire State of Georgia 
including 159 counties -- can bail out. And Georgia cannot bail out 
unless it can establish that at no time in the last 17 years did the 
state or - any:subdivision use a discriminatory voting test or device. 
There have only been five successful bailout suits in history. Four 
were by individual subdivisions located in states that were not 
covered by the Act: Wake - eoonty; - N;ear; - v; - 5nited - States, Civ. No. 
1198-66 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 1967); Elmoyte ·· eoonty; -; Ida.ho ·· v; -- 5nited 
States, Civ. No. 320-66 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1966); and Apac!'le - eqonty; 
Ariz; ·- v; ·- tJnited ·~ states, 256 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966); Alaska - v; 
5nited - States, Civ. No. 2122-71 (D.D.C. July 2, 1972). I see little 
justification for allowing bailout suits by such counties while 
denying them for counties in states covered by § [ 5. In either 
situation, the county may be blameless of voting discrimination. 
Although it might be argued that a county in a § 5 state is more 
likely to be pressured to discriminate, such a county may have 
already resisted such pressure in the past, before the Voting Riqhts 
Act was passed, when the pressure was 1 ikely much greater. Of the 
states covered under the Act, only Alaska (as covered under the 1970 
extension) has bailed out. ~laska · v; - 5ryiteq · states, Civ. No. 101-66 
(D.D.C. Aug. 17, 1966), And the physical difficulties of proving no-
discrimination in Alaska in 1966 are readily distinguishable from 
such an undertaking in Georgia in 1979. (I have not yet acquired 
copies of the unreported decisions, so my comments on them are 
incomplete.) Thus the argument must contend that the bailout option 
is simply not a realistic alternative in this situation. 
The construction of § 4 proposed in this argument is 
4. 
entirely consistent with the interpretation of the Act in Sheffield, 
where politicial subdivisions that do not register voters were found 
to be subject to preclearance requirements. That opinion emphasized 
that "State" as used in §§ 4 and 5 of the Act means the State and all 
of its political subdivisions. Mechanical application of that view 
to the statutory language in this case supports the outcome proposed 
by this argument. The remaining two arguments of the District Court 
are not persuasive. Permitting local governments to bail out would 
only shift the flood of litigation from the Attorney General's office 
to the District Court; and I would question whether many localities 
would have sufficient incentive to int iate such a suit. And the 
District Court's fear that a bailed-out subdivision would be subject 
to informal pressures from state officials to adopt d iscr imina tory 
practices seems paranoid at best. 
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Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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opinion. 
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RJEVIJEW & OUTLOOK 
,, 
' Defending the Constitution 
'.(he Supreme Court this week lim-
ited .some applications of the Voting 
Rights Acts, raising predictable howls 
that it is abandoning civil rights. The 
truth is to the contrary. The Court has 
movt>d against a threat to American 
polihcal vitality, and enhanced the 
pre~fige of civil rights Jaws, by repu-
diatjng an overbearing judicial and 
bureaucratic perversion of their . in-
tent.·· 
Under color of the Voting Rights 
Act ~f 1965, and even . more so of its · 
197S1 extension, the Justice Depart-me* Civil Rights Division has been 
tryi~g to redraw the local form of gov-
ermpent throughout the South and 
Southwest. This activity has been far 
mm~e widespread than even the series 
of private suits and lower court deci-
sio~~ now overturned by the Supreme 
Court's Mobile decision on Tuesday. 
I,ry the name of preventing plots to 
disenfranchise black and Hispanic vot-
ers;~ the Voting Rights Acts have re-
quired local governments in these re-
gions to obtain '·preclearance" from 
the Justice Department for· such rou-
tine:: actions a.S land annexations. In 
case after case, "Justice" has used 
this ·leverage to freeze elections and 
. fo~e a switch from at-large voting to 
single-member districts. Its aim .was 
no longer to guarantee equality in use 
of the ballot; but to produce equality 
of r_esult. The Voting Rights Acts had 
bee~ transformed into an affirmative 
actiOn employment program for. mi· 
nority candidates. 
The Supreme Court has spoken 
aga\nst the worst abuse of this author-
ity.: ~beit in the divided voice that is 
becoming its trademark. In the deci-
sion. in City of Mobile, Alabama v. 
Bolden, the court overturned lower 
court directives to scrap the city's 
three·member at-large commission 
go\iernment in favor of a mayor and 
single-member-district City Council. 
Thts drastic change had been ordered 
wirpout any proof that the commission 
sys}em, . a standard feature of many 
small cities, was deliberately installed 
to keep blacks out of government. AI· 
though no blacks had won in Mobile's 
at-large elections, the Court emphati-
cally rejected the notion, attributed to 
Justice Thurgood Marshall "that ev-
ery 'political group,' or at least every 
such group that is in the minority, has 
a federal constitutional right to elect 
candidates in proportion to its num-
bers." Wrote Justice Stewart, "The 
Equal Protection Clause . . . does not 
require proportional representation." 
This decision cuts the ground from 
Wlder Justice Department policy that 
has so far forced City Council restruc-
turing in three of the nation's 10 larg-
est cities and patalyzed local policies 
in hundreds more, and for flimsier 
reasons than in Mobile. But the Court 
refused to end this business alto-
gether. A simultaneous decision, in 
City of Rome, Georgia v. United 
States, upheld the 1975 Voting Rights 
Act and its preclearance provision. 
Justice Marshall, who this time wrote 
the majority opinion, stated it didn't 
matter that the act intruded on "state 
sovereignty"; "principles uf federal-
ism that might otherwise be an obsta-
cle to congressional authority," he 
wrote, "are necessarily overridden by 
the power to enforce the Civil War 
Amendments 'by appropriate legisla-
tion.· " 
Justice Marshall is right, of course, 
both in history and practice when the 
issue is guaranteeing to blacks and 
other minorities their Fifteenth 
Amendment right to vote. The growth 
of the black suffrage since 1965 has 
brought enormously beneficial change 
to Southern politics. But the law has 
been perverted from this original no-
ble purpose to a carte blanche for fed-
eral tinkering with local governments. 
The Justice Department and lower 
federal courts have consistently mis-
read local politics and would be sur-
prised by the new constellations their 
intervention has produced. By limiting 
the most arbitrary of these actions, 
the Supreme Court gives some relief 
to our valued but much harassed sys-
tem of local government. But the 
Court will also enhance the prestige of 
the Voting Rights law when it is 
turned against genuine abuses. . 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term "State'' 
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political sub-
divisions thereof that control eiection processes, and that those· 
subdivisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act 
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. 
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala-
bama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court 
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term 
"State'; in § 4 (a) when it comes to an action to "bail out" 
from the preclearance requirement. Because this decision not 
only conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as 
to the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent. 
I 
Although my dissent is based on statutory and constitu-
tional grounds, the need to examine closely the Court's treat-
ment of the Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the 
facts of this case. Rome is a city of about 30,000, and 15% of 
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types 
of local action. First, in 1966 the Georgia Assembly estab-
lished a majority vote requirement with runoff elections for 
the City Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced 
the number of election wards from nine to three. Under the 
new arrangement, three city commissioners and two members 
of the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for 
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numbered posts.1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com~ 
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in 
this case. The annexations are alleged to have diluted the 
black vote in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters, 
but 9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely un-
populated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 
the additional white voters in the annexed lands had caused a 
net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate.2 
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of 
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of 
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed 
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter 
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in 
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting 
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The 
court observed that white officials have encouraged bla~ks to 
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to politi-
cal candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for 
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the 
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters). 
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern-
ment, the court stated that the "white elected officials of 
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black 
community," and actively seek black political support.8 !d., 
1 As part of the package of revisionR, the A8sembly increased the Board 
of Education from five to six membrrs, eased voter registration require-
ments, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp. 
221, 224 (DC 1979). 
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since 
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975 
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were 
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823 
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in 
1978. See Brief for United States, at 38, n. 26. 
3 The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to 
upgrade some black neighborhoods," has subsidized the transit system 
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of 
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome 
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can 
probably determine the outcome of many if not most con-
tests." Ibid. 
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve 
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The 
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations 
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of 
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many res-
ervations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a 
black candidate running under the challenged election rules 
commanded three times the share of votes that the black 
community holds, while nine of the annexations at issue were 
of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting when 
they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider whether this 
Court should reverse the District Court's ruling on the evi-
dence as clearly erroneous. Rather, I cite the contradictions 
and apparent inconsistencies in the factual aspects of the hold-
ing below because they highlight how far the courts, including 
this Court, have departed from the original understanding of 
the Act's purpose and meaning. Against this background, I 
address the substantive questions posed by this case. 
II 
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political 
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations 
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the 
District Court of the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court 
finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used 
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action 
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. The District 
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern-
ment. 472 F. Supp., at 225. 
'l 
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Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand~ 
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political 
life. See p. 3, supra. These findings demonstrate that the 
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout 
proviSIOn. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long 
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may 
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of 
federal authorities.4 
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, 
·and holds that no subdivision may bailout so long as its 
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can 
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we 
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout 
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers 
back to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests ( 1) "in 
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (2) "in any 
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." 5 
4 Section 5 permits two methods of preclearance. A local government 
may ask the District Court of the District of ColumhirL for a rnling that 
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the At-
tornry General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c (1976). The administrative procedure is used almost exclusively, 
since it takes less time. 
5 Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part: 
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is 
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be 
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because 
of his failure to comply with any test or device in any state with respect 
to which the determ·ination.s have been made unde1· the first two se~ 
tences of subdivision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision 
with 1·espect to tvhirh such determinations have been made as a sepm·ate 
unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or sub-
division against the United States has determined that no such test or 
device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing with 
the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote 
on account of race or color .... " 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (1976) (em-
phasis supplied) . 
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b), 
this case concerns the first category in that definition.6 Thus 
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibi-
tion of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b). 
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this 
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to dis-
criminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban 
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any con-
trol over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language 
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court con-
tinued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. 
Consequently, in States covered by the Act all changes in local 
voting rules and regulations must now be reviewed by federal 
authorities. I d., at 126-127. 
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the 
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the 
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the lan-
guage does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus 
has construed the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one mean-
ing in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied 
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the 
statute to irrationality. 
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the 
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by 
§ 4 (b), and those of covered local governments that are lo-
cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight sub-
divisions in the latter group have bailed out from the pre-
clearance obligation in six separate actions.7 Yet the only 
6 Under § 4 (b), a State or political subdivision is subject to the Act if 
the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible popu-
lation voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General 
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the 
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trig-
ger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 1973b (b), 1973c ( 1976). 
7 Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States, C. A. 
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difference between those governments and the city of Rome 
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to 
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification 
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bailout but 
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when 
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bail-
out criteria. 
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does 
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. The argu-
ment nevertheless faHs, according to the Court's opinion, be-
cause congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 states that bailout should not be available to a sub-
division if the State in which it is located is covered by the 
Act. Ante, at-. It is elementary that where the language 
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to 
look at its legislative history. We resort to legislative rna-
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry, 
McKinley and Otem Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC 
July 30, 1976) (three coun1ies); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake 
County, North Camlina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23, 
1967) (one county); Elm01·e County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No. 
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Co-
conino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966) 
(three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972, 
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but 
the bailout order was rescinded two yC'ars later after a District Court 
found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby 
violating the Act. New Y O?"k v. United States, C. A. No. 24-19-71 
(DC Jan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (1974) (referring to Torres v. 
Sachs, C. A. No . 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973)). 
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston 
County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), and three 
were dismisRed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners, 
El Paso County. Colorado v. United States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC 
Nov. 8, 1977); Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v. United States, 
C. A. No. 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969)). 
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terials only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its 
face. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1948); United States 
v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee 
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning 
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disre-
garded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.'' 
Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning 
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivi-
sions that exercise control over elections. Accordingly, there 
is no basis for the majority's reliance on congressional state-
ments that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If 
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same 
language must also relieve that burden when the city can 
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict require .. 
ments for bailout. 
III 
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con-
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a) 
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to 
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both in-
trudes impermissibly on the prerogatives of state and local 
governments and abridges the voting rights of all citizens in 
States covered under the Act. Under § 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, Congress may impose such constitutional depri-
vations only if it is acting to remedy violations of voting 
rights. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 
327-328 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 667 
(1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the District 
Court finding that Rome has not discriminated against the 
voting rights of blacks, there is no authority under the Fif-
teenth Amendment for continuing those deprivations until the 
entire State of Georgia satisfies the bailout standards of 
§ 4 (a). 
• ! 
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When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exer-
cise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclear-
ance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns. 
!d., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield, 
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant 
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion).8 
That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys 
local control of the means of self-government, one of the cen-
tral values of our polity.9 Unless the federa.l structure pro-
vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own 
democratic procedures, the right of each community to deter-
mine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Con-
8 Other Justices have expressed the same concern. E. g., South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (Black, J., concurring and dis;;:enting); 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., concurring a.nd dissenting); .see also Georgia v. United States, 
411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976), 
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority 
and power from their respective States," their integrity, like that of the 
States, is protected by the principles of federalism. 
1l The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state 
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.); 
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.); L011site1· v. Northampton County Board of Elec-
tions, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959). 
This Court has emphasized the import.ance in a democratic society of 
preserving local control of local matters. Sec Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
'U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would de-
prive the people of control of schools through their elected representa-
tives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum 
on public housing project "ensures that all the people of a community 
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures ... 
and to lower tax revenues"). Preservation of local control, naturally 
enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments. 
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n. 8, 426 U. S., at 855; 
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911). 
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stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individ-
ual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered 
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the 
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting 
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to 
chart policy. 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not 
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual 
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a pro-
phylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court em-
phasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be 
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress 
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evi-
dence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of 
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new 
remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage 
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those juris-
dictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposi-
tion of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the 
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been 
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." !d., 
at 330.10 
10 The Court found important confirmation of the rationality of the 
coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of "recent racial 
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions ex-
empted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331. 
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary 
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that 
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the dis-
criminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their 
rare." I d., at 122. See id., at 146 (Douglas, J .); id., at 216, and n. 94 
(Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); 
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That history supported temporary suspension 
of those few literacy tests that were still in use, see id., at 147 (Douglas, 
J.), without providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, preclea.rance 
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The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized, 
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be 
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination did not in 
fact continue or materialize during the prescribed period. 
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act 
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at 
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which 
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not 
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined pe-
riod]." !d., at 331. 
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an 
unusual sense, the point is c1ear. So long as the bailout option 
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting 
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing 
preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without 
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclear-
ance becomes acute. 
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not 
have direct control over their city's voting practices until 
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's 
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word 
"State" in § 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that 
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and 
every one of its subdivisions meets those criteria. This out-
come makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to the 
errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single sub-
division.11 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has 
involves a broad restraint on all state and local voting pra<'tices, regard-
less of whether they have been, or even could be, used to disrriminate. 
11 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Court's position dictates this absurd result 
by insisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of pre--
clearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would 
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State 
which could not bailout due to the failings of a single subdivision. A 
more rational approach would treat the states and local governments 
independently for purposes of bailout. If subdivisions in Georgia were 
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succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.12 
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous 
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, 
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions, 
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's 
approximately five million people and 877 local governments.13 
Thus, the consequence of today's ruling is to seal off the con-· 
stitutionally necessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act. 
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption 
against voting changes by certain state and local govern-
ments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments 
meeting § 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can 
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may 
free to seek bailout on their own , then a bailout action by the State 
could properly focus on the State's voting policies. Then, if Georgia 
were entitled to bailout, preclearance would continue to apply to sub-
divisions that by their own noncompliance remained subject to the Act. 
Of course, the situation would be different if, overtly or covertly, the 
State had contributed to the subdivision's failure to comply. 
12 Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966); 
.Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's 
1971 suit was prompted by the rccoverage of the State under the Act in 
the 1970 extension. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-established 
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit. 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78--0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipu-
lated dismissal of action). 
One other State-Virginia-has attempted to bailout under § 4 (a). 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. U·nited States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC 
1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virginia did not 
satisfy § 4 (a) because a state literacy test administered in some localities 
between 1963 and 1965 was found to be discriminatory in the context of 
the inferior education offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties 
before that period. 
1 3 The Solicitor General states that in Georgia there arc 159 counties, 530 
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every 
voting change, no matter how irrelevant it might be to discrimination in 
voting. Brief of Unted States, Appendix, at 1a. 
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be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as 
action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fif. 
teenth Amendment. But if bailout is not available to govern-
ments like the city of Rome, the statute oversteps those lim-
its. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
District Court. 
IV 
The Court today offers several "practical" bases for its new 
interpretation of§ 4 (a). Ante, at-. Although my statu-
tory and constitutional analyses are independent of these con. 
siderations, it is informative to scrutinize this aspect of the 
Court's opinion. Far from demonstrating that the Court's 
tortured approach is necessary to the effective implementa-
tion of the Voting Rights Act, these considerations accent the 
makeweight nature of the Court's analysis. 
First, the Court argues that if bailout were available to the 
city of Rome, the "advantage of time and inertia," South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U. S., at 328, would be 
shifted away from the victims of voting discrimination. Ante, 
at -. But a bailout suit must be brought by the local gov-
, ernment in the District Court of the District of Columbia, and 
in that action the plaintiff bears the burden of showing its 
compliance with the criteria in § 4 (a). The subdivision re-
mains subject to the Act while a bailout suit is pending. 
Realistically, for the local government there is no advantage 
of time and inertia in this scheme. 
Second, the Court notes that over 7,000 subdivisions cur-
rently are required to preclear voting changes. Bailout suits 
by a small percentage of those subdivisions, the Court insists, 
would swamp the District Court for the District of Columbia. 
Ante, at -. In view of the acknowledged difficulties that 
confront a local government in seeking bailout in the District 
of Columbia, it is by no means self-evident that the "flood-
gates" perceived by the Court would ever open. Such suits, 
involving substantial expense as well as uncertainty, would 
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not likely be initiated unless there were a substantial likeli-
hood of success. Moreover, the Court's argument ignores the 
procedures of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attor-
ney General not to contest bailout if he finds that the state 
or local government has not used a discriminatory test or 
device over the preceding 17 years.14 In fact, the Attorney 
General consented to bailout in the nine actions under § 4 (a) 
that have succeeded, while only three bailout suits have gone 
to trial.15 Thus the Department of Justice, not the courts, 
would shoulder much of the added burden that might arise 
from recognizing a bailout right for governments like the city 
of Rome. That burden could hardly be more onerous than 
the Attorney General's present responsibility for preclearing 
all voting changes by 7,000 subdivisions. In the first six 
months of 1979 over 3,200 such voting changes were submitted 
to the Attorney General, a rate of more than 25 per working 
day.1o 
14 The statute provides 
" If the Attorney General determines that he has no reason to believe 
that any such test or device has been used during the seventeen years 
preceding the filing of [a bailout] action ... he shall consent to the 
entry of such judgment." 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (a). 
15 In addition to this case, the other bailout actions that have been tried 
were Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States, supra n. 7, and 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, supra n. 13. Three actions 
under § 4 (a) have been dismissed by stipulution of the parties, and in 
one-the New York City case-bailout was granted and then rescinded 
without a trial. See n. 7, supra. 
16 Letter to Joseph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney 
General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice (Aug. 3, 
1979), reprinted in Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at 1c. These astonishing 
figures compare unfavorably with those cited by MR. Jus•rrcE STEVENS in 
his Sheffield dissent, where he questioned the efficacy of the Attorney 
General's review of preclearance requests that were then arriving at the 
rate of only four a day. 435 U. S., at 147-148, and nn. 8, 10. See 
Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200--201 (PowELL, J., concurring). It 
hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Justice Department-
much less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judg-
.... 
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Third, the majority theorizes-wholly without justification 
in the record-that discrimination-minded state officials would 
pressure a bailed-out local government to adopt discriminatory 
voting policies. Ante, at -. There is simply no basis for 
such speculation in fact or theory. Rome's eligibility for bail-
out demonstrates that if state pressures to discriminate exist, 
they can be resisted. Moreover, if the unlikely event imagined 
by the Court were to occur, there are ample remedies for 
such discrimination under both the Act and the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
v 
If there were any reason to believe that today's decision 
would protect the voting rights of minorities in any way, per-
haps this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends 
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court 
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has 
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite 
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the 
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such 
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local govern .. 
ment in a State covered by the Act to meet the Act's require-
ments diligently. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth 
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights 
Act could have intended that result. 
ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus, 
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions 
and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of the Federal 
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Mu. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term "State" 
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political sub-
divisions that control election processes, and that those sub-
divisions are subject to the requirement in ~ 5 of the Act 
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. 
United States v Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala-
bama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court 
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term 
"State'' when it comes to an act1011 to "bail out" from the 
preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only 
conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as to 
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent. 
I 
Although I dissent ou statutory and constitutional grounds, 
the need to exami11e closely the Court's treatment of the 
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this 
case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15%, of 
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types 
of local actwn affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia' 
Assembly established a maJority vote requirement for the City 
Commission and the Board of Educatwn, aud reduced the 
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new 
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of 
the Board of EducatioJ.l ar<.' chosen from each ward for num~ · 
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bered posts. 1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com-
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in 
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote 
111 Rome by disproportiOnately adding white voters. But 
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopu-
lated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the 
additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a 
net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate.2 
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of 
the three-judge District Court m this case and its findings of 
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed 
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter 
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in 
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting 
m Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The 
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to 
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to politi-
cal candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for 
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the 
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters). 
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern-
ment, the court stated that the "white elected officials of 
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black 
commumty,'' and actively seek black political support.8 !d., 
1 As part of the package of revisions, the A~:;embly increasrd the Board 
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration rrquire-
ments, and :;hli'trd registratiOn responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp. 
·~21, 224 (DC 1Y79). 
2 The t>tatistH·s on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since 
the 1978 populatiOn of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975 
votrr registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were 
black in 1975, that. percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823 
white voters and mne black voter:; who lived m the annexed areas m 
1978. See Brief for Umted States, at 38, n. 26. 
3 The District Court al~o noted that the ctty has "made an effort to 
upgradP some black netghborhood~." lw~ subsidtzrd the transit system 
..... 
78-1840-DISSENT 
CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES 
at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome 
''the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can 
probably determine the outcome of many if not most con-
-tests." Ibid. 
Despite these findings, tHe District Court refused to approve 
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The 
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations 
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of 
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many res-
ervations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a 
black candidate running under the challenged election rules 
commanded three times the share of votes that the black 
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue 
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting 
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider 
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies 
of the holding below because they highlight how far the 
courts, including this Court, have departed from the original 
understanding of the Act's purpose and meaning. Again this 
backgTound, I address the substantive questions posed by this 
casP. 
u 
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political 
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations 
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court 
finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used 
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action 
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. The District 
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of 
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern-. 
ment. 472 F . Supp., at 22/'i, · -
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Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand~ 
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political 
life. See pp. 2-3, supra.. These findings demonstrate that the 
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout 
provisiOn. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long 
as Georgia is covered by ~ 5 Of the Act, the city of Rome may 
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of 
federal authorities.4 
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, 
and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its 
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can 
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we 
have interpreted them before. · Section 4 (a) makes bailout 
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers 
ba.ck to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in 
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any 
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." 5 
4 Section 5 permit;;; two mrthods of preclearance. A local government 
may ask the District Court of the Distnct of Columbia. for a ruling that 
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the At-
torney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c. Thr administrative procedure ts ttsrd amost Pxclusively, since 
it takrs lffis time. 
5 Section 4 (a) provides in relrvant part : 
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is 
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be 
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because 
of his failure io comply with any test or device in any State with respect 
to which the determinations have been rnaae under the first two sen-
tences of subclivision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision 
with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate 
uuit, nnless the Umtcd State~ Distnct Court for the District of Columbia 
1n an actwn for a declaratory judgment bronght by such State o1· sub-
division against the United States has determined that no such test or 
device hu~ been u~ed durwg thr ::;eventt>eu years preceding the filing of the 
action wtth the purpo~e or wtth the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote ou ll,Ccount of racP or color. " 42 U S C. ~ 1973b (a) (em~ · 
pbasis . :>upplied). 
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Because the en tire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b), 
this case concerus the first category in that definition.0 Thus 
the crucial lauguage here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibi-
tion of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b). 
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this 
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to dis-
criminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban 
on tests and devices to all political subdivisious with any con-
trol over voting. 435 U. S .. at 120. Since the same language 
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court con-
tinued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. 
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes 
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the 
Act. ld., at 126-127. 
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the 
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the 
bailout context. however. the Court today finds that the lan-
guage does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus 
construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one mean-
ing in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied 
i11 another context. Such a protean construction reduces the 
statute to irrationality. 
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the 
rights of localities like Rome, which are iu States covered by 
§ 4 (b). aml those of covered local governments that are lo-
cated in States not covered by the Act. Tweuty-eight sub-
divisiolJS in the latter group have bailed out from the pre-
clearance obligation in six separate actions.7 Yet the only 
6 UmlPr § 4 (b), a State or politieal HulxllVI::non i~ subJect to thr Act If 
the Din>etor of tilP C'en.sus findH that lf'sS than 50% or tlw Pligible popu-
ln1ion voted in lhc l:u.;t pre,;identi:ll Plectwn, and the Attorney General 
dPtPrmineH that a di,;criminatory "t<•st or cfpvice" wa.s maintained in the 
jnri.sdictwn in 1964. Tho;;e cf('(prmination::;, which arP unrPviewable, trig-
ger the application or the prccl<•arance rPqlllrement of § 5. 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 1973b (b) , 1973c. 
7 Counties of Choctaw aud l\IcCurtain, Oklahornu v. United Statel!, C. A. 
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difference between those governments and the city of Rome 
is that the State in which ,Rome is located is itself subject to 
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification 
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but 
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when 
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bail-
out criteria. 
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does 
not deny, the "abstract force'' of this argument. The argu-
ment uevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, be-
eause congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a sub-
division located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at - -. 
It is elementary that where the langauge of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look at its legisla-
tive history. We resort to legislative materials only when 
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two countiefl); New Mexico, Cun·y, 
McKinley and Otem Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC 
July 30, 1976) (tlm·e countiPs) ; Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2125 (DC Sept . 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations") ; Wake 
Couuty, North Carolina v. Umted States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23, 
19l'i7) (one county); Elmore County, idaho v. United States, C. A. No 
:3:20-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Co-
con·ino Counties. Arizona v. Unitecl States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966) 
(thrt>e countit>s). ThrPc counties in N ew York City bailed out in 1972, • 
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but 
the bailout order was rescinded l wo yE-an; later after a D1strict Court. 
found that the StatP had conducted elections in English only, thereby' r ', 
violating the Act. New York v. Untted States, C. A. No. 2419- 71 (DC 
.lan. liS, 1974), aff'd, 4Hl U.S. 888 (1974) (ref(•rring to Torres v. Sachs, 
C A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY SPpt. 27, 197:3)) . 
Bailout wa:o demed m one actwn mvolvmg a loeal subd1viswn, Gaston 
County, North Carolina v. United States, 895 U. S. 285 (1969) , and three 
werf' di:>missed by sllpnlalwn of the p:uhes, Board of Commtssioners, 
El Paso County, Colorado v. United States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC 
Nov. S, HJ77) ; Yuba County, CaLifonna v. Umted States, C. A. No. 75-
2170 (DC May 25, 1976) ; Nash Co,unty, North Carolina v. UnztPd States~ 
(' A No 1702-(16 (DC Sept. 26 , 1969) ). 
.. 
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the congressional mandate is unclear on its face. Ex parte 
Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v. Oregon, 
366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee reports 
in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning of 
ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded 
if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute." Good-
·ing v. United States, 416 U.S. 430,468 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting) . 
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning 
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivi-
sions that exercise control over elections. Accordingly, there 
i.s no basis for the majority's reliance on congressional state-
ments that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If 
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same 
section must also relieve that burden when the city can 
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict require-
ments for bailout. 
III 
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con-
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a) 
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to 
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both in-
trudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and 
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered 
under the Act. Under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Con-
gress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is 
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301. 327-328 (1966); 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 ( 1966) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome 
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the 
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing 
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies. 
~he bailout standards of ~ 4 (a) 
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When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exer-
cise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclear-
ance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns. 
ld., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield, 
the statute's "encroachment 011 state sovereignty is significant 
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion).8 
That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys 
local control of the means of self-government, one of the cen-
tral values of our polity.9 Unless the federal structure pro-
vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own 
democratic procedures, the right of each community to deter-
mine its owu course within the boundaries marked by the Con-
8 Other Justiceti have expre:;~ed the same concern. E. g., South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (Black, J., concurring and di~entmg) ; 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969) 
(Harlan, J ., concurring and discenting); see also Georgia v. United States, 
411 U. S. 526, 545 (Hl73) (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
In National League of Cities v. Usery , 426 U.S. R33, 856, n. 20 (1976), 
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority 
and power from their re,;pective States," their mtegrity, like that of the 
States, 1s protected by the principles of federalism. 
9 The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state 
aud local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.); 
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.); Lassiter v. Northampton Co·unty Board of Elec-
tions, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) . 
This Court has emphasized the 1mportance in a democratic society of 
preserving locul control of Jocul matters. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would de-
prive the people of control of schools through their elrcted representa-
tives" ) ; James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum 
on public housing project "ensure!:! that all the people of a community 
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditureH ... 
and to lower tax revenue,;"). Preservation of local control, naturally 
enough, wvolves protecting the mtegrity of state and local governments. 
See National League of Cities v. Use1'y , supra n. 8, 426 U. S., at 855;: 
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U S. 559, 565 (1911) 
.. 
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stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individ-
ual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered 
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the 
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting 
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to 
chart policy. 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not 
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual 
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a pro-
phylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court em-
phasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be 
imposed only ill response to some harm. When Congress 
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evi-
dence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of 
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new 
remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage 
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those juris-
dictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposi-
tion of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the 
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been 
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." I d., 
at 330.10 
10 The Court found important confirmation of the rationality of the 
coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of "recent racial 
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions ex-
empted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331. 
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary 
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 
supm n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that 
the congressional action was ju:stified by the "long history of the dis-
criminatory use of literacy test:; to disfranchise voters on account of their 
ral'e." !d., -at 122. See td .. at 146 (Douglas, J.); td., at 216, and n. 94 
(Harlan, .J.) ; td., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MAHSHALL, JJ.); 
id ., at 284 (STEWAH'l', J .) . That history supported temporary suspension 
of tho:se few literacy tests still in use, see id., at 147 (Dongas, J .) , with-
·(lllt providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, preclearance involve~· 
78-1840-DISSENT 
10 CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized, 
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be 
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact 
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period. 
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act 
provides for termiuatiou of special statutory coverage at 
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which 
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not 
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined pe-
riod].'' I d., at 331. 
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an 
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option 
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting 
Rights Act may overreach congressio11al powers by imposing 
preclearance ou a nondiscriminating governmellt. Without 
bailout, the problem of constitutioual authority for preclear-
ance becomes acute. 
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not 
have direct control over their city's voting practices until 
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's 
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word 
"State" in § 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that 
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and 
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This 
outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to 
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single sub-
division.11 Since the statute was e11acted, only one State has 
a broad restraint on all stat(' and lof•al votmg practice~. regardl!'l:is of 
whether they haw been. or evrn could be, u~rd to di;:cnminate. 
11 Tr. of Om! Arg. 38. The Court's po~ition dirtatr;: th1s rccentric rl'sult 
by insisting that ;;ubdivi:sionK in covered State:" ran be rrlirved of pre-
clearancE' only whPn thPir Sta1t• bail:,; out. In m~' view thiR alHo would 
cast l:'erions doubt on thE' Ad 'R constitutionality as u,pplied to any State 
which could not bail out dur to the failing::; of a ;;inglp Hubdivi;:ion . A 
rational approach would treat t hr states and lora! govrrnm!'nt;; mde-
pendt>ntly for purpo,;e" of bailout. If ;mbdivi;.;ions m Georgia were free 
.. 
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succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.12 
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous 
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, 
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions, 
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's 
approximately five million people a.nd 877local governments.13 
Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutio11ally nec-
cessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act. 
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption 
against voting changes by certain state and local govern-
ments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments 
meeting § 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can 
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may 
to ~:;eek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could 
properly focus on the State's voting policieH. Th!'n, if Georgia were 
entitled to bail out, preclearance would cont.inue to apply to Hubdivisions 
that by their own noncompliance met thE> coveragr critE>ria of § 4 (6) . 
Of course, the :situation would bE> differ!'nt if the State had contributed, 
overtly or covertly, to the :subdivision's failure to comply. 
12 Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966); 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's 
1971 suit wa~ prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in 
the 1970 exten~:;ion. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-eHtablished 
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit. 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-04R4 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipu-
lated disnnssal of action). 
One other Sta.te-Virgmia-lu.tH <Lttemped to bail out under § 4 (a) . 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC 
1974), aff'd, 420 U. S. HOI (1975). The court held that Virginia did not 
satiHfy § 4 (a) bcca uPe a. state li terucy te:st admimsterE>d m some localities 
between 1963 und 1965 was discriminatory in the context of the inferior 
educatiOn offered to Virgima blaeks in certain rural countieH before that 
penod. 
13 The Sohc1tor General :statt-s that Ororgu1 ha" 159 counties, 530 
municipalities, and 188 other :subdiviHions that now must preclear every 
voting change, no matter how irrPlevant the chang<> might be to di:serimi"' 
rtation in voting. Bmf of UnitE>d StatE's, Appmdix, at, la, 
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be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as 
action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fif~ 
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome 
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For 
these reasons, I would reverse the · judgment of the District 
Court. 
IV 
The Court today offers several "practical" bases for its new 
interpretation of§ 4 (a). Ante, at-. Although my statu~ 
tory and constitutional analyses are independent of these con-
siderations, it is informative to scrutinize this aspect of the 
Court's opinion. Far from demonstrating that the Court's 
tortured approach is necessary to the effective implementa-
tion of the Voting Rights Act, these considerations accent the 
makeweight nature of the Court's analysis. 
First, the Court argues that if bailout were available to the 
city of Rome, the "advantage of time and inertia," South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U. S., at 328, would be 
shifted away from the victims of voting discrimination. Ante, 
at -. But a bailout suit must be brought by the local gov-
ernment in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and 
in that action the plaintiff bears the burden of showing its 
compliance with the criteria in § 4 (a). The subdivision re-
mains subject to the Act while a bailout suit is pending. 
Realistically, for the local government there is no advantage 
of time and inertia in this scheme. 
Second, the Court notes that over 7,000 subdivisions cur-
rently are required to preclear voting changes. Bailout suits 
by a small percentage of those subdivisions, the Court insists, 
would swamp the District Court for the District of Columbia. 
Ante, at - - . In view of the acknowledged difficulties that 
confront a local government in seeking bailout in the District 
of Columbia, it is by no means self-evident that the "flood-
~ates" perceived by the Court would ever open. Such suits, 
involving substantial expense as well as uncertainty, would 
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·not likely be initiated unless there were a substantial likeli-
hood of success. Moreover, the Court's argument ignores the 
procedures of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attor-
ney General not to contest bailout if he finds that the state 
or local government has not used a discriminatory test or 
device over the preceding 17 years.11 In fact, the Attorney 
General conse11ted to bailout in the nine actions under § 4 (a) 
that have succeeded, while only three bailout suits have gone 
to trial.' 5 Thus the Department of Justice, not the courts, 
would shoulder much of the added burden that might arise 
from recognizing a bailout right for governments like the city 
of Rome. That burden could hardly be more onerous than 
the Attorney General's present responsibility for preclearing 
all voting changes in 7,000 subdivisions. In the first six 
months of 1979 over 3,200 such voting changes were submitted 
to the Attorney General, a. rate of more than 25 per working 
day. 16 
14 The statute provides 
"If the Attorney General determines that he has no rea::;on to believe 
that any such te::;t or device has been u;;ed during the seventePn years 
preceding the filing of [a bailout] action .. . , he shall consent to the 
entry of ;;urh judgment." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). 
1 5 In addition to thi;; rase, the other bailout actions that have been tried 
were Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States, supra 11. 7, and 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, supra n. 13. Three actions 
under § 4 (a) havp been dismis;;ed by stipulation of the partieH, and in 
one--the New York City ca:;e--bailout was granted and then rescinded 
without a trial. See n. 7, supra. 
IG Letter to Jmseph W. Dorn from DrewS. Day~; III, Assistant Attorney 
General, Civil Right8 Division, U. S. Department of Justice (Aug. 3, 
1979), 1·eprinted in Brief for Petitioner::;, App. C, at 1c. These astoniHhing 
figure::; compare unfavorably with those cited by MR .• Ju::;·rrcE S'I'EVENs in 
his Sheffield dis;;ent , where he que::;tioned the efficacy of the Attorney 
Grneral'::; review of preclearance reque;;ts that then w<>re arrtving at the 
rate of only four a day. 435 U. S., at 147-148, and nn . 8, 10. See 
Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200--201 (PowF;LL, J ., concurring). It 
hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Ju;;tice Department-
much le::;;; the Attorney Qpneral-could make a thoughtful, personal Jndg-. 
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Third, the ml'j>jority theorizes-wholly without justification 
in the record-that discrimination-minded state officials would 
pressure a bailed-out local government to adopt discriminatory 
voting policies. Ante, at -. There is simply no basis in 
fact or theory for such speculation. Rome's eligibility for bail-
out demonstrates that any state pressures to discriminate can 
be resisted. Moreover, if the unlikely event imagined by tl~e 
Court were to occur, there are ample remedies for such dis-
crimination undyr both the Act and the Fifteenth Amendment. 
\ 
v 
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would 
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way perhaps 
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends 
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court 
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has 
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite 
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the 
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such 
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local govern-
ment in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the 
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth 
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights 
Act could have intended that result. 
ment on an average of twenty-jive preclearance petitions per day. Thus, 
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions 
and States are finajly judged by unidentifiable employees of the federal 
b~reaucracy, usuall~ without anything resembling an evidentiary hearin~. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFlJ 
No. 78- 1840 
City of Rome et al., Appellants,] On t!EP~l from the United 
v. States District Court for 
United States et al. the District of Columbia .. 
[December -, Hl79] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 and its applicability to electoral changes 
and annexations made by the city of Rome, Ga. 
I 
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by appellant 
city of Rome, a municipality in north western Georgia, under 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1971 et seq. 
(1976) . In 1970 the city had a population of 30,759, the 
racial composition of which was 76.6% white and 23.4% 
Negro. The voting-age population in 1970 was 79.4o/o white 
and 20.6% Negro. 
The governmental structure of the city is established by a 
charter e11acted in 1918 by the General Assembly of Georgia. 
Before the amendmeuts at issue in this case, Rome's city 
charter provided for a nine-member city commission and a 
five-member board of education to be elected concurrently on 
an at-large basis by a plurality of the vote. The city was 
divided into nine wards, with one city commissioner from 
each ward to be chosen in the citywide election. There was 
no residency requirement for board of education candidates. 
In 1966, the General Assembly of Georgia passed several 
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toral provisions of the city's charter. 'l'hese e11actmen ts 
altered the Rome electoral scheme in the following ways: 
(1) the number of wards was reduced from nine to three; 
(2) each of the nine commissioners would henceforth be 
elected to one of three numbered posts established within each 
ward; 
(3) each commissioner would be elected by majority rather 
than plurality vote, and if no candidate for a particular posi-
tion received a majority, a runoff election would be held 
between the two candidates who had received the largest 
number of votes: 
(4) the terms of the three commissioners from each war·d 
would be staggered; 
( 5) the board of education was expanded from five to six 
members; 
(6) each board member would be elected at-large, by 
majority vote, for one of two numbered posts created iu each 
of the three wards, with runoff procedures identical to those 
applicable to city commission elections; 
(7) board members would be required to reside in the 
wards from which they were elected; 
(8) the terms of the two members from each ward would be 
staggered. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires pre-
clearance by the Attorney Genera] or the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia of auy change in a 
"standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," 42 
U. S. C. § 1973c (1976), made after November 1, 1974, by 
jurisdictions that fall within the coverage formula set forth 
in § 4 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. ~ 1973b (b) (1976). In 
1965, the Attorney General designated Georgia a covered 
jurisdiction under the Act, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897, and the 
municipalities of that State must therefore comply with the 
preclearance procedure, United States v. Board of Comrnib'-
s·iorrers of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U, R 110 ( 1978) , · 
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It is not disputed that. the 1966 changes in Rome's electoral 
system were within the purview of the Act. E. g., Allen v. 
State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) . Nonetheless, 
the city failed to seek preclearance for them. In addition, the 
city did not seek preclearance for 60 annexations made 
between November 1, 1964, and February 10, 1975, even 
though required to do so because an annexation constitutes a 
change in a "standard, practice or procedure with respect to 
voting" under tlw Act., Perk1:ns v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 
(1971) . 
In June 1974, the city did submit one annexation to the 
Attorney General for preclearance. The Attorney General 
discovered that other annexations had occurred. and, in 
response to his inquiries, the city submitted all the annexa-
tions and the 1966 electoral changes for preclearance. The 
Attorney General declined to preclear the provisions for 
majority vote, numbered posts, and staggered terms for city 
commission anu board of education elections, as well as the 
residency requirement for board elections. He concluded that 
.in a city such as Rome, in which the population is predomi-
nately white and racial bloc voting has Leen common, these 
electoral changes would deprive Negro voters of the oppor-
tunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The Attorney 
General also refused to preclear 13 of the 60 annexatious in 
question. He found that the disapproved annexations either 
contamed predominately wh1te populations of significant size 
or were near· predominately white areas and were zoned for 
residential subdivisiOn development. Considering these fac-
tors in light of Rome's at-large electoral scheme and history 
of racial block voting, he determined that the city had not 
carried its burden of proving that the aunexations would not 
dilute the Negro vote. 
In response to the city's motion for reconsideratiou, the 
Attorney General agreed to clear the 13 annexations for school 
board electiOns, He reasoned that his disapproval of the 1965 
\, . 
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voting changes had resurrected the pre-existing electoral 
scheme and that the revivified scheme passed muster under the 
Act. At the same time, he refused to clear the annexations 
for city commission elections because, in his view, the resi~ 
dency requirement for city commission contained in the pre~ 
existing electoral procedures could have a discriminatory 
effect. 
The city and two of its officials then filed this action, seek~ 
ing relief from the Act based on a variety of claims. A three-
judge court, convened pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973b (a) 
and 1973c (1976), rejected- the city's arguments and granted 
summary JUdgment for the defendants. 472 F. Supp. 221 
(DC 1979). We noted probable jurisdiCtion, 443 U, S. -
(1979) , and uow affirm. 
II 
We must first address the appellants1 assertion that, for 
two reasons, t.h1s Court may avoid reaching the merits of this 
action, 
A 
The appellants contend that the city may exempt itself 
from the coverage of the Act. To _evaluate this argument, we 
must examine the provisions of the Act in some detail. 
Section 5 of the Act requires that a covered jurisdiction that 
wishes to enact any "standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on 
November 1, Hl64," must seek preclearance from the Attorney 
General or the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia. 42 U, S. C. § 1973c ( 1976) 1 Section 4 (a) of 
1 In Its entiret), § 5 provide~ · 
' 'Whenever a State or politwal subdivisiOn witl1 respect to which the 
prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of th1s title based upon de~ 
tPrminations made under the fir~1. ~entence of ~ectwn 1973 (b) of this 
title are l11 effect shall enact or sePk to adrmm~ter any voting qualifi-
cation or prerequiRite to votmg, or staJ!dard, practice, or procedure 
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the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (1976),2 provides that the 
preclearance requirement of § 5 is applicable to "any State" 
that the Attorney General has determined qualifies under the 
her 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect 
to which the prohibitions ~et forth in ~,;ectwn 1973b (a.) of this tit le 
based upon determinations madP under the second sentence o( section 
1973b (b) of this title are in effrc1 shall enact or serk to administer 
any voting qualification or prerequisite to votmg, or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure with respect to voting different from thnt in force 
or effect ou November 1, 1968, or wlwnever a. State or political subdivi-
sion with respect to whiCh the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) 
of this title based upon delerminntions made under the third sentence 
of section 1973b (b) of th1s title are 111 effect :ohall enact or seek to 
admimster any votmg qualificatiOn or prerequisite to voting, or stand-
ard, practice, or procedure with respect fo votmg diffen·nt. from tlult 
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may 
institute an aciwn in the United Stn.tes District. Court. for t.he District 
of Columbm for a dC'claratory JUdgment that such qualification, pre-
requisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose 
and will not have the effect of denying or almdgmg the l'ight to vote 
on account of race or color, or in contravcutwn of th(' guarantees seL 
forth in sectwn 1973b (f) (2) of tl1is title, and unlrss and until the court 
enters such Judgment no pen.;on shall be d('nied the nght fo vote for 
failure to comply w1th such qualification, prerequisite, standard, prac-
tice, or procedure : Provided, 'I11at such qualification, prereqm~ite, stand-
ard, practice, or proc£>dure may be £>nforced without such proceeding 
if the qualification, prer£>qni:oit£>, standard, practice. or procedure has 
been submitted by the chi£>f legal officer or other appropriate official 
of such State or snbdiviswn to the Attorney General and the Attorney 
General has not. interposed an objectiOn within sixty days after such 
submission, or upon good cause :-;hown, to facilitate an expedit£>cl ap- ' 
proval within 8ixty days after such :-;ubmission, the Attornt'Y General 
has affirmatively mdicated that. ~nch objPction will not be made. Nei-· 
thor an affirmative mdication by tht> At.tomey General thaL no objec-
tion will be made, nor the Attorney G£>neral's failure to obje<'t, nor a 
declaratory judgment. entered undPr thP ~ectwn shall bar a. ~ubsequcnt 
action to enJoin enforcement of such qualificatiOn, JW<'requi;,;ite, stand-
ard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirma-
tively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day pe-
ri:od followmg receipt of a. submi~siou, the At.torney General mcly reserve-
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coverage formula of § 4 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b) (1973),8 
and to "any political subdivision with respect to which such 
determinations have been made as a separate unit." As we 
the right to re-examine the submissiOn if additional information comes 
to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which 
would otherwise reqmre objection in accordance with this section. Any 
action under this ;:;ectwn shall be heard and determined by a court · of 
three judges in accordancf' w1th the provisions of sectwn 22154 of Title 
28 and any appeal shall he to the Supreme Court." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c 
(1976). 
2 In its entirrty, § 4 (a) provides: 
"To assure that the right of citizens of the Umted States to vote is 
not drnwd or abndged on account of race or color, or in contravention 
of the guarantPcs srt forth in Rubsection (f) (2) of thu; sechon, no citizen 
shall be demrd t·he righL to vote in nny Federal, State, or local election 
because of hi~ failure to comply with any test or device in any State 
with respect !o which the dctermmationR have beeu made under the 
fir::;t two senteJJC<!t> of sub~ect10n (h) of this sect.Jon or m any political 
subdivision with respect to which such determinations ha.ve been made 
as a separat.e nnit, unles::; the United States District Court. for the Di::;~ 
triet of Columhw, in an achon for a declaratory judgment brought by 
such State or subdivision against, the United States ha:> determined that 
no such test or device has been used during the seventeen years pre~ 
ceding the filing of the action for lhe purpose or with the effect of deny-
ing or abndging the ngh! to vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantee~ set forth in subsection (f) (2) of this 
section . Provided, That no such declaratory judgment shnll il:lsue with 
respect to any plamtiff for a period of ::;evente<,n years after the entry 
of a final Judgment of nny court of the United Statrs, other than the 
denial of a declaratory judgment under this section, whether entered 
prior to or after the ennctrrwnt of tlus subchapter, determining that 
denials or abridgments of the right to vote on account. of race or color, 
or in contravention of the guarantees HeL forth m i:iub::;ection (f) (2) of 
this section through the u:>e of ;;nch tests or devices ha,ve oecurr·ed any-
where m the terntory of such plamtiff. No Citizen ;;hall be denied the 
right to vote m any Fedt>ral, State, or local electiOn because of his fail-
nre to comply with any tei:it or device in any 8tate with rrspect to wluch 
the determina twn::; have been made under the third Hmtence of sub-
section (b) of this 8cct10n or m any politiCal ~ubdivi~ion with respect 
t o whwh such determinatwns have been made as a separate umt, unless . 
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have noted, the city of Rome comes within the preclearance 
requirement because it is a politwal unit m a covered jurisdic-
tion, the State of Georgia. United States v. Board of Com-
missioners of Sheffield, Alabama., 435 U. S. 110 (1978). 
the United States District Court for the District of Colnmbia in an action 
for a declaratory Judgment brought by such State or subdivision against 
the United State1:1 has determined that. no such test or device has been 
used during the ten year8 ]Jrecedmg the fi ling of the action for the 
purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote 
on accoum of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in .,;ubsrctwn (f) (2) of this ;,;ectwn : Provided, That no such 
declaratory jndgment, shaJl i~sue w1th respect t,o any plaintiff for a 
period of ten year::; after tl1e entry of a final judgment of any court of 
the United States, other l han the denial of a declnratory judgment under 
this section, whether entered prior to or after the enactment of this 
paragraph, determining that. denials or abndgments of the right to vote 
on account of mce or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth 
in subsectiOn (f) (2) of this section through the use of teAts or devices 
have occurred anywhere m the territory of such plmnt1ff. 
An a.ct10n pursuant to thi;; sU:bsectwn ::;hall be heard and determined 
by a court of three judgrii m accordancr with the proviswns of section 
2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall he to the Supreme Court. The 
court shall retain JUrisdiction of any actiou pursuant to this subsection 
for five years after judgment and sha11 reopen the action upon motion 
of the Attorney General allegmg that a test or deviCe has been used 
for the purpose or w1th the effect of denying or abndging the nght to 
vote on account, of race or color, or in coutrnventwn of the guarantees 
set forth in sub~echon U) (2) of this secnon . 
If the Attorney General determme:s that he ha::; no rruson to believe 
that any such teRt or devwc has been used durmg the seventeen years 
preceding the filing of an action under tlw firl-'t sentencr of this sub-
section for the JJilflJOI:le or with the effect or denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the 
guarantees ~et forth in subsection (f) (2) of tln~ sectwn, he shall con-
sent to the entry of such judgment. 
1f the Attorney General determmes that he ha:; no reason to believe· 
that any such test or dev1ce has bern usrd during the ten year::; preced-
ing the tlling of an actwn under the second sentence of this subsection 
for the purpose or with the effect of denymg or abndglng the right to 
vote on account o( race or color, or 111 eontravenhou of the guarantee~ 
... 
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Section 4 (a) also provides, however, a procedure for exemp-
tion from the Act. This so-called "bail out" provision allows 
a covered jurisdiction to escape the .. prcc1earance r<>quircment 
of § 5 by bringing a declaratory JUdgment action before a 
three-Judge panel of the V nited States District Court for the 
set forth m :;uh:;ertion (f) (2) of this Hl'rtJOn, hr shall ronHent. to the entry 
of ::;uch judgment.'' 4:2 U. S. C.§ H)73 (b)(n) (l!:l7fi) . 
:J In its entirety, § 4 (b) provtder, 
"The provision;; of :,;ub~:~ection (a) of this sectwn shall apply in any 
State or m any political subchvunon of a state winch (1) the Attorney 
eletwral determine:-; maintamecl on November 1, 1964, any teRt or ci('VICe, 
ami with rr~pect to winch (2) the Dtreetor of the Cpn:-;us detenmnes 
that les::; than 50 prr centum of the per:-;ons of votm11: age re:;iding 
therem were rrgt::<trred on Nowmber 1, 1964, or that lr:;H than 50 per 
centum of such per:;ons votrd 111 tlw prr>'tclentwl election of Novrmber 
1964. On and after August 6, 1970, 111 additiOn to any Statr or political 
subdtvi::;JOn of a State detrrmined to ll<' subJrct to ~ubsrction (a) of this 
section pmsuant. to the prrvtous ~rntrncr, the provi~:~wm; of sub~rctwn 
(a) of thts 1:>Pct10n ;;hall apply m any State or any polthcal subdtvtSIOrt of 
a State whtch (i) t.Jw Attornry General drtrrnmw~ mamtauwd on No-
vembrr 1, 1968, :my t<>~t or device, and wtth r·espert to wluch (n) the 
I>irector of the Crnsus drtrrminrs that leks than 50 prr centum of the 
persons of voting age rr~iding then•in were rrgi::;tered on November 1, 
1968, or t.Jmt le;;s than 50 per centum of such persons votrd 111 thr presi-
den!Jal election of November 1068. On and aftc•r August G, 1975, in ad-
dttion to any State or pohtreal subdtvtflton of a St.atc detrrmined to be 
subject to subsrction (a) of tlu,; 8eetwn pur~uant to the previous two 
sentences, the provtHto!l~ of i:(Ub;;rction (a) of lht~ Hrctwn ~hall apply m 
any State or any polltical subdivt~JOn of a State wluch (t) the Attorney 
0eneral detrrmme,; mamtamrd on November 1, 1!:!72, any test or device, 
and with respect to whrrh (11) thr Dtrector of thr Crn::;u;;; detemunes 
that less than 50 per cPntnm of the cthzrn:; of votmg age were registered 
on November 1, 1!:!72, or that le:-;::; than 50 per centum of Huch pcr:-;ons 
voted m the Prektdl'ntta! elretwn of Novrmber 1!:!72. 
"A determmatwn or crrtttieation of the Attorney GruPral or of the 
Director of the Cl'nt<u,; under tlu::; ::;cction or under ~ectron 197:3d or 
1973k of thrs tttlr ,;hall not he reviewable Ill any court and shall be 
effective· upon puhhcat.wn m thP FPrlernl He!J:t~1cr." 42 ll S C § 19730. 
(b) (1976) • 
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District of Columbia and proving that no "test or device" 4 
has been used in the jurisdiction "during the seventeen years 
preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the 
effect of denyiug or abridging the right to vote on account of 
race or color.'' The District Court refused to allow the city to I 
"bail out'" of the Act's coverage, holding that the political 
units of a covered jurisdiction cannot independently bring a 
§ 4 (a) bailout action. We agree. 
In the terms of § 4 (a), the i~e tll[Q,S on whether the city 
is, for bailout purposes, either a "State with respect to which 
the determinations have been made under subsection (b) of 
this section" or a "political subdivision with respect to which 
such determinations have been made as a separate unit," the 
"determinations" in each instance being the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision whether the jurisdiction falls within the cover-
age formula of § 4 (b) On the face of the statute, the city 
fails to meet the definition for either term, since the coverage 
formula of ~ 4 (b) has never been applied to it. Rather, the 
city comes within the Act because it is part of a covered 
State. Under the plain language of the statute, then, it I 
appears that any bailout action to exempt the city must be 
fi~y, anQ_ seek~"@ o1, the State of Goorg_ia. 
The appellants seek to avoid this conclusion by relying on 
our decision in Un£ted States v. Board of Commissioners of 
Sheffield, Alabama, supra. That decision, however, did not 
even discuss the bailout process. In Sheffield, the Court held 
that when the Attorney General determines that a State falls 
within the coverage formula of § 4 (b), any political unit of 
4 Section 4 (e) of the Act provides: 
"The phrase ' test or device' shall mean any requirement that a person 
as a prerequisite for votmg or registration for votmg (1) demonstrate the 
ability to read, wnt.e, understand, or mterpret any matter, (2) d<'monstrate 
any educational achi<'vement or· his knowledge of any particular subject, 
(3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his quahfications by the 
voucher of registered voterio or members of any other class." 42 U S. c.' 
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the State must preclear new voting procedures under § 5 
regardless of whether the unit registers voters and therefore 
would otherwise come within the Act as a "political subdivi-
~ion." 5 In so holding, the Court necessarily determined that 
the scope of ~§ 4 (a) and 5 is "geographic" or "territorial," 
id., at 120, 126. and thus that, when an entire State is covered. 
it is irrelevant whether political units of it might otherwise 
come under § 5 as "political subdivisions.'' I d., at 126-129·. 
Shl}ffield, then, did not hold that cities slJJl.h. as Rome are 
~'political subdivisionS" nder §§ 4 and 5. Thus, our dedsion 
in that case is in no way inconsistent with our conclusion that, 
under the express statutory language. the city is uot a "politi-
cal subdivision'' for purposes of § 4 (a) "ba1l out.' ' 
Nor did Sheffield suggest that a municipality in a covered 
State is itself a "State'' for purposes of the § 4 (a) exemption 
procedure. Sheffield held that, based Oll the structure and 
purposes of the Act. the legislative history, and the contem-
poraneous interpretation of the Attorney GeneraL the ambi-
guities of ~ ~ 4 (a) and 5 should be resolved by holding that 
§ 5's preclearance requirement for electoral changes by a cov-
ered "State'' reached all such changes made by political units 
in that State. See id., at 117-118. By contrast, in this case 
the le islative history precludes an ar ument that § 4 (a)'s 
bai1_9ut proce~. made ava1 able to a covered "State," ~s 
also implicitly made available to political uni .in the State. 
The onumttee eport stated : 
"This opportunity to obtain exemption is afforded only 
to those States or to those subdivisions as to which the 
formula has been determined to apply as a separate unit; 
5 SectiOn 14 (c)(2) of the Ael providrs: 
"The term 'politi!'al subdivision' shall mean any county or parish, 
except that where registration for votiug Is not conducted under the 
supervision of a. county or puriHh, the ferm shall lnclnclc any other sub~ 
division oi a Stale which conduct~'! regi~tmtJon for votmg " 42 U S. C~ 
§ 19731 (c) (2) (1976 ) • 
, .. . . 
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subdivisions within a State which is covered by the for~ 
mula are not afforded the opportunity for separate exemp-
tion." H . R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 
(1965). 
The Senate Committee1s majority report is to the same effect~ 
awe are also of the view that an entire State covered by 
the test and device prohibition of section 4 must be able 
to lift the prohibition if any part of it is to be relieved 
from the requirements of section 4." S. Rep. No. 1621 
(Pt. 3) , 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 ( 1965)o 
See also id., at 21. Bound by this u11ambiguous congressional 
intent, we hold that the cit,y of Rom«:> may not use the bailout. 
procedure of § 4 (a) .6 
6 We also reject the appPllants ' argument that the majority vote, runoff' 
election, and numbered posts provisions of the c1ty's charter have already 
been precleared by the Attornry General because in 196S the State of 
Georgia submitted, and the Attorney General precleared, a comprehensive 
Municipal Elect~wn Code t11at is now Title 84A of the Codr of Georgia. 
Both the relevanL regulation,· 28 CFR § 51.10 (1978), and the decision 
of this Court require that. the jurisdictiOn 11 in some unambiguous and 
recordable manner ~ubmit any legislation or regula.tion in que8tion directly 
to the Attomey General wit11 a request for his considenttion pursuant 
to the Act, '' Allen v. State Boa1'd of Elections, ;393 U. S. 571, ·574 (1969) , 
and that the At1orney General be afforded an adequate opportunity to 
determine the purpose of the electoral changes and whether they will 
adversely affect, mmority voting in that jurisdJCtJOn, 8ee United States v. 
Boar·d of Cmnrnissioners of Sheffield, Alabama .. 485 U. S. 110, 137-188 
(1978) . Under this standard, the State's 1968 :;ubmission cannot be viewed 
as a subm1sSJOn of the city'R 1966 elf'ctoral changes, for , a<> the District 
Court noted, the State's submissiOn mformed the Attorney General only 
of "its decis10n to defer to local charters and ordmancE's regardmg rna. 
jority votmg, runoff elections, and numbered po:;;ts," and "d1d not .. : 
submit in an 'unambiguous and recordable manner ' all municipa.l char.ter 
provisions, as written in 1968 or as amended thereafter, regarding these 
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B 
The appellants next argue that its electoral changes have 
been precleared because of allegedly tardy action by the 
Attorney General. On May 24, 1976, the city asked the 
Attorney General to reconsider his refusal to preclear the 
electoral changes and the 13 annexations. On July 14, 1976, 
upon its own accord, the city submitted two additional affi-
davits. The Attorney General denied the motion to recon,~ 
sider on August 12, 1976. 
Section 5 of the Act provides that the Attorney General 
must interpose objections to origmal submissions within , 60 
days of their filing. ' If the Attorney General fails to make 
a timely objection, the voting practices submitted become 
fully enforceable. By regulation, the Attorney General has 
provided that requests for reconsideration shall also be decided 
within 60 days of their receipt. 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) (1978).8 
If in the present case the 60-clay period for reconsideration ls 
computed as running continuously from May 24, the date of 
the initial submission of the reconsideration motion, the period 
expired before the Attorney General made his August 12 
response. ln contrast, if the period is measured from July 14, 
the date the City supplemented its request, the Attorney Gen~ 
eral'g response wa.s timely. 
The timing provisions of both the Act and the regulations 
are silent on the effect of supplements to requests for recon-
sideration. We agree with the Attorney General that the 
'l See n . 1, supra. 
8 This regulatwn provide.;, : 
"When the Attorney General object:; to a snbrnith•d change affecting 
voting, and the ~ubmitting authority scekmg reconsidE'ration of ihe 
objection brings additwnal mformatwn to the attention of the Attorney 
General, the Attorney General shall decide withm 60 clay8 of receipt of a 
request for reconsJderatwn (provided that hE' shall have at. least 15 days 
following a conference held at the submitting authority's reqncHt) whether· 
to withdraw or lo r.ontmue hJR objection '' 28 C'FH § 51.3 (d) (1978) . 
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purposes of the Act and its implementing regulations would 
be furthered if the 60-day period provided by 28 CFR § 51.3 
(d) were interpreted to commence anew when additional infor-
mation is supplied by the submitting jurisdiction on its own 
accord. 
The logic of Georgia. v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973),. 
indicates that the Government's approach fully comports with 
the Act and regulations. In that case, the Court examined a 
regulation of the Attorney General, 28 CFR § 51.18 (a), that 
provided that § 5's mandatory 60-day period for consideration 
of original submissions is tolled whenever the Attorney Gen-
eral finds it necessary to request additional information from 
the submitting jurisdiction. Under the regulation, the 60-day 
period commences anew when the jurisdiction in question 
furnishes the requested information to the Attorney Gen-
eral. The Court upheld the regulation, holding that it was 
"wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act." I d., at 541. 
Georgia v. United States stands for the proposition that the 
purposes of the Act are furthered if, once all information 
relevant to a submission is placed before the Attorney General, 
the Attorney General is accorded the full 60-day period pro-
vided by law in which to make his "difficult and complex" 
decision, id., at 540. It follows, then, that when the submit-
ting jurisdiction deems its initial submission on a reconsidera-
tion motion to be inadequate and decides to supplement it, as 
the city of Rome did m the present case, the 60-day period 
under 28 CFR § 51.3d is commenced anew. A contrary ruling 
would mean that the Attorney General would, in some cases, 
be unable to give adequate consideration to materials sub-
mitted in piecemeal fashion. In such circumstances, the 
Attorney General might be able to respond only by denying 
the reconsideration motion. Such a result would run counter 
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penalize submitting jurisdictions that, have legitimate reasons 
to file supplementary materials.~ 
III 
The appellants raise five issues of law in support of their 
contentiou that the Act may Ilot properly be applied to the 
electoral changes and annexations disapproved by the Attor-
ney General. 
A 
The District Court found that the disapproved electoral 
changes and annexations had not been made for any dis-
criminatory purpose, but did have a discriminatory effect. 
The appellants argue that § 5 of the Act may not be read as 
prohibiting voting practices that have only a discriminatory 
effect. The appellants do not dispute that the plain language 
of § 5 commands that the Attorney General may clear a prac-
tice only if it "does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race or color.'' 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1976) (emphasis 
added). By describing the elements of discriminatory pur-
pose and effect in the conjunctive, Congress plainly intended 
that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discrimi-
natory purpose and effect are absent. Our decisions have con-
sistently interpreted § 5 in this fashion. Beer v. United 
States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976); City of Richmond v. United 
States, 422 U. S. 358, 372 (1975); Georgia v. United States, 
411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 
387, 388 (1971). Furthermore, Congress recognized that the 
Act prohibited both discriminatory purpose and effect when, 
in 1975, it extended the Act for another seven years. S. Rep. 
No. 94--295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-16 (1975); H. R. Rep. 
No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1975) . 
e Because of our resolution of thi:; is:;ue, we need not address the 
Government's contention that the 60-day period providrd by 28 CFR' 
§ 51.3 (d) is prrm1s:;ive rather than mandittory . 
•""'. 
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The appellants urge that we abandon this settled interpre-
tation because in their view § 5, to the extent that it prohibits 
voting changes that have only a discriminatory effect, is 
unconstitutional. Because the statutory meaning and con-
gressional intent are plain, however, we are required to reject 
the appellants' suggestion that we eugage in a saving construc-
tion and avoid the constitutional issues they raise. See, e. g., 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 499-501 
(1979); id., at 508-511 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Instead, 
we now turn to their constitutional contentions. 
B 
Congress passed the Act under the authority accorded it by 
the Fifteenth Amendment.10 The appellants contend that the 
Act is uncOI{stfhttional ~ecause it exceeds Congress' power to 
enforce that Amendment. They claim that§ 1 of the Amend-
ment prohibits only purposeful racial discrimination in voting, 
and that in enforcing that provision pursuant to § 2, Congress 
may not prohibit voting practices lacking discriminatory 
intent even if they are discriminatory in effect. For purposes 
of this case, we need not-and do not-decide whether § 1 of 
the Fifteenth Amendment reaches only voting practices that 
have a discriminatory purpose. We hold that, even if § 1 of 
the Amendment prohibits only purposeiul discrimination, the 
pri_or deci~ Court fore~ose any argument that Qon- ; 
gress may_pot, pu 2'; outlaw ~mg ..12~ctic~s that 
are discriminatory in efl'ect. 
~sking us to do nothing less than over-
rule our decision in South Carolina v Katzeribach, 383 U. S. 
--..... ----------
10 The Amendment providet:. • 
"Section 1. The right of cit1zeus of the Umted State~ to vote shall nol be 
denied or abridged by the United State~ or by any State or account of 
race, color, or prevwus conditwn of serv1tude. 
''Section 2. The Congress shall h~tve powrr to eiJforre this artier by appro-
priate leg:isla t10n."· 
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301 (1966), in which we upheld the constitutionality of the 
Act. The Court in that case observed that, after making 
an extensive investigation, Congress had determined that its 
earlier attempts to remedy the "insidious and pervasive evil" 
of racial discrimination in voting had failed because of "unre-
mitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution" in some 
parts of this country. Id., at 309. Case-by-case adjudication 
had proved too ponderous a method to remedy voting dis-
crimination, and, when it had produced favorable results, 
affected jurisdictions often "merely switched to discriminatory 
devices not covered by the federal decrees." ld., at 314. In 
response to tts determination that "sterner and more elaborate 
measures'' were necessary, id., at 309, Congress adopted the 
Act, a "complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas 
where voting discriminatiou has been most flagrant, '' id., at 
315. 
The Court then turned to the question whether the Fif-
teenth Amendment empowered Congress to impose the rigors 
of the Act upon the covered jurisdictions. The Court exam-
ined the interplay between the judicial remedy created by § 1 
of the Amendment and the legislative authority conferred 
by § 2 : 
uBy adding this authorization [in § 2] , the Framers 
indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible 
for implementing the rights created by § 1. 'It is the 
power of Congress which has beeu enlarged. Congress 
is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate 
legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the 
[Civil War] amendments fully effective.1 Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345. Accordingly, in addition to the 
courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate 
the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion in votiug." I d. , at 325-326 (emphasis ln original) . 
Congress' authority u11der § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,. 
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sary and Proper Clause, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 421 ( 1819) . This authority, as applied by longstanding 
precedent to congressional enforcement of the Civil War 
Amendments, is defined in these terms : 
" 'Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted 
to carry out the objects the l Civil War] amendments 
have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to 
the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons 
the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and 
the equal protection of the laws against State denial 
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the 
domain of congressional power. ' Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U. S. [339,] 345-346.' ' South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, at 327. 
Applying this standard, the Court held that the coverage for-
mula of § 4 (b), the ban on the use of literacy tests and related 
devices, the requirement that new voting rules must be 
precleared and must lack both discriminatory purpose and 
effect, and the use of federal examiners were all appropriate 
methods for Congress to use to enforce the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. !d., at 329-337. 
The Court's treatment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach of 
the Act's ban on literacy tests demonstrates that, under the 
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may prohibit voting practices 
tha.t have only a discriminatory effect. The Court had earlier 
held in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 
360 U. S. 45 (1959), that the use of a literacy test that was 
fair on its face and was not employed in a discriminatory 
fashion did not violate ~ 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. In 
upholding the Act's per se ban on such tests in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, the Court found no reason to overrule Lassiter. 
Instead, the Court recognized that the prohibition was an 
appropriate method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment 
because for many years most of the covered jurisdictions had 
irnposed &uch tests to, f!ffect, voting discrimination and the con-
,, 
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tinued use of even nondiscriminatory, fairly administered 
literacy tests would "freeze the effect" of past discrimination 
by allowing white illiterates to remain on the voting rolls while 
excluding illiterate Negroes. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. This holdiug makes clear that Con-
gress may, under the authority of § 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, prohibit state action that, though in itself not violative 
of § 1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. 
Other decisions of this Court also recognize Congress' broad 
power to enforce the Oivil War Amendments. In Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), the Court held that 
legislation enacted under authority of § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 11 would be upheld so long as the Court could 
find that the enactment "'is plainly adapted to [the] end'" 
of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and "is not prohib-
ited by but is consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the 
constitution,'" regardless of whether the practices outlawed 
by Congress in themselves violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. !d., at 651 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, 
at 421). The Court stated that, '' [ c] orrectly vit>wed, § 5 is a 
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to 
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legis-
lation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Ibid. Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court unanimously upheld a provi-
sion of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 315, imposing a five-year 11ationwide ban 
on literacy tests and similar requirements for registering to 
vote in state and federal elections. The Court concluded that 
Congress could rationally have determined that these provi-
sions were appropriate methods of attacking the perpetuation 
of earlier, purposeful racial discrimination, regardless of 
whether the practices they prohibited were discriminatory only 
H Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provJdE>t> that, " [t]he Con~ 
gres~ shall have power t,o enforce, by appropri11te lrgit>latlon, the provisions· 
of this arf.wl~." · 
'· 
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in efl'ect. See id., at 132-133 (opinion of Black, J.) ; id., at 
144-147 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id., at 216-217 (opinion of 
Harlan, J.); id., at 231-236 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and 
MARSHALL, JJ.); id., at 282-284 (opinion of STEWART, J ., 
joined by BURGER, C.-J., and BLACKMUN, J.).12 .. 
It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment 
Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves qo 
not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions 
attacking racial discrimination in voting are "appropriate," as 
that term is defined in M cCiilloch v. Maryland and Ex parte 
Virginia. In the present case, we hold that .tb,e...Act~l@l on 
electoral changes that are discriminator in effect is an appro-
priate method o )romotin the purposes of the Fifteenth 
A~, even if it is assume that § 1 of the Amenilment 
prohibits only intentional discrimination in voting. Congress 
could rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes 
by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional 
racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful 
discrimination/ 3 it was proper to prohibit changes that have 
a discriminatory impact. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, at 335; Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 216 (opinion of 
Harlan, J.). We find no reason, then, to disturb Congress' 
considered judgment that banning electoral changes that have 
a discriminatory impact is an effective method of preventing 
States from "'undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights recently 
12 There wns no opinion for the Court. in thit; ca:::;e . Mr. Justice Douglas 
expres~:;ed the virw that the legislation in queo;tion was authorized under 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 
144-147 (1970) . The other eight. Members of the Court believed that 
the Congre:ss had permis:::~ibly acted withlll the authority provided it by 
§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. ld., at 132-133 (opinion of Black, 
J.); ·id., at 216 (opmion of Harlan, .J.) ; id., at 232-2;34 (opinion of-
BHENNAN, WHITE, and lVIAH:::iHALL, .J.J.); id., at 283 (opin1on of STEWAH'l', 
J ., joined by THE CHIEF Jut:~•nm: and BLACKMUN, J.) . 
13 See South Car-olina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 , 335, and n . 47'· 
(1966) (citing H. R. Rep . No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Se:ss. , 10-11 (1965) i' 
S .. Rep. No. 162 (Pt.3),, 89tl~ Cong., M Seo;:::;., 8, 12 (1965)) . . 
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won' by Negroes." Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 140 
(1976) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 
8 (1969) ). 
c 
The appellants next assert that, even if the Fifteenth 
Amendment authorized Congress to enact the Voting Rights 
Act, that legislation violates princi,gles,.J.>f federalism articu-
lated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 
(1976). This contention necessarily supposes that National 
League of Cities signifies a retreat from our decision in South ~ 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, S'upra, where we rejected the argu-
ment that the Act "exceed[s] the powers of Congress and 
encroach [ es l on an area reserved to the States by the Con-
stitution," 383 U. S., at 323, and determined that, "[a]s 
against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use 
any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition 
of racial discrimination in voting," id., at 324. To the con-
trary, we find no inconsistency between these decisions. · 
In National League of Cities, the Court held that federal 
legislatiOn ~ng mirlTinum wages and hours could not 
constitutionally be extended to employees of state and local 
governments. The Court determined that the Commerce 
Clause did not provide Cougress the authority to enact legis-
lation "directly displac[ing] the States' freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions," 426 U. S., at 852, which, it held, included employer-
employee relationships m programs traditionally conducted 
by States, id., at 851-852. 
The decision in National Leag'ue of Cities was based solely 
on an assessmeut of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause, and we explicitly reserved the question "whether 
different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect inte-
gral operations of State governments by exercising authority 
granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as . .. 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." !d., at 852, n. 17" ·:The 
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answer to this question came four days later in Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). That case presented the issue 
whether, in spite of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress had 
the authority to bring the States as employers within the 
coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and to provide that successful plain-
tiffs could recover retroactive monetary relief. 'The Court 
held that this extension of Title VII was an appropriate 
method of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment : 
"[W] e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the 
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, . . . are 
necessarily limited by the enforcement rovisions of · 5 
of the Fourteenth mendment. In that section Congress 
is expresSly gran tea autfiOi:ity to enforce 'by appropriate 
legislation' the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limita-
tions on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant 
to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that 
js plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, 
it is exercising that authority under oue section of a con-
stitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own 
terms embody limitations on state authority." Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, supra, at 456, 
We agree with the court below that Fitzpatrick stands for 
the proposition that principles of federalism that might other-
wise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily 
overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amend-
ments "by appropriate legislatiou. '' Those Amendments 
were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power 
and an intrusion on state sovereignty. Applying this princi-
ple, we hold that Congress had the authority to regulate state 
and local voting through the provisions of the Voting Rights 
Act.14 N ational League of Cities, then, provides no reason to 
--------------------------------------------JI 
14 Tncleed, F1:t~patr-ick v. Bit~er, 427 U, S, 445 (1976), strongly suggested 
;;· 
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depart from our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenba,ch that 
"the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of 
state power," 383 U. S., at 325, and that the Act is "an 
appropriate means for carrying out Congress' constitutional 
responsibilities," id., at 308,15 
D vi--
The appellants contend in the alternative that, even the 
Act and its preclearance requirement were appropriate means 
of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment in 1965, they had out-
lived their usefulness by 1975, when Congress extended the 
Act for another seven years. We decline this invitation to 
overrule Congress' judgment that the 1975 extension was 
warranted. 
In considering the 1975 extension, Congress acknowledged 
that, largely as a result of the Act, Negro voter registration 
had improved dramatically since 1965. H. R. Rep. No. 94-
196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1975). Congress determined. however, 
that "a bleaker side of the picture yet exists. '' H. R. Rep. 
No. 94-196, supra, at 7; S. Rep. No. 94-295, supra, at 13. 
Significant disparity persisted between the percentages of 
whites and Negroes registered in at least several of the covered 
jurisdictions. In addition, though the number of Negro 
elected officials had increased since 1965, most held only rela-
tively minor positions, none held statewide office, and their 
this result by citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), 
as one of several cases sanctioning 
11intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War amendments, into the 
judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved 
to the States. The legislation considered in each case was grounded on 
the expansion of Congress' powers-with the correRponding diminution of 
state sovereignty-found to be intended by the Framers and made part of 
the Constitution upon the States' ratification of those Amendments, a 
phenomenon aptly described as a 'carving out' in Ex parte Virginia, [100 
U. S. 339, 346 (1880)] .'' Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra., at 455-456. 
15 See also Katzenbach v, Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 646-647 (1966). 
. .. 
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number in the state legislatures fell far short of being repre-
sentative of the number of Negroes residing in the covered 
jurisdictions. Congress concluded that, because minority 
political progress under the Act, though "undeniable," had 
been "modest and spotty," extension of the Act was warranted, 
H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, supra, at 7-11; S. Rep. No. 94-295, 
S'upra, at 11-19. 
Congress gave careful consideration to the propriety of 
readopting § 5's preclearance requirement. It first noted that 
"[i]n recent years the importance of this provision has become 
widely recognized as a means of promoting and preserving 
minority political gains in covered jurisdictions." H. R. Rep. 
No. 94-196, supra, at 8; S. Rep. No. 94-295, supra, at 15. "'" 
After examining information on the number aud types of sub-
missions made by covered jurisdictions and the number and 
nature of objections interposed by the Attorney General, Con-
gress not only determined that § 5 should be extended for 
another seven years, it gave that provision this ringing 
endorsement: 
"The recent objections entered by the Attorney Gen-
eral ... to Section 5 submissions clearly bespeak the con-
tinuing need for this preclearance mechanism. As regis-
tration and voting of minority citizens ·increases, other 
measures may be resorted to which would dilute increas-
ing minority voting strength. 
"The Committee is convinced that it is largely Sec-
tion 5 which has contributed to the gains thus far 
achieved in minority political participation, and it is like-
wise Seeton [sic] 5 which serves to insure that that 
progress not be destroyed through new procedures and 
techniques. Now is not the time to remove those pre-
clearance protections from such limited and fragile suc-
cess.' ' H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, supra, at 10-11. 
See also S. Rep. No. 94-295, supra, at 15- 19 .. 
•. • 
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It must not be forgotten that in 1965, 95 years after ratifica~ 
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment extended the right to vote 
to all citizens regardless of race or color, Congress found that 
racial discrimination in voting was an "insidious and pervasive 
evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our coun~ 
try through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Consti-
tution." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 309. In 
adopting the Voting Rights Act, Congress sought to remedy 
this century of obstruction by shifting "the advantage of time 
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." 
I d., at 328. Ten years later, Congress found that a seven-year 
extension of the Act was necessary to preserve the "limited 
and fragile" achievements of the Act and to promote further 
amelioration of voting discrimination. When viewed in this 
light, Congress' considered detennination that at least another 
seven years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter 
the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive votiHg discrimina-
tion is both unsurprising and unassailable. The extension of 
the Act, then, was plainly a constitutional method of enforcing 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 
E 
As their final constitutional challenge to the Act, 1.a the in-
dividual appellants argue that, because no elections have been 
held in Rome since 1974, their First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendment rights as private citizens of the city have been 
abridged. ln blaming the Act for this result, these appellants 
identify the wrong culprit. The Act does not restrict private 
political expression or prevent a covered jurisdiction from 
holding elections; rather, it simply provides that elections may 
be held either under electoral rules in effect on November 1, 
1964, or under rules adopted since that time that have been 
properly precleared. When the Attorney Gelleral refused to 
10 We do not re<~rh thr merits of thr appellant.~' argument that the Act 
violate~:> the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, since that issue is not justi-
ciable. See, e. g., Baker· v.. Carr,. 369 U. S. 186 (1962') . 
\ 
t!J ... ' 
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preclear the city's electoral changes, the city had the authority 
to conduct elections under its electoral scheme in effect on 
November 1, 1964. Indeed, the Attorney Genera.! offered 
to preclear any technical amendments to the city charter 
necessary to permjt election£ under the pre-existing scheme or 
a modification of that scheme consistent with . the Act. In 
these circumstances, the city's failure to hold elections can 
only be attributed to its own officials, and not to the operation 
·of the Act. 
IV 
Now that we have reaffirmed our holdings in South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach that the Act is "an appropriate means for 
carrying out Congress' constitutional responsibilities" and ·is 
"consonant with all ... J'>rovisions of the Constitution," 383 
U. S., at 308, we must address the appellants' contentions that 
the 1966 electoral changes and the annexations disapproved by 
the Attorney General do not, in fact, have a discriminatory 
effect. We are mindful that the District Court's findings of 
fact must be u·pheld unless they are clearly erroneous. 
A 
We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in 
finding that the city had failed to prove that the 1966 elec-
toral changes would not dilute the effectiveness of the Negro 
vote in Rome.17 The District Court determined that racial 
bl~g_ existing in J1ome. It found that the electoral 
changes from plurality-win to majority-win elections, num-
bered posts, and staggered terms, when combined with the 
presence of racial bloc voting, Rome's majority white popula-
tion, and at-large electoral system, would dilute Negro voting 
strength. The District Court recognized that, under the pre-
17 Under § 5, the city bears the burden of proving lack of discrimina~ 
tory purpose and effect. Bee1· v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 140-141 
(1976); Geor-gia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 538 (1973); South 
(JarolirW, v. l(atzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966) . 
' " 
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existing plurality-win system, a Negro candidate would have 
a fair opportunity to be elected by a plurality of the vote if 
white citizens split their votes among several white candidates 
and Negroes engage in "single-shot voting" in his favor. 18 
Tfhe 1966 change to the majority vote/runoff election scheme 
significantly decreased the opportunity for such a Negro can-
didate since, "even if he gained a plurality of votes in the 
·general election, [he] would still have to face the runner-up 
white candidate in a head-to-head runoff election in which, 
given bloc voting by race and a white majority. [he] would 
be at a severe disadvantage." City of Rome v. United States, 
472 F. Supp. 221, 244 (DC 1979) (footnotes omitted).10 
1s Single-shot voting l1as been dPscribed as follows: 
"Consider [a.] town of 600 whites and 400 blacks with an at-large elec-
tion to choose four council members. Each voter is nble to cnst four 
votes. Suppose there are eight white candidates, witl1 the votes of the· 
whites split among them approximately equally, and one black candidate, 
with all the blacks voting for him and no one else. The ref'ult is that 
each white candidate receives nbout 300 vot.cs nncl tho black cnnclidate 
receives 400 votes. The black has probably won a seat. This technique 
is called single-shot voting. Single-shot voting enables a minorit~r group 
to win some at-large. seats if it concentrates its vote behind a limited 
number of candidates and if tho vote of the majority is divided among a 
number of ca.ndidates." 
U . S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years 
After 206-207 . (1975). 
1'0 The District Court found that Rome's Negro citizens believed that a 
Negro will nevrr be elected ns long as the city's present electoral system 
remains in effect . City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 226 
(DC 1979) . Only four Negroes have ever sought elective office in Rome, 
and none of them wnR elected. The campaign of the Rev. Clyde Hill, 
who made the strongest showillg of the four, indicat('S both the presence 
of bloc voting in the city and the dilutive effect of the majority votE/ 
runoff C>!ection scheme adopted in 1966. The city's elections were operated 
under that schrme when Rev. Hill ran for the board of education in 1970. 
With strong support from t.lw Nrgro community, Rev. Hill ran again~t 
three wtute opponents and received 921 votes in the general election, while 
his opponents received 909, 407, and 143 vote;;;, respectively. Rev. Hillt 
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The District Court's further conclusion that the city had 
failed to prove that the numbered posts, staggered terms, and 
Board of Education residency provisions would not have the 
effect of forcing head-to-head contests between Negroes and 
whites and depriving Negroes of the opportunity to elect a 
candidate by single-shot voting, id., at 245, is likewise not 
clearly erroneous.20 The District Court's holdings regarding 
all of the 1966 electoral changes are consistent with our state-
ment in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976), that 
"the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting 
procedure changes would be made that would lead to retrogres-
sion in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral process." 
then, would have been rlectrd under the pre-1966 plurality-win voting 
scheme. Under the majority-win/ runoff election provisions a,dopted in 
1966, however, a runoff election was hE'ld, and the white candidate who 
was the runner-up in the general election defea.ted Rev. Hill by a vote 
of 1409-1142. 
2o In so holding, the District. Court relied on thi;; analy~is by the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights : 
"'There are a nurriber of voting rules which have the effect of frus-
trating single-shot voting. . . . [I]nstead of having onr race for four 
positions, there could be four race;:;, each for only one position. Thus for 
post no. 1 there might be one black candidate and one white, with the 
white winning. The situation would be the same for each post, or seat-
a black candidate would alwn~·s fn,ce n, white in a head-to-head contest 
and would not be able to win. There would be no opportunity for single-
shot voting. A black still might win if tlwre were more than one white 
candidate for a post, but this possibility would be eliminated if there was 
also a majority requirement. 
"' [Second,] each council member might. be required to live in a, separate 
district but with voting still at large. Thi~-ju:;t like numbered posts-
separate:;; one conte~t into :1 number of individual rontc~t 
"' [Third,1 the term:; of council member:;; might be staggered. If each 
membrr hal' a 4-year tenn and one mrmber is elected eaC'h year, then 
the opportunity for single-~hot voting will never ari:se.'" City of Rome v. 
United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 244, n. 95 (DC 1979) (quoting U. S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, supra n. 18, at 207-208) . 
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B 
The District Court also found that the city had failed 
to meet its burden of proving that the 13 disapproved 
annexations did not dilute the Negro vote in Rome. The 
city's argument that this finding is clearly erroneous is severely 
undermined by the fact that it failed to present any evidence 
shedding meaningful light on how the annexations affected the 
vote of Rome's Negro community. 
Because Rome's failure to preclear any of these annexa-
tions caused a delay iu federal review and placed the annexa-
tions before the District Court as a group, the court was 
correct iu concluding that the cumulative effect of the 13 
annexations must be examined from the perspective of the 
most current available population data. Unfortunately, the 
population data offered by the city was quite uninformative. 
The city did not present evidence on the current general popu-
lation and voting-age population of Rome, much less a break-
down of each population category by race. 21 Nor does the 
record reflect current information regarding the city's regis-
tered voters. The record does indicate the number of Negro 
and white registered voters 111 the city as of 1975, but it is 
unclear whether these figures included persons residing in the 
annexed areas in disputr. 
21 In City of Rtchmond ' · United States, 422 U . S. 35R (1975), and 
City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC' 1972) , sum-
martly aff'd, 410 U. S. 962 (1973), evidruce of thr racml rompos1tion of 
the general populatiOn wa::; used to asses,; the 1mpact of nnnexatwm; on the 
import<mce of the Negro votr in the commnmty. Tins mformntion, when 
coupled w1th datn on the racial compositwn of the commumty's voting-
age population, provide::; more probative rvidence m ::;uch <'H::iPH than does 
voter registratiOn data, which may peqwtuate the effect:< of prwr dls-
crnninatwn 111 the rrgiHtration of voter:<, EltJ v. Klahr, 40:~ l'. S. 108, 115, 
n. 7 (1971). Bunk~ v. Richardson, :384 U. S. n, ~)2-9:3 (1966), or reflect 
a belief among tlw Negro population that it cannot elect a candidate of 
its choice, d . n. 19, supra. Current voting-age population dahL are pro-
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Certain facts are clear, however. In February 1978, the 
most recent date for which any population data was compiled, 
2,58~ whites and only 52 Negroes resided in the disapproved 
annexed areas. Of these persons, 1,797 whites and only 24 
Negroes were of voting age, and 823 whites and only 9 Negroes 
were registered voters. We must assume that these persons 
moved to the annexed areas from outside the city, rather than 
from within the preannexation boundaries of the city, since 
the city, which bore the burden of proof, presented no evidence 
to the contrary. 
The District Court properly concluded that these annexa-
tions must be scrutinized under the Voting Rights Act. See 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 388-390 (1971). By 
substantially enlarging the city's number of white eligible 
voters without creating a corresponding increase in the number 
of Negroes, the annexations reduced the importance of the 
votes of Negro citizens who resided within the preannexa-
tion boundaries of the city. In these circumstances, the city 
bore the burden of proving that its electoral system "fairly 
reflects the strength of the Negro community as it exists after 
the annexation[s] .'' City of Richmond v. United States, 422 
U. S. 358, 371 (1975). The District Court's determination 
that the city failed to meet this burden of proof for city com-
mission elections was based on the presence of three vote-
dilutive factors: the at-large electoral system, the residency 
requirement for officeholders. and the high degree of racial 
bloc voting. Particularly in light of the inadequate evidence 
introduced by the city, this determination cannot be consid-
ered to be clearly erroneous. 
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term ustate" 
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political sub-
divisions that control election processes, and that those sub-
divisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act 
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. 
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala-
bama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court 
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term 
"State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the 
preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only 
conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as to 
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent. 
I 
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds, 
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the 
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this 
case. Ttl Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15o/o of 
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types 
of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia· 
Assembly established a majority vote requireme11t for the City 
Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the 
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new 
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of 
the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for num-
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bered posts.1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com-
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in 
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote 
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But 
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopu-
lated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the 
additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a 
net decline of 1% in the b1ack share of Rome's electorate.2 
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of 
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of 
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed 
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter 
registration dunng the past seventeen years," and that "in 
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting 
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The 
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to 
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to politi-
cal candidacy by b1acks, and that a recent black contender for 
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the 
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters). 
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern-
ment, the court stated that the "white elected officials of 
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black 
community/' and actively seek black political support.3 Id., 
1 As part of the package of revisions, the Assembly increast-d the Board 
of Education from five to six members, eased voter regi~tration require-
ments, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp. 
221, 224 (DC 1979) . 
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since 
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975 
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the c1ty's voters were 
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 82J 
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in 
1978. See Brief for United State~, at 38, n. 26. 
8 The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to 
upgrade some black neighborhoods," has subsidized the tran81t system 
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome 
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can 
probably determine the outcome of many if not most con-
tests." I bid. 
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve 
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The 
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations 
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of 
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many res-
ervations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a 
black candidate running under the challenged election rules 
commanded three times the share of votes that the black 
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue 
were of vacaut land and thus had no effect at all on voting 
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider 
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies 
of the holding below because they highlight how far the 
courts, including this Court, have departed from the original 
understanding of the Act's purpose and meaning. Again this 
background, I address the substantive questions posed by this 
case. 
II 
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political 
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations 
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court 
finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used 
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action 
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. The District 
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of 
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern· 
ment. 472 F. Supp., at 225. 
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Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand-
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political 
life. See pp. 2-3. supra. These findings demonstrate that the 
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout 
provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long 
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may 
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of 
federal authorities.4 
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, 
and holds that no subdivision may· bail out so long as its 
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can 
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we 
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout 
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers 
ba.ck to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in 
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any 
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." 5 
4 Section 5 permits two methods of preclearance. A local government 
may ask the District Court of the District of Columbia for a ruling that 
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the At-
torney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c. The admini~trntive procedure is 1l8Cd mno:>t cxclu~ivt>ly, since 
it takeR lrss time. 
5 Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part: 
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United Statrs to vote is 
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be 
denied the right to vole in any Fedeml, State, or local election because 
of his failure to comply with an~· trst or device ·in any State 1cith 1·espert 
to which the determinations have been made unde1· the fi1'st two sen-
tences of subdivision (b) of this section 01' in any political subdivision 
with 1·espect to which such determinations have been made as a sepamte 
unit, unless the Unitrd State;,; DiHtrict Court for the Dl:>trict of Columbia 
in an action for a dpc]aratory judgment brought by such State or sub-
division againo;t the United States has determined that no such test or 
device ha~ been UHed during the o;rventeen yrars precrding the filing of the 
action with lhl' purpo~e or with the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on nrcount of race or color .. .. " 42 U. S. C . § 1973b (a) (em-
phasis supplied) . 
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b), 
this case concerns the first category in that definition.0 Thus 
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibi-
tion of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b). 
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this 
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to dis-
criminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban 
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any con-
trol over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language 
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court con-
tinued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. 
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes 
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the 
Act. /d., at 126-127. 
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the 
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the 
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the lan-
guage does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus 
construes the identical words in §' 4 (a) to have one mean-
ing in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied 
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the 
statute to irrationality. 
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the 
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by 
§ 4 (b), and those of covered local governments that are lo-
cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight sub-
divisions in the latter group have bailed out from the pre-
clearance obligation in six separate actions. 7 Yet the only 
6 Under § 4 (b), a State or political subdivision is subject to the Act ir 
the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible popu-
lation voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General 
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the 
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trig-
ger the application of the preclearance reqmrement of § 5. 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 1973b (b), 1973c. 
1 Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States, C. A. 
.. 
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difference between those governments and the city of Rome 
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to 
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification 
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but 
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when 
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bail-
out criteria. 
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does 
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. ·The argu-
ment nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for 
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as 
Rome are 'political subdivisions~'' or "States," but merely sub-
jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of ~ 5; 
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a sub-
division located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at-. 
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry, 
McKinley and Ote1'0 Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC 
July 30, 1976) (three countie8); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake 
County, North Carolina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23, 
1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No. 
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Co-
conino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966) 
(three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out m 1972, 
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but 
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a Distnct Court 
found that the Stnte had conducted elections in English only, thereby 
violating the Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC 
.Tan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (i974) (referring to Torres Y. Sachs, 
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973)) 
Bailout was denied in one action involvmg a local subdivisiOn, Gaston 
County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), and three 
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners, 
El Paso County, Colorado v. United States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC 
Nov. 8, 1977); Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v. United States~ 
' C. A. No. 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969)) . 
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Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield 
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political sub-
divisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point 
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control 
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of 
fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail 
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look 
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials 
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its fac~. 
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); Un,ited States v. 
Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee 
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaniug 
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disre-
garded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.J' 
Gooding V, United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974) 
(MARSHALL, J, dissenting). 
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning 
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivi-
sions that exercise control over elections. Accordingly, there 
is no basis for the majority's reliance on congressional state-
ments that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If 
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same 
section must also relieve that burden when the city can 
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict require-
ments for bailout. 
III 
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con-
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of~ 4 (a) 
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to 
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both in-
trudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and 
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered 
under the Act. · Under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Con-
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gress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is 
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301. 327-328 (1966); 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 667 ( 1966) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome 
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the 
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing 
those deprivatioi1s until the entire State of Georgia satisfies 
the bailout standards of § 4 (a). 
When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exer-
cise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclear-
ance under the Act implicates · serious federalism concerns. 
I d., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield, 
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant 
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion).8 
That encroachment is especially troub1ing because it destroys 
local control of the means of self-government, one of the cen-
tral values of our polity.9 Unless the federal structure pro-
8 Other Justices have expressed the same concern. E. g., South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); 
Allen v. State Boa1·d of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) ; see also Georgia v. United States, 
411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (POWELL, J., dissenting) . 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976), 
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority 
and power from their respective States," their integrity, like that of the 
States, is protected by the principles of federalism . 
9 The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state 
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.); 
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.); Lassite1· v. Northampton County Board of Elec-
tions, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959) . 
ThiR Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of 
preserving local control of local matters. See Milliken v. B1·adley, 418 
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would de-
prive the people of control of schools through tlwir elected representar-
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vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own 
democratic procedures, the right of each community to deter-
mine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Con-
stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individ-
ual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered 
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the 
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting 
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to 
chart policy. 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not 
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual 
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a pro-
phylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court em-
phasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be 
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress 
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evi-
dence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of 
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new 
remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage 
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those juris-
dictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposi-
tion of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the 
absence of proof that l the state or local government has] been 
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." I d., 
at 330.10 
tives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum 
on public hou,;ing project ''ensures that all the people of a community 
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures ... 
and to lower tax revenues" ). Preservation of local control, naturally 
enough, involves protecting the integrity of ;:;tate and local governments. 
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n 8, 426 U. S., at 855; 
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) . 
10 The Court found important confirmation of the rationality of the 
coverage formula in the fact th;Jt there wa~ no evtdence of "r~ent ractat 
.. 
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The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized, 
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be 
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact 
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period. 
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act 
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at 
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which 
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not 
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined pe-
riod]." I d., at 331. 
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an 
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option 
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting 
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing 
preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without 
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclear-
ance becomes acute. 
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not 
have direct control over their city's voting practices until 
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's 
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word 
"State" in§ 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that 
di~rrimination involving tests or df'vices" in Stair.~ or subdivisions ex-
empted from prrrlearance. 383 U. S., at 331. 
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary 
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black':; view t.hat 
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the dis-
criminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their 
rare." I d., at 122. See icl., at 146 (Douglas, .J.); id., at 216, and n. 94 
(Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MAHSHALL, JJ.); 
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That history supported temporary suspension 
of those few literacy te~t~ still in use, see id., at. 147 (Dougas, .J.), with-
out providing any bmlout-likr opt-ion. In contraRI, prrrlearance involves 
a broad restramt on all state and local voting pract1res, rrgardles;, of 
whether they have been, or even rould be, 11sed to cll:scriminatc • 
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it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and 
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This 
outcome makes every city and county in G~orgia a hostage to 
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single sub-
division.11 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has 
succeeded in bailing out-A1aska in 1966, and again in 1971.12 
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous 
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, 
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people aud 60 subdivisions, 
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's 
11 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Comt's position dictate:; this eccentric re:;ult 
by insisting that subdivi:;ions in covered States can be relieved of pre-
clearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would 
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State 
which could not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A 
rational approach wo11ld treat the states and local governments inde-
pendently for purpose~ of bailout.. If Hubdivir:;ion~ in Georgia. wen· free 
to seek bailout on their owu, then a bailout action by the State could 
propt>rly focus on thr State's voting policieo; . Then, If Gt>orgia were 
entitled to bail out, preclearance would continue to apply to :;ubdivisions 
that by their own noncomphancr met fhe coverage rriteria of § 4 (b) . 
Of cour;:;e, the situation would be different if the State had contributed, 
overtly or covertly, to t'he o;ubdivi;:;ion's failure to comply. 
12 Alaska v. United States, · c. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966); 
Alaska v. United State~. C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's 
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in 
the 1970 extension . The 1975 extension of the Act abo re-e::;tablished 
coverage of Alask<t, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit. 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipu-
lated dismissal of action) . 
One other State-Virginia-has nttemped to bail out under § 4 (a) . 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F . Supp. 1319 (DC 
1974), aft''d, 420 U. S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virgmia did not 
sati~fy § 4 (a) becau~e a state literacy te!:it admini:;tered in some localities 
betwt>en 1963 and 1965 wa:; di~cnminatory in the context of the inferior 
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approximately five million people and 877 local governments.13 
Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutionally nec-
cessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act. 
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption 
against voting changes by certain state and local govern-
ments. If that presumption,js restri.cted to those governments 
meeting§ 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the .presumption can 
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may 
be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as 
action by Congress· at the limit of its authority under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome 
may not bail out. the statute oversteps those limits. For 
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District 
Court.u 
13 The Solicitor General states that Gt>orgia. has 159 counties, 530 
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every 
voting change, no matter how irrelevant the changE' might be to discrimi-
nation in voting. Brief of United StatE's, Avpendix, at 1a. 
14 On a practical level, the District Court argut>d that since morE' than 
7,000 subdivisions currt>ntly art> required to prt>clPar voting change:;, bail-
out suit;; by a small perct>ntagE' of tho~!' subdivi~ion~ would ~wamp that 
court. Ante, at - . In viE'w of the acknowledged ditficultie::; that con-
front a local government in srt>king bailout in tht> District of Columbia, 
it is by no means self-evident that the "floodgates" perceived by the cjourt p_. C, 
would t>ver open. Such suits, involving substantial exprnse as well as 
uncertainty, would not likely bt> initiatrd unless tht>re wert> a sub::;tantiai 
11 
C 
likelihood of succt>ss. Moreover, the <;/ourt'~ argumt>nt ignores the proce-X... · 
durt>s of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) direct:; the Attorney Gent>ral not to 
contest bailout if he finds that the state or local governmt>nt has not used 
a discriminatory test or devicr over the preceding 17 yt>ars. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a) . In fact , the Attorney General consented to bailout in the 
nine actions under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only threE' bailout 
~>nits havE' gone to trial. St>f' 1111. 7 and 1:3, supra. Thm; thr Department 
of Justice, not thr courts, would shoulder much of the added burdf'n that 
might ari:;e frcm rrcognizing a bailout right for govt>rnmmts likE' the city 
of Rome. That burdrn could hardly be more ont>rous than the Attonw,v 
Gent>ral's present re:;pon:;ibility for prrclearing all voting changes in 7,000 
subdivision:; . In the fir:;t six month~:; of 1979 over 3,200 such voting· 
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IV 
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would 
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way p€rhaps 
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends 
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court 
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has 
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite 
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the 
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such 
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local govern-
ment in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the 
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth 
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights 
Act could have intended that result. 
changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a rate of more than 25 
per working day. Letter to .To~eph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III, 
Assi~tant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of 
Ju~tice (Aug. 3, 1979), reprinted in Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at 1c. 
These a:stoni~hing figure,.; compare unfavorably with those cited by MR. 
JUI:l'riCE STEVENS in hi;; Sheffield dissent, where he questioned the efficacy of 
the Attorney General's review of preclearance reque:;t;; that then were 
llf1'iving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U. S., at 147-148, and nn. 8, 
10. See Berry v. Doles, 43R U. S. 190, 200-201 (PowELL, .T., concurring). 
It hardly need be added that no ~enior officer in the Jwotice Department-
much less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judg· 
ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus, 
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions 
and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employee,; of the federal 
bureal.\cracy, usually without anything resembling an evidentiary hearing. 
.... 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-1840 
City of Rome et al. , Appellants,] On Appeal from the United 
v. States District Court for 
· United States et aL the District of Columbia. 
[December - , 197!)] 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term "State" 
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political sub-
divisions that control election processes, and that those sub-
divisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act 
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. 
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala-
bama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield) . Today the Court 
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term 
"State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the 
preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only 
conflicts with Sheffi.eld but also raises grave questions as to 
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent. 
][ 
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds, 
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the 
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this 
case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15 % of 
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types 
of local action affecting voting. First, in H)6() the Georgia' 
Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City 
Commission and the Board of Educatiou , and rcduced the 
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new 
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members ~:. / 
the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for nun/ 
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bered postsV Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com-
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in 
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote 
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But 
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopu-
lated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the 
addition.al white ~oters in the annexed land had cau~e_d j1 
net dechne of 1% m the b1ack share of Rome's electorateV _ 
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of 
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of 
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed 
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter 
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in 
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting 
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The 
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to 
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to politi-
cal candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for 
the Board of Education na.rrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the 
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters). 
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern-
ment, the court stated that the "white elected offic"ifr'al of 
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the lack 
community/' and actively seek black political support a /d.,~ 
~of the package of revisions, the Assembly increased the Board 
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration require-
men~, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp. 
221L?24 (DC 1979) . 
~The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since 
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975 
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were 
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 8n 
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in 
197 . See Brief for United State::;, at 38, n. 26. 
The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to 
upgrade some black neighborhoods," ha.s subsidized the transit syste/ 
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome 
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can 
probably determine the outcome of many if not most con-
tests." Ibid. 
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve 
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The 
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations 
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of 
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many res-
ervations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a 
black candidate running under the challenged election rules 
commanded three times the share of votes that the black 
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue 
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting 
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider 
whether the District Court's ruliug on the t>Vidence is clearly 
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies 
of the holding below because they highlight how far the 
courts, including this Court. have departed from the ori ina! 
understanding of the Act's purpose and meauing. gain this 
background, I address the substantive questions posed by this 
II 
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political 
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations 
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. ~ 
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court ............... 
finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used 
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action 
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color." Ibid. The District 
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of 
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern~ 
ment. 472 F. Supp ., at 225. 
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Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand-
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political 
life. See pp. 2-3. supra.. These findings demonstrate that the 
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout 
provisJOn. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long 
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may 
/ not alter any voti~·actice without the prior approval of 
V federal authorities.A~ 
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, 
and holds that no subdivision may · bail out so long as its 
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can 
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we 
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout 
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers 
ba~k to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i)~ ''in V 
any State" reached by ~ 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any 6 
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." :...:=:-------
/{)' ~Section 5 permits two methods of preclearance. A local government 
may ask the District Court of the District of Columbia. for a ruling that 
the voting change h; acceptable, or it may submit the change to the At-
torney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c. The admini::;tm1ive procedure i~; used nmo;;t excluKively, sine~ 
0 it takes less time. 
/.') ~Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part: 
lY To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is 
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be 
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because 
of his failure to comply with an~· test or device in any State tt•ith respect 
to which the deterrnination.s have been made under the first two sen-
tences of subdivision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision 
with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate/ 
unit, unless the United States Di~;trict Court for the District of Columbia 
in an action for a. declaratory judgment brought by such State or sub-
division again::;t the United States has determined that no such test or 
device ha::; been used during the ,;eventeen yeHrs preceding the filing of the 
action with the purpo~P or with the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color .. , ." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (em-
phasis supplied). 
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b), 
this case concerns the first category in that definition 
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s 
tion of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b). 
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this 
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to dis-
criminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban 
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any con-
trol over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language 
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court con-
tinued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. 
Consequently, federal authorities 110w must review all changes 
in local votmg rules and regulations in States covered by the 
Act. /d., at 125-127. 
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the 
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the 
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the lan-
guage does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus 
construes the identical words in ~ 4 (a) to have one mean-
ing in one situatiou and a wholly different sense when applied 
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the 
statute to irrationality. 
This irrationality is evident in the coutrast between the 
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by ~ 
§ 4 (b), and those of covered local govemments that are lo~ 
cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight sub-
divisions in the latter group have bailed out from the pre- (f) 
clearance obligation in six separate actions~ Tit me only 
~Under § 4 (b), a State or political subdivision is subjPct Lo the Act ir 
the Director of tho Census finds that less than 50% of the Pligible popu-
lation volPd in the last prPsidential election, and the AttornPy General 
determines that a discriminatory "test or devwe" wa<> mumtained in the 
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, wh1ch arp unreviewablr, trig-/ 
ger the application of the prrclearanco requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 1973b (b), 1973c. 
J... Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States, C A. 
. . 
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difference between those governments and the city of Rome 
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to 
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification 
for allowing a subdivision in North .Carolina to bail out but 
denying a similar privilege to a, subdivision in Georgia when 
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bail-
out criteria. 
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does 
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. ··· The argu-
ment nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for 
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as ~ 
Rome are 'political subdivisions' '' or "States.'' but merely sub~ 
jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of ~ 5; 
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a sub-
division located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at--. 
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); Ne'W Mexico , Curry, 
McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC 
July 30, 1976) (three counties) ; Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2125 (DC Se'pt. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake 
County, North Catalina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23, 
1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No. 
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county) ; Apache, Navaho and Co-
conino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966) 
(three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972, 
Ne'W York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but 
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a District Court 
found that the State had· conducted elections in English only, thereby 
violating the Act. Ne'W Yor-k v. United States, C. A. No. 2419...:71 (DC 
.Tan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 U.S. 888 (1974) (referring to 'l'or-res v. Sachs, 
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973) ). 
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston 
County, Nor-th Carolina v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), and three 
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners, 
El Paso County, Colorado v. Un-ited States, C. A. No. 77-0185 (DC 
Nov. 8, 1977) ; Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v. United States;. 
' C. A. No. 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969) ) . 
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Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield 
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political sub-
divisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point 
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should contr·ol 
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of 
fairness, if Rome must preClear it must also be free to bail 
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look 
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials 
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its fac~. 
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v. 
Oregon, 366 U. "S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee 
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning 
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disre-
garded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute." 
Gooding v. U·nited States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning 0 
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all politi~ubdiv...k ".:iJ 
sions that exercise control over elections.~cc;dingly, there 
is no basis for the majority's reliance on ongressional state-
ments that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If 
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same 
section must also relieve that burden when the city ca/1 
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict require-
ments for bailout. 
III 
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con-
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of~ 4 (a) 
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to 
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both in-
trudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and 
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered 
under the Act. · Under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Cou~ 
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gress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is 
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301. 327-328 (1966); 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 667 ( 1966) (Harlan, J ., 
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome 
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the 
Fifteeuth Amendment provides no authority for continuing . ~ 
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies ~ 
the bailout standards of § 4 (a) . [ 
When this Court first sustain~';} the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, it conceded that the legislation was 11an uncommon exer-
cise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclear-
ance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns. 
I d., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield, 
the statute:s 11encroachment on state sover~ignt~ is s1g~1i~cant !'}:'" 
and undemable." 435 U. S., at 141 (d1ssentmg opmwn). ~ 
That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroy 
local control of the means of self-go"\Ternment one_ of the...cen:. -@ 
tral values of our polityi: Unless the federal structure pro-
ther Justices have expressed the same concern. E. g., South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 , 358 (Black, J ., concurrmg and dis.~enting); 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969) 
(Harlan, J ., concurring and dissentmg) ; see also Georgia v. United States, 
411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (POWELL, J., di8senting) . 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976), 
the Court noted tha~ because political subdivi.sio.ns "d~rive .their authority~ 
and power from their respective Stateo;," their mtegtlty, hke that of the 
Sta.t-es, is protected by the principles of federalism. 
J.. The federal system allocates pnmary control over elections to state 
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J .) ; 
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.) ; Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elec-
tions, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959) . 
This Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of' 
preserving local cont rol of local matter:,. Sec Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local school::; "would de-
prive th<> people of control of school:, through their elected repre::;entar- "' 
]E/-£ "'cw- .t' -ii.. ~UW>A"""- ~ 1"' "'tr-·-ui.-i ~ l 
ffJc,.._.~ ~ ~s4"'-';.,l~ I~S~ ruUf-<:JJ ~ -h.:s- CAS/!/ 
r lb. ~-r ~ ~ ~n~ ~S'~ ffw/1; 11~~. 
~"'l<f ~ IJ tOv r ~~ ~ ~~ se-.....-t. 
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vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own 
democratic procedures, the right of each community to deter-
mine its own course withm the boundaries marked by the Con-
stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individ-
ual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered 
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the 
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting 
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to 
chart policy. 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not 
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual 
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a pro-
phylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court em-
phasized that preclearauce, like any remedial device, can be 
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress 
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evi-
dence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of 
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new 
remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage 
formula in ~ 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those juris-
dictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposi-
tion of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the 
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been 
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." I d., 
at 330. 
tives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum 
on public houo;ing proJect "ensures that all the people of a community 
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures ... 
and to lower tax revenues") . Preservation of local control, naturally 
enough, involves protecting the integrity of :;tate and local governments. 
See National League of G-itie8 v. Usery, supra n 8, 426 U. S., at 855 ; 
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) . 
'7\ The Court found important confirmation or the rationality of the-
coverage formula in t11e fact thut there wao; no ~v1dence of " recent rac1at 
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The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized, 
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be 
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact 
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period. 
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act 
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at 
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which 
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not 
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined pe-
riod] ." I d., at 331. 
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an 
t.musual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option~ 
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting 
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing 
preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without 
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclear-
ance becomes acute. 
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not 
have direct control over their city's voting practices until 
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act'5 
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word 
"State" in § 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that 
di~rrimination involving test~ or drvires" in Rtatr,; or subdivi~ions rx-
empted from prr('learnnce. 383 U. S., at 331. 
This Court took a s1milar approach when it affinned the temporary 
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 
supra n . 9. The entll'e Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view thaL 
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the dis-
crimina.tory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voterR on account of their 
rare." !d., at 122. See icl., at 146 (Douglas, J.); ul., at 216, [Uld n. 94 
(Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); 
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That history supportE'd temporary suspen.·ion 
of those few literacy teHts f'till in use, see id., at. 1-17 (Douga:-, J.), with -
out providing any ba.ilout-likr opt.ion. In contrn;:t, pr<>rlearance involve~ 
a broad rest ra.int. on all stat.<' and local voting prartH'P:>, rpgardle;., of 
whetlwr they have bf'(•n, or ev('ll rould be, UHCd to cl1:-rrimmate. 
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it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and 
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This 
outcome makes every city and county in G~orgia a hostage to 
errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single sub-
division. Since the statute was enacted, only one State has .R}-----
succeeded in bai1ing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.~~ 
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous 
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, 
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions, 
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's 
-,rTr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Court's position dictates this eccentric re~ulL 
by insisting that ~ubdivi:;ions in covered States can be relieved of pre-
clearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would 
C!I-St serious doubt 011 the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State 
which could not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A 
rational approach wonld treat the states and local government:; inde-
pendently for purpose~ of bailout.. If subdivi::;ions in Georgia were free 
to seek bailout on their own, tlwn a bailout action by the State could 
properly focus on tlw State's voting policies. Then, if Georgia were 
entitled to bail out, preclearance would continue to apply to :;ubdivisions 
that by fheir own noncomphance met fhe coverage rnterin of § 4 (b) . 
Of cour~e, the situation would Of' different if the State had contributed, 
tly or covertly, to t'he subdivi::;ion's failure to comply. 
:Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966); 
ka v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972) . Alaska's 
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in 
the 1970 extension. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-establi:;hed 
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit. 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipu-
lated dismissal of action) . 
One other State-Virginia-has attemped to bail out under § 4 (a) . 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC 
1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virginia did not ~ 
satisfy § 4 (a.) becau~e a state literacy test administered in :;orne localitie~ 
between 1963 and 1965 wa:; di:-;cnminatory in the rontext of the inferior 
education offered to Virgi.oia blacks in certain rural counties before that 
rerioct, 
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approximately five million people and 877local governmentsF 
Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutionally nee~ 
cessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act. 
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption 
against voting changes by certain state and local govern-
ments. If that presumptionjs restri.cted to those governments 
meeting § 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can 
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may 
be seen, as the South Carolioo v. Katzenbach Court saw it, -as 
action by Congress- at the limit of its authority under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome 
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For ~ 
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District 
Court., 
~ )f'The Solicitor General states that Georgia ha~ 159 countie~, 530 
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions 'that now mu~t preclear every 
voting change, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to diHcrimi-
nation in voting. Brief of United States, Appendix, at 1a. 
"-)If On a practical level, the District Court argued that ~ince more than 
7,000 i:iubdivi~ions currently are required to preclear voting change,, bail-
out suit:; by a ::;mall percentage of those subdivil:lions would :;wamp that 
court. Ante, at - , In view of the acknowledged difficulties that con-
front a local governmrnt in sreking bailout in the Di~trict of Columbia, /J 
it i;; by no means self-evident that the "floodgates" perceived by the c/ourtJ.. .L ' 
would ever open. Such suiti:i, involving substantial exprni:ie as well as 
uncertainty, would not likely be initiated unle;;;; therP were a sub::;tantial 
0 
/1 
likelihood of i:iUCcess. Moreover, the rourt'i:i argument ignores the proce-~.L· 
dures of a bailout suit. Srction 4 (a) directs the Attorney General not to 
conte:;t bailout if he find::; that the statr or local government has not used 
a discriminatory test or device over the preceding 17 years. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a). In fact, the Attorney General con::;ented to bailout in the 
nine actwns under § 4 (a) that have sucreeded, whilP only threp bailout 
~;uits have gone to trial. SeP Ill!. 7 and 1:3, o'Upra. Thu:; the Department 
of Ju::;ticP, not thP court:;, would shouldPr much of the addPd burdPn that 
might arise frcm rrcognizing a bailout right for govprnrncnt:; likf' the city 
of Home. That burden could hardly be more onprou:; than the Attorney 
Genpra]'s present reHponsibility for prPclearing all voting changes in 7,000 
subdivision~ . In the first l:lix months of 1979 over 3,200 such voting· 
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IV 
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would 
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way perhaps 
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends 
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court 
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has 
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite 
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the 
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such 
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local govern-
ment in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the 
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth 
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights 
Act could have intended that result. 
changes were :submitted to the Attorney General, a rate of more than 25 
per working day. Letter to .lo~eph W. Darn from Drew S. Days III, 
As,;istant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of 
,Justice (Aug. 3, 1979), reprinted in Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at 1c. 
These astonishing figures compare unfavorably with thosr cited by MR. 
Jus·rrcE S'I'EVENH in hio Sheffield di:ssent, where he que:;tioned the efficacy of 
the Attorney General':; review of preclearance reque;;t!> that then were 
nr.•iving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U.S., at 147-148, and nn. 8, 
10. See Berry v. Doles. 43R U. S. 190, 200-201 (PowELL, .T., concurring). 
It hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Ju;;tice Department-
much less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personto~l judg-
ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus, 
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions 
and State:; are finally judged by unidentifiable employee:; of the federal 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
Eighteen months ago this Court held that the term "State" 
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political sub-
divisions that control election processes, and that those sub-
divisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act 
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. 
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala-
bama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court 
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term 
"State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the 
preclearance requirmhent. Because this decision not only 
conflicts with Sheffi(ld but also raises grave questions as to 
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent. 
I 
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds, 
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the 
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated. by the facts of this 
case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15% of 
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types 
of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia' 
Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City 
Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the 
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new 
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of 
the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for num,. 
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bered posts.1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com· 
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in 
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote 
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But 
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopu· 
lated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the 
additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a 
net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate.2 
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of 
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of 
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed 
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter 
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in 
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting 
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The 
court observed that white officials have encoura.ged blacks to 
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to politi-
cal candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for 
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the 
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters). 
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern· 
ment, the court stated that the "white elected officials of 
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black 
community," and actively seek black political support.8 !d., 
1 As part of the package of revisions, the A8sembly increased the Board 
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration require-
ments, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp. 
221, 224 (DC 1979) . 
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since 
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975 
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were 
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823 
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in 
1978. See Brief for United States, at 38, n. 26. 
3 The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to 
upgrade some black neighborhoods," has subsidized the transit system 
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome 
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can 
probably determine the outcome of many if not most con-
tests." Ibid. 
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve 
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The 
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations 
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of 
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many res-
ervations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a 
black candidate running under the challenged election rules 
commanded three times the share of votes that the black 
community holds. Moreover, 11ine of the annexations at issue 
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting 
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider 
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies 
of the holding below because they highlight how far the 
courts, including this Court. have departed from the original 
understanding of the Act's purpose ami meaning. 1 Against 
this background, I address the substantive questions posed by 
this case. 
II 
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political 
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations 
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court 
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of 
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern-
ment. 472 F. Supp., at 225. 
4 The Court·~ opinion simply ignores the most relevant facts. In so \ 
doing, the Court avert~ its eyes from the central paradox of this case: 
Even though Rome hns met. every criterion !'!:itablished by the Voting 
Right!:i Act for protrcting the political rights of minoritie::~, the Court holdEJ 
that. the city ~ust remain subject to pr('Clearance. 
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finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used 
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action 
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color."' Ibid. The District 
Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand-
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political 
life. See pp. 2-3. supra. These findings demonstrate that the 
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout 
provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long 
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may 
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of 
federal authorities.5 
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, 
and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its 
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can 
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we 
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout 
available to "such state or subdivision," language that refers 
ba.ck to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in 
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any 
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit." 0 
5 Srction 5 permits two methods of preclt>arance. A local government 
may ask the District Court of the District of Columbia for a ruling that 
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the At-
torney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 19nc. The administrative procedure i~> used amost exclusively, since 
it takes less time. 
6 Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part: 
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is 
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be 
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because 
of his failure to comply with an:v test or device in any State 11•ith 1·espect 
to which the determinations have been made under the fi1·st two sen-
tences of subdivision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision 
with respect to which such dete1·minations have been made as a separate 
unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or sub-
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b), 
this case concerns the first category in that definition .7 Thus 
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibi-
tion of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b). 
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this 
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to dis-
criminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban 
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any con-
"trol over voting. 435 U. S. , at 120. Since the same language 
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court con-
tinued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. 
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes 
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the 
Act. Id., at 126-127. 
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the 
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the 
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the lan-
guage does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus 
construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one mean-
ing in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied 
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the 
statute to irrationality. 
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the 
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by 
§ 4 (b) , and those of covered local governments that are lo-
division against the United States has determined that no such test or 
device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the 
action with the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color .. .. " 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (em-
phasis supplied) . 
7 Under § 4 (b ) , it State political subdivision is subjrd to th~.> Act if 
the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible popu-
lation voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General 
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the 
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trig-
ger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 1973b (b ) , 1973o. 
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cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight sub-
divisions in the latter group have bailed out from the pre-
clearance obligation in six separate actions.8 Yet the only 
difference between those governments and the city of Rome 
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to 
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification 
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but 
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when 
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bail-
out criteria. 
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does 
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. The argu-
ment nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for 
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as 
Rome are 'political subdivisions'" or "States," but merely sub-
8 Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oldahoma v. United States, C. A. 
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry, 
McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC 
July 30, 1976) (three counties); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake 
County, North Carolina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-60 (DC Jan. 23, 
1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No. 
32~6 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Co-
conino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966) 
(three counties) . Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972, 
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419--'71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but 
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a District Court 
found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby 
violating the Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC 
Jan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (19'74) (referring to Torres v. Sachs, 
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. '1!1, 1973)) . 
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston 
Count·y, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), and three 
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissionersr 
El Paso County, Colomdo v. ·United States, C. A. ·No. 77-0185 (DC' 
Nov. 8, 1977) ; Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v United States; 
C. 'A: No.1702.!....(i6; (DC Sept. 26, 1969).)1 .. 
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jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of § 5; 
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a sub-
division located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at-. 
Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield 
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political sub-
divisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point 
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control 
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of 
fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail 
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look 
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials 
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face. 
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v. 
Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee 
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning 
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disre-
garded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.·" 
Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning 
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivi-
sions that exercise coutrol over elections.\) Accordingly, there 
is no basis for the majority's reliance on congressional state-
ments that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If 
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same 
section must also relieve that burden when the city can 
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict require-
ments for bailout. 
0 This construction applies to polit.ical subdivision;; dPfined by § 14 (c) 
(2) of the Art, 42 U. S. C.§ 1973 (c) (2), aH wPII ns to gowrnments like 
RomP thnt do not fnll within thP ::;tatutory dt•finition . Thu;;, undPr 
Sheffield'~ statutory interprPtatiott all ,;ubdivi,;ion~ in States <·ovrrPd by 
the Act should bP entitled to bail out. Thr eon::;titutional analy::;is of 
Part III, infm, rrarhP~ the r;ame conclusion. 
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III 
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con4 
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a) 
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to 
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both in-
trudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and 
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered 
under the Act. Under§ Z of the Fifteenth Amendment, Con-
gress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is 
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. s·. 301, 327- 328 (1966); 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome 
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the 
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing 
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies 
the bailout standards of§ 4 (a).10 
When this Court first sustained· the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exer-
cise of congressional power."· South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U. S:, at 334. The Court recognized that preclear-
ance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns. 
Id., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield, 
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant 
and undeniable." 435 U. S. , at 141 (dissenting opinion).11 
10 In view of tht> narrower forus of my appronch to tlw statutory and I 
con:-:i itutional isHueo; ra i::ll"u in this cn.se, I do not reach the broad analysis 
offc•red by Mn. JusTICE HEHNQUrs·r 's dis~ent . 
11 Other Ju~tices have Pxpreo;~t>d the same conct>rn . E. g., So·uth Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 35S (Black, J :, concurring and dissenting); 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969) 
(Harlan, J. , concurring and dissenting); see all:lo Georgia v. United States, 
411 U. 8. 526, 545- (1973) (POWELL, J ., dissenting). 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976), 
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority 
and power from their respective States," their integrity, like that of the 
States, is protected by the principles of federali sm. 
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That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys 
local control of the means of self-government, one of the cen-
tral values of our polity.12 Unless the federal structure pro-
vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own 
democratic procedures, the right of each community to deter-
mine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Con-
stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individ-
ual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered 
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the 
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting 
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to 
chart policy. 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not 
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual 
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a pro-
phylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court em-
phasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be 
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress 
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evi-
dence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of 
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new 
12 The frdt>rnl systrm allocates primary control over elections to state 
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.); 
id., at 201 (Harlan, .J.); LCU3siter v. Northampton County Board of Elec-
tions, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959). 
This Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of 
preserving local control of local matter~. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would de-
prive the people of control of school~ through their elected representa-
tives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum 
on public housing project "ensures that all the people of a community 
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures . .. 
and to lower tax revenues"). Preservation of local control, naturally 
enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments. 
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n . 8, 426 U. S., at 855.~ 
I(Jovle v Oklahoma, 221 U S 559, 565 (1911) 
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remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage 
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those juris-
dictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposi-
tion of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the 
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been 
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." 1 d., 
at 330.13 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized. 
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could bl" 
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact 
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period. 
"Acknowleclgiug the> possibility of oV<'rbreadth. tlw Act 
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at 
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which 
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not 
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined pe-
riod]." !d., at 331. 
Although this passage uses the term ''overbreadth" in an 
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option 
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting 
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing 
13 The Court, found important confirmation of tlJC ra tionalii.y of the 
coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of "recent racial 
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions ex-
empted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331. 
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary 
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that 
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the dis-
criminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voter;; on account of their 
rare." !d., at 122. See id., at 146 (Douglas, J.); id., at 216, and n. 94 
(Harlan, J.); id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MAHSHALL, JJ.); 
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That l1istory supported temporary suspension 
of those few literacy tests still in use, see id., at 147 (Dougas, J.), with-
out providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, pn•clearance involves 
a broad restraint on all sta.te and local voting practic<>s, regardless of 
whether the:y have been, or even could be, used to di::;crimina.te. 
78-1840-DISSENT 
CITY OF ROME v, UNITED STATES 11 
preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without 
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclear-
ance becomes acute. 
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not 
have direct control over their city's voting practices until 
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's 
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word 
"State" in§ 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that 
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and 
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This 
outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to 
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single sub-
division.14 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has 
succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.:15 
14 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Court's position dictates this eccentric result 
by insisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of pre-
clearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would 
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State 
:which rould not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A 
rational approach would treat the ~tates and local governments inde-
pendently for purJ1oses of baHout.. If ;;ubdivisions in Georgia were free 
to seek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could 
properly focus on the State's voting policie;;. Then, if Georgia were 
entitled to bail out, preclearance would continue to apply to subdivisions 
that by their own noncompliance met the coverage criteria of § 4 (b). 
Of course, the situation would be different if the State had contributed, 
overtly or covertly, to the subdivision's failure to comply. 
:ts Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966); 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's 
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in 
the 1970 extension. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-established 
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit. 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipu-
lated dismissal of action). 
One other State-Virginia-has at.temped to bail out under § 4 (a). 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC 
1974), aff'd, 420 U. S. 901 (1975). The court held that Virginia did not 
~~ti&fy § 4 (a) because a state literacy test administered in some localitie~ 
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That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous 
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, 
or in 1971 for that State's ·ao2;ooo people and 60 subdivisions, 
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's 
_approximately five million people and 877local governments 16 
Today's ruling therefore will ·seal off the coi1stitutionally nec-
cessary sa.fety valve in the Voting Rights Act. 
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption 
against voting changes by certain state and local govern-
ments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments 
meeting§ 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can 
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may 
be seen, as the South CarOlina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as 
action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fif .. 
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome 
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For 
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District 
Court/7 
between 1963 and 1965 was discriminatory in the context of the inferior 
education offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties before that 
period. 
16 The Solicitor General statPs that Georgia has 159 counties, 530 
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every 
voting ehange, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to discrimi~ 
nation in voting. Brief of United States, Appendix, at la. 
17 On a practical level, the District Court argued that :since more than 
7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting change", bail~ 
out suit" by a small percentage of tho:>e ::nibdivi:sions would swamp that 
court. Ante, at - . In view of thP acknowlPdged difficulties that con-
front a local governmPnt in :sePking bailout in the District of Columbia, 
it is by no means self-evident that the "floodgate,.;" perceived by the court 
would ever open. Such "uits, involving sub,tantial expense as well as 
uncertainty, would not likely be initiated unles~ there were a substantial 
likelihood of :>ucce"s. Moreover, the court's argument ignore" the proce-
dure~ of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attorney Geiwral not to 
contest bailout if he finds th,~t the state or local government haR not u,e!f 
.. 
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IV 
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would 
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way perhaps 
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends 
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court 
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has 
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite 
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the 
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such 
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local govern-
ment in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the 
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth 
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights 
Act could have intended that result. 
a discrnmnatory !e~t or device over the preceding 17 year:;;. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a). In fact, the Attorney General ron~ented to bailout in the 
nine action~ under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only three bailout 
suits have gone to tnal. See 1111. 7 and 13, supra. Thus the Department 
of J u~tlce, not the courts, would :,;boulder much of the added burden that 
might arllil' from recogmzing tt bailout right for government;; likf' the city 
of Rome. That burden could hardly bf' more onerous than the Attorney 
General's present re~ponsibility for prPclraring all voting changPs in 7,000 
subdivisiOns. In the fir;;t ;six montht> of 1979 over 3,200 ~uch voting 
changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a ratP of more th<m 25 
per working day. Lettt•r to .Joseph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III, 
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights DiviHion, U. S. Department of 
Justice (Aug. 3, 1979), repnnted iu Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at 1c. 
These astom:,;hmg figures compare unfavorably with thosr cited by MR. 
JU::>TICE S·rEVENS m lm; Sheffield dissent, where lw que~t ioned thr efficacy of 
the Attorney General'::- review of preclearance requests that then were 
ar:oiving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U.S .. at 147-148, and nn. 8, 
10. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200-201 (PowELL, .J., concurring). 
H hardly need be addrd that no ~enior officer Ill the J usttce DPpartment-
much less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judg-
ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus, 
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisions 
and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of the federal 
bureaucracy, usually without anything resembling an evidentiary hearing • 
' 
-lw-o 
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,...J-__,~-~~--·rs ago this Court held that the term 11State" 
in § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political sub-
\ divisions that control election processes, and that those sub-
divisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act 
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. 
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala-
bama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield). Today the Court 
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term 
11State" when it comes to an action to 11bail out" from the 
preclearance require1hent. Because this decision not only 
conflicts with Sheffif{ld but also raises grave questions as to 
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent. 
I 
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds, 
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the 
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this 
case. In Rome, a city of-about 30,000, approximately 15% of 
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types 
of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia' 
Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City 
Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the 
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new 
arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of 
the. Board of Education are chosen from ea£h ward :or " / 
J 
..... ,' 
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bered posts.1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com· 
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in 
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote 
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But 
9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopu. 
lated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the 
additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a 
net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate.2 
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of 
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of 
fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed 
a "literacy test or other device . . . as a prerequisite to voter 
registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in 
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting 
in Rome." 472 F. Supp. 221, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The 
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to 
run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to politi-
cal candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for 
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the 
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters). 
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern· 
ment, the court stated that the "white elected officials of 
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black 
community," and actively seek black political support.3 Id., ~ 
1. As part of the package of revisions, the Assembly increased the Board 
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration require-
ments, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp. 
221, 224 (DC 1979) . 
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since 
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975 
voter registration totals. Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were 
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823 
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in 
1978. See Brief for United States, at 38, n. 26. 
3 The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effo:S~e: / 
upg<odo .ome black no;ghbo<hoode," h., rub,;d;eed the tnnffit '/ 
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome 
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can 
probably determine the outcome of many if not most con-
tests." Ibid. 
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve 
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The 
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations 
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of 
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many res-
ervations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a 
black candidate running under the challenged election rules 
commanded three times the share of votes that the black 
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue 
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting 
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider 
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is cleaily 
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies 
of the holding below because they highlight how far the 
courts, including this Court, have departed from the original 
understanding of the Act's purpose and meaning.4 Against 
this background, I address the substantive questions posed by 
this case. 
II 
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political 
subdivision can attempt to end its preClearance obligations 
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C: ~ 
§ 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Cour~ 
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of 
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern-
ment. 472 F. Supp., at 225. 
4 The Court's opinion simply ignores the most relevant facts. In so 
doing, the Court averts its eyes from the central paradox of this case: 
Even though Rome has met every criterion established by the Voting 
Rights Act for protecting the politjcal rights .of minorities, the Court holds: 
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finds that in that jurisdiction no utest or device has been used 
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action 
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color:-'' Ibid. 'The District 
Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand-
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political 
life. See pp. 2-3, supra. These findings demonstrate that the 
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout 
provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long 
as Georgia is covered by§ 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may 
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of 
federal authorities.5 
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, 
and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its 
State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can 
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we 
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout 
available to '~tate or subdivision," language that refers 
ba.ck to tbe provisi~n's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in 
any State" reached by § 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in an~ _____-
political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit."/ 
5 Section 5 permits two methods of preclearance. A local government 
may ask the District Court of the District of Columbia for a ruling that 
the voting change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the At-
torney General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c. The administrative procedure is used amost exclusively, since 
it takes less time. 
6 Section 4 (a) provides in relevant part : 
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is 
not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be 
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because 
of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State with 1·espect 
to whicfi the determinations have ·been made undm· the ji1·st two sen-
tences of suo eli vision (b) of this section or in any political subdivision 
with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separatl! 
unit, unles:; the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
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Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b), 
this case concerns the first category in that definition:' Thus 
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibi-
tion of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b). 
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this 
key phrase. The Court reasoned th~t by referring to dis-
criminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban 
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any con-
trol over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language 
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court con-
tinued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. 
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes 
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the 
Act. Id., at 126-127. 
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the 
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the 
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the lan-
guage does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus 
construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one mean-
ing in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied 
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the 
statute to irrationality. 
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the 
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by 
§ 4 (b), and those of covered local governments that are lo-~ 
division against the United States has determined that no such test or 
device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the 
action with the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color .... " 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (em-
phasis supplied) . 
1 Under §"4 (b), astate) political subdivision is subject to the Act if 
the Director of the Censu;'linds that less than 50% of the eligible popu-
lation voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General 
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the 
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trig-
ger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U. S. C. 
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cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight sub .. 
divisions in the latter group have bailed out from the pre-
clearance obligation in six separate actions.8 Yet the only 
difference between those governments and the city of Rome 
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to . . 
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification 
for allowing a subdivision in.North Carolina -to bail out but 
de!J.ying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when 
both have been found to be in full compliance with the· bail-
out criteria. 
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does 
not deny, the "abstract force'' of this argument. ·The argu-
ment nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for 
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as 
Rome are 'political subdivisions'" or "States," but merely sub~ 
8 Counties of Choctaw and McCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States, C. A. 
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry, 
McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC 
July 30, 1976) (three counties); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. ·75-
2125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake 
County, North Carolina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23, 
1967) (one county); Elrno1·e County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No. 
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Co-
conino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966) 
(three counties) . Three counties in New York City ·bailed out in 1972, 
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419--'71 (De Apr. 13, 1972), but 
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a District Court 
found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby 
violating tbe Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DG 
Jan. 18, 1974), aff'd, 419 ·u. S. 888 (1974) (referring to Torres v. Sachs, 
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. '1!1, 1973)) . 
Bailout was denied in one action involving a local subdivision, Gaston 
County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), and three· 
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissionersr 
El Paso County, Colorado v. ·United States, C. A. ·No. ·77--0185 (DC" 
Nov. 8, 1977) ; Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 75~ 
2170 (DC May 25, 1976); Nash County, North Carolina v. United Statest 
' C. :A •. No. "1702-66 (DC Sopt. 26, 1969)). / 
.. ...... ~-. 
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jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of § 5; 
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a sub-
division located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at-. 
Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield 
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political sub-
divisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point 
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control 
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of 
fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail 
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look 
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials 
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face. 
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v. 
Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 ( 1961). Although "committee 
reports in particular are often a he1pfu1 guide to the meaning 
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disre-
garded if inconsistent with the p1ain language of the statute." 
Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974) 
(MARSHALL, J ., dissenting) . 
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning 
of "State" as used in § 4 (a,): It includes all political subdivi-
sions that exercise control over elections.\) Accordingly, there 
is no basis for thelt~'tr's reliance on congressional state-
ments that are incons1s nt with the terms of the statute. If 
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same 
/_ 
section must also relieve that burden when the city can 
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict require- __.--
ments for bailout. ~ 
0 This construction applies to political subdivisions defined by § 14 (c) 
(2) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (c)(2), as well as to governments like 
"--\" !Rome that, do not fall within ... bi atutory definition . Thus, under 
Sh-effield's statutory interpret.atio.!!)"all subdivi:oions in States covered by 
the Act should be entitled to bail out. The constitutional analysis of 
P<trt III, infra, r·eaches the same conclusion. 
I, 
78-l84o.-::DISSENT 
8 CITY OF ROME v. ·UNITEJ;> STATES 
III 
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con. 
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a) 
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to 
the city of Rome. · 'The preclearance requirement both in-
trudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and 
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered 
under the Act. ·Under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Con-
gress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is 
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383' U. S'. 301, 327-328 (1966); 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome 
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the 
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing 
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies 
the bailout standards of s 4 (a) .10 
When this Court first sustained· the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exer-
cise of congressional power."· South Carolina v; Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U. S:, at 334'. The Court recognized that preclear-
ance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns. 
ld., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield, 
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant 
and undeniable." 43'5 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion).11 
10 In view of the narrower focus of my approach to the statutory and l 
con~tit.utional issue::; raised in this cm;e, I do not reach the broad analysis 
offPred by MH. JusTrcE REHNQUrs•r's dis::;ent. 
11 Other Justices have expresHed the same concern . E. g., So'Uth Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 ; 358 (Black', J :, concurring and dissenting); 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U: S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Geo1·gia v. United States, 
411 U. S. 526, 545· (1973) (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
In National Leag'Ue of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, n. 20 (1976), 
the Court noted that because political subdivisions "derive their authority 
and · power from their respective Sta.tes," their integrity, like that of the · 
States, is protected by the principles of federalism; 
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That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys 
local control of the means of self-government, one of the cen-
tral values of our polity.u Unless the federal structure pro-
vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own 
democratic procedures, the right of each community to deter-
mine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Con-
stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individ-
ual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered 
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the 
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting 
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to 
chart policy. 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not 
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual 
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a pro-
phylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court em-
phasized that preclearance, like · any remedial device, can be 
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress 
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evi-
dence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of 
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new 
12 The federal system allocates primary control over elections to state 
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.); 
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.); Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elec-
tions, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959) . 
This Court has emphasized the importance in a democratic society of 
preserving local control of local matters. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would de-
prive the people of control of schools through their elected representa-
tives"); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum 
on public housing project "ensures that all the peop1e of a community 
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures .. . 
and to lower tax revenues"). Preservation of local control, naturally 
enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments. 
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n. 8, 426 U. S., at 855; 
!Qo..11le v .. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) . 
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remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage 
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those juris-
dictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposi-
tion of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the 
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been 
free of substantia1 voting discrimination in recent years." l d., 
at 330.13 
The Court in South Carolina v . .Katzenbach emphasized, 
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be 
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact 
did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period. 
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth. tlw Act 
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at 
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which 
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not 
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined pe-
riod]." !d., at 331. 
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an 
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option 
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting 
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing 
13 The Court, found important confirmation of the rationality of the 
coverage formula in the fact that there was no evidence of "recent racial 
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions ex-
empted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331. 
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary 
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that 
the congressional action was justified by the "long history of the dis-
criminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their 
rare." !d., at 122. See id., at 146 (Douglas, J.) ; id., at 216, and n. 94 
(Harlan, J.) ; id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHI1'E, and MARSHALL, JJ.); 
id., at 284 (STEWART, J.). That history supported temporary suspension 
of those few literacy tests still in use, see id., at 147 (Dougas, J.), with-
out providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, preclearance involver5 
a broad rest raint on all sta.te and local voting practices, regardless of 
whether they have been, or even could be, used to discriminate. 
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preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without 
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclea.r-
ance becomes acute. 
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not 
have direct control over their city's voting practices until 
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's 
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word 
"State" in§ 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that 
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and 
every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria,. This 
outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to 
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single sub-
division.14 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has 
succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971,15 
14 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Court's position dictates this eccentric result 
by insisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of pre-
clearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would 
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State 
:which could not bail out due to the failings of a single subdivision. A 
rational approach would treat the statPs and local governments inde-
pendently for purposes of bailout. If subdivisions in Georgia were free 
to seek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could 
properly focus on the State's voting policies. Then, if Georgia were 
entitled to bail out, preclearance would cont.inue t.o apply to subdivisions 
that by their own noncompliance met the coverage criteria of § 4 (b). 
Of course, the situation would be different if the State had contributed, 
overtly or covertly, to the subdivision's failure to comply. 
15 Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966); 
Alaska v. United States, c·. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972). Alaska's 
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in 
the 1970 extension. The 1975 extension of the Act also re-established 
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit. 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78-0484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipu-
lated dismissal of action) . 
One other State-Virginia-has aLtemped to bail out under § 4 (a). 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (DC 
1974) , aff'd, 420 U. S. 901 (1975) . The court held that Virginia did not 
s~tis.fy § 4 (a) because a state literacy test adrninli:;tered in some localitie~ 
j 
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That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous 
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, 
or in 1971 for that State's .. 302;ooo people and 60 subdivisions, 
is a f~r cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's 
. approximately five million people and 877local governments lil 
Today's ruling therefore will ·seal off the constitutionally nec-
cessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act. 
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption 
against voting changes 'by certain state and local govern-
ments. If that presumption is -restricted to those governments 
meeting§ 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can 
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may 
be seen, as the South Caro'lina v. Katzenoach Court saw it, as 
action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fif,. 
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome 
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For 
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District ~ 
Court.17 ~ 
between 1963 and 1965 was discriminatory in the context of the inferior 
education offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties before that 
period. 
16 The Solicitor General statrs that Georgia has 159 counties, 530 
municipalities, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every 
voting change, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to discrimi-
nation in voting. Brief of United States, Appendix, at la. 
1 7 On a practical level, the DistriC't Court argued that since more than 
7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting changes, bail-
.9llt suits by a small percentage of those subdivisions would swamp that 
' court. . In view of the acknowledged difficulties that con-
front a local government in seeking bailout in the District of Columbia, 
it is by no mean~ self-evident that the "floodgates" perceived by the court 
would ever open. Such suits, involving substantial expense as well as· 
w1certainty, would not likely be initiated unless there were a substantial 
:likelihood of succes:::. Moreover, the court's argument ignores the proce-
dures of a bailout suit. Sect10n 4 (a) dirPcts the Attorney GenPral not to 
contest bailou1 if he finds that the state or local government'has not used 
J 
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IV 
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would 
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way/perhaps~ 
this case could be viewed as one where the CoJr\'s ends .... 
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court 
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has 
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite 
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the 
most local decisions made by this small mty in Georgia. Such 
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local govern-
ment in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the 
Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteentv 
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights 
Act could have intended that result. 
a discrimmatory te~t or device over the preceding 17 year::.. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a) . In fact, the Attorney General consented to bailout in the 
nine actwn:; under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only three bailout 
suits have gone to trial. See nn. 7 and 13, supm. Thus the Department 
of Just1ce, not the courts, would ~boulder much of the added burden that 
might arilse from recogmzing a bailout right for governments like the city 
of Rome. That uurden could hardly br more onerous than the Attorney 
Genrral's pre~ent re:;poni:libility for prec!Parmg all voting change:; in 7,000 
subdivis10n:s. In thr fir:st :six month:; of 1979 ovrr 3,200 :such voting 
changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a rate of morr than 25 
per working day Letter to Joseph W. Darn from Drew S. Days III, 
Assistant Attorney General, Civll Rights Division, U. S. Department of 
Ju:;tice (Aug. 3, 1979), repnnted in Brief for Petitioner:;, App. C, at 1c. 
These a:;tomshmg figures compare unf<worably with thosr cited by MR. 
Ju~:>TICE S'l'EVENS in his Sheffield dissent, whPre hP que~t10ned the efficacy of 
the Attorney General 's review of preclearance requests that then were 
ar:oiving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U. S., at 147-148, and nn. 8, 
10. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190, 200--201 (PowELL, .J., concurring). 
It hardly need be added that no :;enior officer in the J ushce Department-
much less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judg~ 
ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. ·Thus, 
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivision~ 
and States are finally judged by umdentifiable employees of the feder1~~ / bureaumoy, u•u.Jly without anything "'"'mbling an ovidontiory hoarin/ 
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No. 78-1840 
City of Rome et al., Appellants,] On Appeal from the United 
v. States District Court for 
United States et al. the District of Columbia. 
[December -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
\ 
Two years ago this C'ourt held that the term ", 'tate" in 
, 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political sub-
divisions that control election processes, and that those sub-
divisions are subject to the requirement in § 5 of the Act 
that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. 
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala-
bama, 435 U. S. 110 (1978) (Sheffield) . Today the Court 
concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term 
"State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the 
preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only 
conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as to 
the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent. 
I 
Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds, 
the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the 
Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this 
case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15% of 
the registered voters are black. This case involves two types 
of local action affecting voting. First, in 1966 the Georgia 
Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City 
Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the 
number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new 
arrangement, three city commissioners and two memhers of 
the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for num-
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bered posts.1 Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome com-
pleted 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in 
this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote 
in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But 
~ of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopu-
lated when they were taken over by the city. By 19.78 the 
additional white voters in the anne;xed lan.d had caused .f'!. 
ne~ decline of 1 ro in the blacJ<: share of !tome's electorate.2 
There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of 
the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of 
fact. Tha~ court made a finding that Rome has not employed 
a "literacy test or other device ... as a prerequisite to voter 
registration during th~ past seventeen years," and that "in 
recent years there have been no direct barriers to black voting 
in ~ome." 472 F , Supp. ~1, 224, 225 (DC 1979). The 
court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to 
run for office, th~Lt there was no evidence of obstacles to politi-
cal candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for 
the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the 
vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters) . 
Although no black has been elected to the municipal govern-
ment, the court stated that the "white elected officials of 
Rome ... are responsive to the needs and interests of the black 
community," and actively seek black political support.3 !d. , 
1 As part of the package of revisions, the Assembly increased the Board 
of Education from five to six members, eased voter registration require-
ments, and shifted registration responsibility to the county. 472 F. Supp. 
221, 224 (DC 1979) . 
2 The statistics on this question are not altogether satisfactory, since 
the 1978 population of the annexed areas must be compared to 1975 
voter registration totals. 'Given that 16.6% of the city's voters were 
black in 1975, that percentage drops only to 15.6% after adding the 823 
white voters and nine black voters who lived in the annexed areas in 
1978. See Brief for United States, at 38, n. 26. 
3 The District Court also noted that the city has "made an effort to 
upgra:de some black neighborhoods," has S\~bsidized the transit ·system 
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at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome 
"the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can 
probably determine the outcome of many if not most con-
tests." Ibid. 
Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve 
the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The 
court held that the city had not proved that the annexations 
and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of 
Rome's blacks. 472 F. Supp., at 245, 247. I have many res-
ervations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a 
black candidate running under the challenged election rules 
commanded thre, times the share of votes that the black 
community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue 
were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting 
when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider 
whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies 
of the holding below because they highlight how far the 
courts, including this Court, have departed from the original 
understanding of the Act's purpose and meauing."' Against 
this background, I address the substantive questions posed by 
this case. 
II 
Under § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political 
subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations 
through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout" ) in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a) . Bailout must be granted if the District Court 
which has a predominantly black ridership, and has hired a number of 
of blacks for skilled and supervisory positions in the municipal govern-
ment. 472 F . Supp., at 225. 
4 The Court '::; opinion Himply ignorf>s thf> most relevant facts. In so 
doing, t.he Court awrts its Pyes from the central paradox of this case : 
F.wn though RomP has mrt. every crilPriou e.~tablishrd by the Votmg 
Rights Act for protecting the polincal rights of minorities, the Court holdt:> I 
that 1 h(· <'it · mu~t remain ~ubject to prccleanlll ce. 
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finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used 
during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action 
for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color.'' Ibid. The District 
Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this stand-
ard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political 
life. See pp. 2-3, supra. These findings demonstrate that the 
city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout 
provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long 
as Georgia is covered by § 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may 
not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of 
federal authorities.~ 
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, 
and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its 
Rtate remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can 
be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we 
have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout 
\available to 11such Rtate or subdivision." language that refers 
hack to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests ( i) 11in 
any State" reached by ~ 4 (b) of the Act. or (ii) uin any 
political subdivision'' which is covered ''as a separate unit." 0 
" Section 5 permits two nwthod::- of prrclrarancr. A local iJ:Ovrrnmrnt 
ma~· a~k the District Court of the District of Columbia for a ruling that 
the vot.ing change is acceptable, or it may submit the change to the At-
tome~· General for him to accept or reject within 60 days. 42 U. R. C. 
§ 1973r. The admmistrativr procedure iR URed amost exclusively, inre 
it takl•,.: lPSs timr. 
~ Sretion --l (a) provide,.: in rrlevtmt part: 
"To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is 
not drnied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be· 
drnied t,he right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because 
of hi~ fajJmr to eomply w1t h any test or device m any State with res peel 
to which the determinations have been made under the first two sen-
lences of subdivision (b) of thtS section or in any political subdivtSion 
'tl'ith respect to which such determinations have been made as a sepamte 
•twit. nnlt>ss the United States Distriet Court for the District of Columbia 
lu an artiou for !\ dechlrator · judgment, brought hy such State 01' SHb·-
78-1840-DISSENT 
UlTY OF RO:YIE v. UNITED STATES 
Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under § 4 (b), 
this case concerns the first category in that definition.' Thus 
the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is § 4 (a)'s prohibi-
tion of tests or devices "in any State" covered under § 4 (b). 
The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this 
key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to dis-
criminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ba.n 
on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any con-
trol over voting. 435 U. S., at 120. Since the same language 
in § 4 (a) also defines the applicability of § 5, the Court con-
tinued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. 
Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes 
in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the 
Act. Id., at 126-127. 
The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the 
same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the 
bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the lan-
guage does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus 
construes the identical words in § 4 (a) to have one mean-
ing in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied 
in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the 
statute to irrationality. 
This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the 
rights of localities like Rome, which are in States covered by 
~ 4 (b). and those of covered local governments that are lo-
division against the United States has determined that no such test or 
device has been u~ed during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the 
action with the purpose or with the eiiect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color ... . " 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a) (em-
phasis supplied) . 
7 l ' m!N §-!(b), a St.ate or political subdivi,;ion ii> ~ubj('C't to thr Act if 
the Director of the Census finds that less than 50% of the eligible popu-
lation voted in the last presidential election, and the Attorney General 
determines that a discriminatory "test or device" was maintained in the 
jurisdiction in 1964. Those determinations, which are unreviewable, trig-
ger the application of the preclearance requirement of § 5. 42 U S. C. 
§§ 1973b (b) , 1973c. 
'18-1840-DISSENT 
CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES 
cated in States not covered by the Act. Twenty-eight sub-
divisions in tho latter group have bailed out from the pre-
clearance obligation in six separate actions.8 Yet the only 
difference between those governments and the city of Rome 
is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to 
the Voting Rights Act. There is no reasoned justification 
for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but 
denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when 
both have been found to be in full compliance with the bail-
out criteria. 
The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does 
not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. The argu-
ment nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for 
two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as 
Rome are 'political subdivisions' " or "States," but merely sub-
8 Counties of Choctaw and i\1 cCurtain, Oklahoma v. United States. . A. 
No. 76-1250 (DC May 12, 1978) (two counties); New Mexico, Curry, 
McKinley and Otero Counties v. United States, C. A. No. 76-0067 (DC 
July 30, 1976) (three counties); Maine v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2125 (DC Sept. 17, 1976) (13 municipalities and 5 "plantations"); Wake 
County, North Carolina v. United States, C. A. No. 1198-66 (DC Jan. 23, 
1967) (one county); Elmore County, Idaho v. United States, C. A. No. 
320-66 (DC Sept. 22, 1966) (one county); Apache, Navaho and Co-
conino Counties, Arizona v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966) 
(three counties). Three counties in New York City bailed out in 1972, 
New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC Apr. 13, 1972), but 
the bailout order was rescinded two years later after a Distnct Court 
found that the State had conducted elections in English only, thereby 
violating the Act. New York v. United States, C. A. No. 2419-71 (DC 
Jan . 18, 1974-) , aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 ( 1974) (referring to 'l'orres v. Sachs, 
C. A. No. 72-3921 (CES) (SDNY Sept. 27, 1973)) . 
Bailout was denied in one action involving a locaJ subdivision, Gaston 
County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969), and three 
were dismissed by stipulation of the parties, Board of Commissioners, 
El Paso County, Colorado v. United States, C A. No.· 77-0185 (DC 
Nov 8, 1977) ; Yuba County, California v. United States, C. A. No. 75-
2170 (DC May 25, 1976) ; Nash County, North Carolina v United States,. 
C. A:No. 1702-66 (DC Sept. 26, 1969) ). 
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jected such entities to the preclearance requirement of § 5; 
and (ii) congressional reports accompanying the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a sub-
division located in a State covered by the Act. Ante, at -. 
Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield 
did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political sub-
divisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point 
that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control 
the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of 
fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail 
out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look 
at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials 
only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face. 
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1948); United States v. 
Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). Although "committee 
reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning 
of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disre-
garded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute." 
Gooding v. United States, 416 U. S. 430, 468 (1974) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning 
of "State" as used in § 4 (a): It includes all political subdivi-
sions that exercise control over elections.9 Accordingly, there 
is no basis for the Court's rdiance on congr('ssional state- ' 
ments that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If 
§ 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same 
section must also relieve that burden when the city can 
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict require-
ments for bailout. 
0 Thi~ construction applies to political subdivisions d<•fi.nrd hy § 14 (c) 
(2) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (c) (2), as well as to governmt'nt::; like 
Romp 1lwt do not. fnll within that ~tat11tor~ · dpfinition. Thu~ , und<>r \ 
8heffiP!d '~ ~tatutor~· interpn·tat .ion, all ~nhdivision~ in StHtP.-< cov<•rpd by 
the Act. should be ent itlt>rl to bail out. The <:Oll~>titut ional atlaly:-;i :; of 
Pa.rt III, infra, reachcl:l the same conclusion. 
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III 
There is, however, more involved here than incorrect con-
struction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of§ 4 (a) 
renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to 
the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both in-
trudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and 
abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered 
under the Act. Under§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Con-
gress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is 
acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South 
' Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 327-328 (1966); 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In view of the District Court finding that Rome 
has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the 
Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing 
those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies 
the bailout standards of§ 4 (a).10 
When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exer-
cise of congressional power." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
supra, 383 U. S., at 334. The Court recognized that preclear-
ance under the Act implicates serious federalism concerns. 
!d., at 324-327. As MR. JusTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield, 
the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant 
and undeniable." 435 U. S., at 141 (dissenting opinion).11 
10 In view of the narrower focus of mr approach to the statutory and 
con~titutional itiSU<'S raitied in this ca.~e, I do noL r<.'ach t be broad analyt'is 
offerrd by l\ln . .TU:>'l'ICE REHNQUrS'r's dis;:cnt. 
11 Other ,Ju~tices have <.'xpre~sed the :same concern E. g., South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (Black, J ., concurring and dissenting); 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 586, and n. 4 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., concurring and di senting); see also Georgia v. United States, 
411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, n . 20 {1976), 
the Court noted that because political subdivisiOns "denvc their authority 
and power from their respective States," their integrity, like that of the 
States, is protected by the prmciples of federali'illl. 
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That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys 
local control of the means of self-government, one of the cen-
tral values of our polity.12 Unless the federal structure pro-
vides some protection for a community's ordering of its own 
democratic procedures, the right of each community to deter-
mine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Con-
stitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individ-
ual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered 
areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the 
influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting 
them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to 
chart policy. 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, did not 
lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual 
rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a pro-
phylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court em-
phasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be 
imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress 
approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evi-
dence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of 
the States and political subdivisions affected by the new 
12 The frderal system allocates primary control over election::; to ::;tate 
and local officials. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 125 (Black, J.); 
id., at 201 (Harlan, J.) ; Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elec-
tions, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959) . 
This Court has emphasized the importance in a. democratic society of 
preserving local control of local matters. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U. S. 717, 744 (1974) (federal court control of local schools "would de-
prive the people of control of schools through their elected representa-
tives") ; James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 143 (1971) (local referendum 
on public housing project "ensures that all the people of a community 
will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures ... 
and to lower tax revenues") . Preservation of local control, naturally 
enough, involves protecting the integrity of state and local governments 
See National League of Cities v. Usery, supra n , 426 U. S., at 855 ; 
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U S. 559, 565 (1911 ) . 
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remedies of the Act." 383 U. S., at 329. Since the coverage 
formula in § 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those juris-
dictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposi-
tion of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the 
absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been 
free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years." ld., 
at 330.13 
The Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach emphasized, 
however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be 
relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact 
did not continue or materializf' during the prescribed period. 
"Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth. the Act 
provides for termination of special statutory coverage at 
the behest of States and political subdivisions in which 
the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not 
materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined pe-
riod]." I d., at 331. 
Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an 
unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option 
is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting 
Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing 
13 Tlw Court found important confirmation of the ralionalit.,v of the 
coverage formula in the fact thaL there was no evidence of "recent racial 
discrimination involving tests or devices" in States or subdivisions e -
empted from preclearance. 383 U. S., at 331. 
This Court took a similar approach when it affirmed the temporary 
suspension of all literacy tests by Congress in 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 
supra n. 9. The entire Court agreed with Mr. Justice Black's view that 
the congressional action was ,iustified by the "long history of the dis-
criminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their 
rare." !d., at 122. See id., at 146 (Douglas, J .) ; id., at 216, and n. 94 
(Harlan, J.) ; id., at 234-235 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) ; 
zd, at 284 (S'l'EWART, J.) . That history supported temporary suspensiOn 
of those few literacy tests still in use, see id. , at 147 (Dougas, J.), with-
onL providing any bailout-like option. In contrast, prrclcarance involve. 
n broad restraint on all stat.e and local votmg practices, regardless · o[' 
whether they have been, or even could be, used to cli~criminate. 
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preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without 
bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclear-
ance becomes acute. 
The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not 
have direct control over their city's voting practices until 
the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's 
restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word 
<~State" in§ 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that 
it has satisfied the standards in § 4 (a), but also that each and 
every one of its politica1 subdivisions meets those criteria. This 
outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to 
the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single sub-
division.n Since the statute was enacted, only one State has 
succeeded in bailing out-Alaska in 1966, and again in 1971.15 
11 Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Cour1's position dictalrs this rccentric result 
by msisting that subdivisions in covered States can be relieved of pre-
clearance only when their State bails out. In my view this also would 
cast serious doubt on the Act's constitutionality as applied to any State 
which could not bail out du\' 10 the failings of a single subdivision. A 
rational approach would trrat the states and local governments inde-
pendently for purposes of bailout. If subdivi ' ions in Georgia were free 
to seek bailout on their own, then a bailout action by the State could 
properly focus on the State's voting policies. Thm, if Georgia were 
entitled to bail out., preclearance would conti11ue to apply to subdivisions 
that by their own noncompliance met the coverage criteria of § 4 (b) . 
Of cour;:;e, the situation would be different if the State had contributed, 
overtly or covertly, to the subdivision's failure to comply. 
15 Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 101-66 (DC Aug. 17, 1966); 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 2122-21 (DC Mar. 10, 1972) . Alaska's 
1971 suit was prompted by recoverage of the State under the Act in 
the 1970 extension . The 1975 extension of the Act also re-established 
coverage of Alaska, which filed but abandoned yet another bailout suit. 
Alaska v. United States, C. A. No. 78...()484 (DC May 14, 1979) (stipu-
lated dismissal of action) . 
One other State-Virginia-has attemped to bail out under § 4 (a) . 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 386 F . Supp. 1319 (DC 
1974), aff'd, 420 U. S. 901 {1975). The court held that Virginia did not 
atisfy § 4 (a) · because a state literacy test administered in some localities 
78-1840-DISSEN"T 
12 CITY OF ROME v. UNITED STATES 
That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous 
States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 
1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, 
or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions, 
is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's 
approximately five million people and 877local governments 16 
Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutionally nec-
cessary safety valve in the Voting Rights Act. 
The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption 
against voting changes by certain state and local govern-
ments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments 
meeting § 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can 
be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may 
be seen, as the South Carolina v. Katzenbach Court saw it, as 
action by Congress at the 1imit of its authority under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome 
may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For 
these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District 
Court.11 
between 1963 and 1965 was discriminatory in the contexL of the mfenor 
t>ducation offered to Virginia blacks in certain rural counties before that 
pPriod 
1 '; The Solicitor General states that Georgia has 159 countH·.•. 530 
mumcipali ties, and 188 other subdivisions that now must preclear every 
voti ng change, no matter how irrelevant the change might be to discrimi-
nation in voLing. Brief of United States, Appendix, at la. 
17 On a practi cal Jevt>l, thl' District Court argut>d that simP more than 
7,000 subdivisions currently are required to preclear voting changes, bail-
out suits by a small percentage of tho;;e ;;ubdivisions would swamp that 
('C\ll'l. .J'/2 ~'. Supp .. at. ~;{l-2;l2. In view of tht> acknuwlrdgt'd difficultiP;o; ' 
that. !'Oill'ront. :L lo<"al gowrnnwnt in ~Pt•king bailout in tlw Di~trirt of Co-
lu111hi:1. it i~ b~· 110 mra11~ ,;plf-r\·idt>nt that thr "rloodgatp~" JH'J'('l'ivt>d by tlw 
c·O ill't· would rvC'I' O]Wil. ~urh ,-uit:<, involvinp; substa ntial <'Xpt•nse as w('i[ as 
unrerlainty , would not likely be initiated unless therP were a ~ubstanlial 
likl'lihood of succrss. Moreover, the court's argument ignores tlw proce-
dures of a bailout suit. Section 4 (a) directs the Attorney General not to 
contest bailout jf he finds that the state or local government has not used 
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IV 
If there were reason to believe that today's decision would 
protect the voting rights of minorities in any way, perhaps 
this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends 
justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court 
found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has 
been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite 
this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the 
most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such 
an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local govern-
ment in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the 
Act's requirements. Neither the Fratners of the Fifteenth 
Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights 
Act could have intended that result. 
a discriminatory test or device over the preceding 17 years. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (a). In fact, the Attorney General consented to bailout in the 
nme actions under § 4 (a) that have succeeded, while only three bailout 
suits have gone to trial. See nn. 7 and 13, supra. Thus the Department 
of Justice, not the courts, would shoulder much of the added burden that 
might arise frcm recognizing a. bailout right for governments like the city 
of Rome. That burden could hardly be more onerous than the Attorney 
General's present responsibility for preclearing all voting changes in 7,000 
subdivisions. In the first six months of 1979 over 3,200 ::mch voting 
changes were submitted to the Attorney General, a. rate of more than 25 
per working day. Letter to Joseph W. Dorn from Drew S. Days III, 
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of 
Justice (Aug. 3, 1979), reprinted in Brief for Petitioners, App. C, at lc. 
These astonishing figures compare unfavorably with tho~e cited by MH. 
JusTICE STEVENS in his Sheffield dissent, where he questioned the efficacy of 
the Attorney General's review of preclearance requests that then were 
amving at the rate of only four a day. 435 U.S., al 147-148, and 1111. 8, 
10. See Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 200-201 (POWELL, J., concurring) . 
It hardly need be added that no senior officer in the Justice Department-
much less the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal judg-
ment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus, 
important decisions made on a democratic basis in covered subdivisiOns 
and States are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of the federal 
bureaucracy, usually without anything resembling a.n evidentiary hearing 
• + 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. dissenting. ~~ 
We have only this Term held that the city of Mobile does  
not violate the Constitution by maintaining an at-large sys-
tem of electing city officials. Oity of Mobile v. Bolden,- ~~~-I 
U. S. - (19-) . This result is reached even though the ~ --~ 
black residents of Mobile have demonstrated that racial "bloc" '"" ~~· ~ _. 
voting has prevented them from electing a black representa- ,_.,.,..._,... ~ 
tive to the city government. The Court correctly •concluded I It~ -I- I r':!-. 
that a city has no obligation under the Constitution to ~ ~ 
structure its representative system in a manner that maxi- _a L-
1 1 
_ 
mizes the black community's ability to elect a black repre-~ .'-V 
sentative. Yet in the instant case, the city of Rome is pre- ~\J 
vented ~, from instituting precisely the type of structural 
changes which the Court says Mobile may maintain con- .a-c:-~ , 
sistently with the Civil War Amendments because Congress ~ 
has prohibited these changes under the Voting Rights Act as ~ 
an exercise of its "enforcement" power conferred by those 
Amendments. ....__ ------. . 
1t is not necessary to hold that Congress is limited to ~~ 
merely providing a forum in which aggrieved plaintiffs may 
assert rights under the Civil War Amendments in order to ~ 
disagree with the Court's decision permitting Congress to k ~~ 
. strait-jacket the city of Rome in this manner. Under § 5 '~j ...- --:_ ,-~ ' 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth ~r,'' 
Amendment, Congress is granted only the power to "enfor~e'' 
by "appropriate" legislation the limitations on state actwn 
I 
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embodied in those Amendments. While the presumption of 
constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of 
the Federal Government or of one of the States, it is this 
Court which is ultimately responsible for deciding challenges 
to the exercise of power by those entities. Marbury v. Madi-
' 
son, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); United States v. Nixon, 
418 U. S. 683 ( 1974). Today's decision is nothing less than a 
total abdication of that authority, rather than an exercise of 
the deference due to a coordinate branch of the government. 
I 
The facts of this case readily demonstrate the fallacy 
underlying the Court's determination that congressional pro-
hibition of Rome's conduct can be characterized as enforce-
ment of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.1 The 
three-judge District Court entered extensive findings of fact-
facts which are conspicuously abs.e._nt from the Court~..Q.Pin­
ion. The lower court f ound that Rome has not employed ...._ 
any discriminatory barriers to black voter registration in the 
past 17 years. Nor has the city employed any other barriers 
to black voting or black candidacy. Indeed, the Court found 
that white elected officials have encouraged blacks to run for 
elective posts in Rome, and are "responsive to the needs and 
1 The Voting Rights Act. io generally viewed as an exercise of Fifteenth 
Amendmrnt power. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 
____ .......,.""'. ())~._..::S::;in:;;ce vote ''dilution" device~ are in i~ue in this case, the rights 
nt ~tnKe ar . viewed as Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 
Czty of Mobile v. Bolden, - U. S. - (19-). Nrvertheless, this 
Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act if it is applied to remedy 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gaston County v. United 
States, 395 U. S 286, 290, n. 5 (1969). Moreover, the nature of the 
enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-· 
mmt;; haH alway~ been treated a~ coexten~ive. See, e. g., United States 
v Guest, 383 U. S 745, 784 (1965) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); James 
v Bowman, 190 U. S. 127 (1903). For this reason , it is not nece;;sary 
to differentiate between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment powers: 
for the purposes of th1s opmion . 
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·interests of the black community." The city has not discrim-
"inated against blacks in the provision of services and has 
nude efforts to upgrade black neighborhoods. 
It was also established that although a black has never 
been elected to political office in Rome, a black was appointed 
to fill a vacancy in an elective post. White candidates vigor-
ously pursue the support of black voters. Several com-
missioners testified that they spent proportionately more time 
campaigning in the black community because they "needed 
that vote to win." The Court concluded that "blacks often 
hold the balance of power in Rome elections." 
Despite this political climate, the Attorney General refused 
to approve a number of city annexations and various changes 
in the electoral process. The city sought to require majority 
vote for election to the City Commission and Board of Edu-
cation; to create numbered posts and staggered terms for those 
elections; and to establish a ward residency requirement for 
Board of Education elections. In addition, during the years 
between 1964 and 1973, the city effected 60 annexations. 
Respondents concede that none of the annexations were 
sought for discriminatory purposes. All of the electoral 
changes and 13 of the annexations were opposed by the At-
torney General on the grounds that their adoption would 
lessen the likelihood that blacks would be successful in elect-
ing a black ·city official, assuming racial bloc voting on the 
part of both whites and blacks. Each of the changes was 
considered to be au impermissible "vote-dilution" device. 
Rome sought judicial relief and the District Court found that 
the city had m!1 its burden of proving that these electoral 
cha nges anCI annexations were not enactea with the purpose 
oTC:i"iSCfim~ting against blacks. The changes were neverthe-
less prohibited because Of their perceived disparate effect.2 
" I share MH. JusncE PowELL'~ observation that the factual conclusions 
respecting the discriminatory effect of the annexations are highly ques-
tiOnable. Supra, at 3. I rest my dissent, however, on somewhat broader 
gronnd&. 
. '· ,. 
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II 
The Court holds today that the city of Rome can constitu-
tionally be compelled to seek congressional approval for most 
of its governmental chauges even though it has not engaged 
in any discrimina.tion against blacks for at least 17 years. 
Moreover, the Court also holds that federal approval can be 
constitutionally denied even after the city has proven that the 
changes are not purposefully discriminatory. While I agree 
with MR. JusTICE PowELL's conclusion that requiring locali-
ties to submit to preclearance is a significant intrusion on 
local autonomy, it is an even greater intrusion on that auton-
omy to deny preclearance sought. 
The facts of this case signal the necessity for this Court 
to carefully scrutinize the alleged source of con ressional 
power o mtrude so eeply in the _governmental structure of 
t~unicipal ·corporations created by some of the 50 States. 
Sectwn 2 of the F ifteenth Amendment and § 5 of the Four-
teenth provide that Congress shall have the power to "en-
force" § 1 "by appropriate legislation." Congressional power 
to prohibit the electoral changes proposed by Rome is de-
pendent upon the scope and· nature of that power. It is 
clear that if the proposed changes would violate the Consti-
tution, Congress could certainly prohibit their implementa-
tion. It has never been seriously maintained, however, that 
Congress can do no more than the judiciary to enforce the 
Amendments' commands. Thus, if the electoral changes in 
issue do not violate the Constitution, as judicially interpreted, 
it must be determined whether Congress ·could nevertheless 
appropriately prohibit these changes to enforce the substan-
tive prohibition of the Amendments. If not properly reme- ( 
dial, the exercise of this power could be sustained only if 
Congress has the authority under its enforcement powers to 
determi.pe without more that electoral changes with a dis-
parate itrpact on race violate the Constitution, in which case 
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Congress by a legislative Act could effectively amend the 
Constitution. 
I think it is apparent that neither of the first two theories 
for sustaining the exercise of congressional power support this 
application of the Voting Rights Act. After our decision in 
City of Mobile there can be no dispute that Rome has not 
en aged in constitut-ionally prohibited conduct. I also do not 
believe at prohibition o ese c anges can genuinely be 
characterized as a remedial exercise of congressionaJ enforce-
ment powers. Thus, the result of the Court's holding is that 
Congress effectively has the power to determine for itself that 
this conduct violates the Constitution. This result violates 
previously well-established distinctions between the Judicial 
Branch anJ the Legislative or Executive Branches of the Fed-
eral Government. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 
(1974) ; Marbury v. Madison, (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) . 
A 
If the enforcement power is construed as a "remedial" grant 
of authority, it is this Court's duty to ensure that a chal-
lenged congressional act does no more than "enforce" the 
limitations on state power established in the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments. M arbury v. Madison. The Court 
has not resolved the question of whether it is an appropriate 
exercise of remedial power for Congress to prohibit local 
governments from instituting structural changes in their gov-
ernment, which although not racially motivated, will have the 
effect of decreasing the ability of a black voting bloc to elect 
a black candidate. 
This Court has found, as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, that Congress intended to prohibit governmental 
changes on the basis of no more than disparate impact under 
the Voting Rights Act. These cases, however, have never 
directly presented the constitutional questions implicated by 
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in no purposeful discrimination in enacting these changes, or 
otherwise. for almost two decades. See Beer v. United States, 
425 U. fl. 130 (1976); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 
U. S. 3.58 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); 
Farley v. Patterson, 393 U. S. 544 (1969). In none of these 
cases was the Court squarely presented with a constitutional 
challenge to congressional power to prohibit state electoral 
practices after the locality has disproved the existence of any 
purposeful discrimination. a 
The cases in which this Court has actually examined the 
constitutional questions relating to congressional exercise of 
·its powers to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments also did not purport to resolve this issue.4 But the 
a In Ott.tJ of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC), aff'd 
nwm., 410 U.S. 962 (1973), the District Court did find that an annexa-
tion ~chcrnr could be prohibited solely on the basis of its disparate impact, 
without a finding of purpol:leful discrimination on the part of the local 
govrrnment,. Petersburg cannot be considered dispositive of the question 
presentrd in this ca;;e, however. The court did. not address any possible 
eon~titut ional difficulties with its conclusion, and thus it is not clear that 
theHe arguments were raised by the parties . An unexplicated per curiam I 
affirmance b~r this Court affirms only the judgment, not thE' reasoning; 
of the Dt~t rict Court. See Hicks v. 'Miranda, 422 U. S. 332 (1975). 
'1 Thi~ i"Hue was also not squarely presented or resolved in United 
Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). In UJO, the issue 
wa:> whcthE'r the State could constitutionally take racial criteria into 
n.ecount in drawing its district lines where such redistricting was not 
strictly necessary to eliminate the effects of past discriminatory districting 
or npportionment. The Court found that use of this criteria was proper, 
for differing real:lonH. In an opinion by MR. JusTICE WHITE, joined by three 
ol'hrr Members of the Court, it was suggested in part that the Voting 
Right~ Act conld com;titutionally require this. The only question, how-
ever, wa::; the constitutionality of state use of racial criteria, vis-a-vi" other 
citizens, and 11ot the constitutionality of congressional acts which required 
stale governments to use racial criteria against their will . In another 
par(, of the opinion, MR. JusncE WHITE reasoned that "the state is not 
powerlc~:5 to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by voterS" 
when it is regularly practiced at the- polls." 430 U. S., at 167. While 
Stntcs may he empowered tu1 voluntarily use racial criteria in order tm· 
• 
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1Jriuciples which can be distilled from those precedents re-
quire the conclusion that the limitations on state power at 
issue cannot be sustained as a remedial exercise of power. 
While the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibit 
only purposeful discriii1ination, the decisions of this Court 
nave recognized that in some circums~ces, congressional 
prohibition of state or local action which 1s not purposefully 
discriminatory may nevertheless be appropriate remedial leg-
islation under the Civil War Amendments. See Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970); Gaston County v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 286 (1969) . 
Those circumstances, however, are not without judicial 
limits. These decisions indicate that congressional prohibi-
tion of some conduct which may not itself violate the Consti-
tution is "appropriate" legislation "to enforce" the Civil War 
Amendments if that prohibition is necessary to remedy prior 
. constitutional violations by the governmental unit, or if nec-
essary to effectively prevent purposeful discrimination by a 
governmental unit. In both circumstances, Congress would 
still be legislating in response to the incidence of state action 
vwlative of the Civil War Amendments. These precedents 
are carefully formulated around a historic tenet of the law 
that in order to invoke a remedy, there must be a wrong-
and under a remedial construction of congressional power to 
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, that 
wroug must amount to a constitutional violation. Only when 
the wrong is identified can the appropriateness of the remedy 
be measured. 
The Court today identifies the constitutional wrong which 
was the object of this congressional exercise of power as pur-
poseful discrimination by local govenunents in structuring 
their political processes iu an effort to reduce black voting 
mimmize the effects of racial bloc voting, that conclusion does not deter-· 
mme the constitutional authority of Congress to require States to use 
racial cntena m structuring their governments. 
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strength. The Court goes on to hold that the prohibitions 
imposed in this case represent an "appropriate" means of 
preventing such constitutional violations. The Court does 
not rest this conclusion on any finding that this prohibition is 
necessary to remedy any prior discrimination by the locality. 
Rather, the Court reasons that prohibition of changes dis-
criminatory in effect prevent the incidence of changes which 
are discriminatory in purpose: 
"Congress could rationally have concluded that, because 
electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable 
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting 
create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper 
to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact." 
Supra, at 19. 
What the Court explicitly ignores is that in this case the city 
has proven that these changes are not discriminatory in pur-
pose. Neither reason nor precedent support the conclusion 
that here it is "appropriate" for Congress to attempt to pre-
vent purposeful discrimination by prohibiting conduct which 
a locality proves is not purposeful discrimination. 
Congress had before it evidence that various governments 
were enacting electoral changes and annexing territory to 
prevent the participation of blacks in local government by 
measures other than outright denial of the franchise. 5 Con-
gress could of course remedy and prevent such purposeful 
discrimination on the part of local governments. See Go-
million v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 347 (1960). And given 
the difficulties of proving that an electoral change or an-
nexatiOn has been undertaken for the purpose of discriminat-
ing against blacks, Congress could properly conclude that as 
a remedial matter it was necessary to place the burden of 
proving lack of discriminatory purpose on the localities. See 
5 See the reference to t lw legislative history in United Jewish Organiza· 
tions v. Carey, 430 U. El. 144, 158 (1978), 
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). But 
all of this does 110t support the conclusion that Co11gress is 
acting remedially when it continues the presumption of pur-
poseful discrimination even after the locality has disproved 
that presumption. Absent other circumstances. it would be a 
topsy-turvy judicial system which held that electoral changes 
which have been affirmatively proven to be permissible under 
the Constitution nonetheless violate the Constitution. 
The precedent on which the Court relies simply does not 
support its remedial characterization. Neither Oregon v. 
:Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), nor South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, supra, legitimize the use of an irrebuttable presumption 
that, vote dilution changes are motivated by a discriminatory 
animus. The principal electoral practice in issue iu those 
cases was the use of literacy tests. Yet. the Court simply 
fails to make any inquiry as to whether the particular elec-
toral practices iu issue here, are encompassed by the "pre-
ventJvc" remedial rationale invoked in South Carolina and 
Oregon . The rationale does support congressional prohibi-
tiOn of some electoral practices, but simply has no logical 
application to thf' "vote-dilution" devices in issue. 
Iu Oregon, the Court sustained a nationwide prohibition 
of literacy tests, thereby extending the more limited suspen-
sion approved in South Carolina. By upholding this con~ 
grc~sional measure, the Court established that under some 
circumstances, a congressional remedy may be constitutionally 
overiuclusive by prohibiting some state action which might 
not be purposefully discriminatory. That possibility does 
not .JUStify the overinclusiveness countenanced by the Court 
in this case, however. Oregon by no means held that Con-
gress could simply use discriminatory effect as a proxy for 
discrmunatory purpose, as the Court seems to imply. In-
stead, the Court opinions identified the factors which rendered 
this prohibition properly remedial. The Court found the 
nationwide ban to be an appropriate means of effectively 
\ • I 
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preventing purposeful discrimination in the application of th,e 
literacy tests as well as an appropriate means of remedying 
prior coustitutional violations by state and local governments ' 
in the administration of education . to minorities. 
The presumption that the literacy tests were either being 
used to purposefully discriminate, or that the disparate effects 
of those tests were attributable to discrimination in state-
administered education was not very wide of the mark. Var-
ious opinions of the Court noted that at the time that Con-
.. gress enacted the ban, few States were utilizing literacy tests, 
400 U. S., at 147 (opinion of Douglas, J.), and the voter 
registration statistics available within those States suggested 
that a disparte effect was prevalent. !d., at 132-133 (opin-
ion of Black, J.) . Even if not adopted with a discriminatory 
purpose, the tests could readily be applied in a discriminatory 
fashion. Thus a demonstration by the State that it sought 
to reinstate the tests for legitimate purposes did not eliminate 
the substantial risk of discrimination in application. Only a 
ban could effectively prevent the occurrence of purposeful 
discrimination . 
The nationwide ban was also found necessary to effectively 
remedy past constitutional violations. Without the nation-
wide ban. a voter who was illiterate due to state discrimina-
tion in education could be denied the right to vote on the 
basis of his illiteracy when he moved into a jurisdiction re-
taining a literacy test for nondiscriminatory purposes. I d., 
at 383- 384. Finally, MR. JusTICE STEWART found that a 
uniform prohibit~on had definite advantages for enforcement 
and federal relations: it reduced tensions with particular 
regions. and it relieved the Federal Government from 
the administrative burden implica.ted by selective state 
enforcement. 
Prcsum.pti vc prohibition of vote diluting procedures is not 
similarly an "appropriate" means of exacting state compli-
tlllCQ with the Cjvil War Amendments.. First, these prohi-
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bitions are quite unlike the literacy ban, where the disparate 
effects were traceable to the discrimination of governmental 
bodies in education even if their present desire to use the 
tests was legitimate. See Gaston County, supra. Any dis-
parate impact associated with the nondiscriminatory elec-
toral changes in issue here results from bloc voting-private 
rather than governmental discrimination. It is clear there-
fore that these prohibitions do not implicate congressional 
power to devise an effective remedy for prior constitutional 
violations by local governments. Nor does the Court invoke 
this aspect of congressional remedial powers. 
It is also clear that while most States still utilizing literacy 
tests may have been doing so to discriminate, a similar gen-
eralization could not be made about all government struc .. 
tures which have some disparate impact on black voting 
strength. At the time Congress passed the Act, one study 
demonstrated that 60% of all cities nationwide had at-large 
elections for city officials, for example. This form of govern-
ment was adopted by many cities throughout this century as 
a reform measure designed to overcome wide-scale corruption 
in the ward system of government. See Jewel, Local Systems 
of Representation: Political Consequences and Judicia 
Choices, 36 Geo. ·wash. L. Rev. 790, 799 (19 7). Obviously, 
annexations similarly cannot be presumed o be devoid of 
legitimate uses. Yet both of these practices are regularly 
prohibited by the Act in most covered cities. 
Nor does the prohibition of all ~te dihtien{bractices with 
a disparate impact enhance congressional prevention of pur.,. 
poseful discrimination. The changes in issues are not, like 
litracy' tests, though fair on their face, subject to discrimina-
tory application by local authorities. See Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). They are either discrimi.,. 
natory from the outset or not. 
Finally, the advantages supporting the imposition of a 
n.atjonwide ban. are simply not implicated in this case. N0-. 
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added administrative burdens are in issue since Congress has 
provided the mechanism for preclearance suits in any event, 
and the burden of proof for this issue is on the locality. And 
it is certain that the only constitutional wrong implicated-
purposeful dilution-can be effectively remedied by prohibit-
ing it where it occurs. For all these reasons, I do not think 
that the present case is controlled by the result in Oregon. 
By prohibiting all electoral changes with a disparate impact, 
Congress has attempted to prevent disparate impacts-not 
purposeful discrimination. 
Congress unquestionably has the power to prohibit and 
remedy state action which intentionally deprives citizens of 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. But unless 
these powers are to be wholly uncanalized, it cannot be appro-
priate remedial legislation for Congress to prohibit Rome 
from structuring its government in the manner as its popula-
tion sees fit absent a finding or unrebutted presumption that 
Rome has, or is. intentionally discriminating against its black 
citizens. Rome has simply committ onstitutional vio-
lations, as this our as e ne them. 
More is at stake than sophistry at its worst in the Court's 
conclusion that requiriug the local government to structure 
its political system in a manner that most effectively en-
hances black political strength serves to remedy or prevent 
constitutional wrongs on the part of the local government. 
The need to prevent this disparate impact is premised on the 
assumption that white candidates will not represent black 
interests, and that States should devise a system encouraging 
blacks to vote in a block for black candidates. The findings 
in this case alone demonstrate the tenuous nature of these 
assumptions. The court below expressly found that white 
officials have ably represented the interests of the black com-
munity. Even blacks who testified admitted no dissatisfac-
tion, but expressed only a preference to be represented by 
officials of their own race. The enforcement provisions of the 
Civil War Amendments were not premised on the notion that .. 
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Congress could empower a later generation of blacks to· "get 
even" for wrongs inflicted on their forebears. What 1s llPW 
at stake in the city of Rome is the preference of the bhtck 
community to be represented by a black. This Court has 
never elevated a notion, by no means confined to blacks, to 
the status of a constitutional right. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
403 U. S. 124 (1971) . This Court concluded in Whitcomb 
that 
"[t]he mere fact that one interest group or another 
concerned with the outcome of ... elections has found 
itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its own 
provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies 
where, as here, there is no indication that this segment 
of the population is being denied access to the political 
system." !d., at 15~155. 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on local governments 
to ere<)t institutional safeguards to ensure the election of a 
black candidate. Nor do I believe that Congress ·can do so, 
absent ~ finc:Fng that this obliga.tion would be necessary to 
remedy constitutional violations on the part of the local 
government. 
It is appropriate to add that even if this Court could find 
a remedial relationship between the prohibition of all state 
action with a disparate impact on black voting strength and 
the incidence of purposeful discrimination, this Court should 
exercise caution in approving the remedy in issue here absent 
purposeful dilution. Political theorists can readily differ on 
the advantages inherent in different govermental structures. 
As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in Farley v. Patterson, 
393 U. S. 544 (1969): "It is not clear to me how a court 
would 'go about deciding whether an at-large system is to be 
preferred over a district system. Under one system, Negroes 
have some influence in the election of all officers; under the 
other, minority groups have more influence in the selection 
of fewer officers.' ' I d., at 586. 
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The result reached by the Court today can be sustained 
only upon the theory that Congress was empowered to deter-
mine that structural changes with a disparate impact on a 
minority group's ability to elect a candidate of their race 
violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. This con-
struction of the Fourtee11th Amendment was rejected in the 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883). The Court empha-
sized that the_ power couferred was "remedial'' only;. The 
Court reasoned that the structure of the Amendment made 
it clear that it did not "authorize Congress to create a code 
of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to 
provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, 
aud the action of State officers ... , when these are subver-
sive of the fundamental rights specified in the Amendment.". 
This interpretatiOn is consonate with the legislative history 
surrounding the enactment of the Amendment.6 
This construction has never been refuted by a majority of' 
the Members of this Court. Support for this construction in 
current years has emerged in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
and Oregon v. Mitchell. 7 See also opinion of PowELL, J., 
0 See, e. g., Burt, "Miranda And Title II: a Morganatic Marriage," 1969 
S. Ct. Rev. 81. 
7 Explicit support can also be derived from Mr Jn§!j~Ha~an'a dis-
senting opinion, joined by MR. JUS'l'ICE S·rEWAR'l', in Katzen: ac ?!!or-
gan, 384 U. S. 641 ( 1966). Mr Justi i e Ha r]~ clarified the need for thr 
remedial construction of congresswna powers. · It is also unnecessary, 
however, to read the majority opinion as establishing the Court's rejection 
of the remedial con~truction of the Civil Rights Cases. While MR . .Jus-
neE BRENN AN's majority opinion did contain language sugge::;ting a re-
jection of the "remedial" construction of the enforcement. powers, the 
opinion also advanced a remedial rationale which supports the determina-
tion reached by the Court. Compare the rationales forwarded at 384 
U. S., at 654 with the statemrnts, at 65fi. It would be particularly inap~ 
propriate to con::>true Katzenbach v. Morgan as a rejecti011 of the reme-
dial interpretation of congres::;ional powers in view of thi~ Court's subse--
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supra, at -. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court 
observed that Congress could not attack evils not compre-
hended by the Fifteenth Amendment. 383 U. S., at 326. 
In Oreyon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 ( 1970), five Members 
of the Court were unwilling to conclude that Congress had 
the power to determine that establishing the age limitation 
for voting at 21 denied equal protection to those between 
the ages of 18 and 20. 
'l'heopinion of JusTICE STEWAR'l' in that case, joined by 
HIEF USTICE BuRGER an JusTICE BLACKMUN, reaffirmed 
that Congress only has the power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to "provide the means of eradicating situations 
that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause" 
but not to "determine as a matter of substantive constitu-
111 tional law that situations fall within the ambit of the clause." 
'/t~Justice Hari~J.!, in a separate opinion, reiterated 
his belief tfiat it 1s the duty of the Court, and not the Con-
gress, to determine when States have exceeded constitutional 
limitations imposed upon their powers. I d., at 204-207. Cf. 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 ( 1975); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U. S. 1, 18 (1958) J Jus&ce ~ also was unwilling to ac-
ce t the broad construction o \illircement powers formulated 
in the opinion 0 USTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICES 
WHITE and MAR::; HALL. 8 
The Court today fails to heed this prior precedent. To 
permit congressional power to prohibit the conduct chal-
lenged in this case requires state and local governments to 
cede far more of their powers to the Federal Government 
than the Civil War Amendments ever envisioned; and it 
6 Smcr lV Ju~tit• ~ · · · fonnd that congre:ssional powt•rs were more 
rircumseribe w t>Il uo aetmg to counter racial di::;criminatwn under 
lhe Fottrtf'rnth Anwndment, hC:' did not have to detC:>rmine the precisr 
na.ture of congres:swnal vower:-; whC:>n they wrrr exC:>rcised in the field of 
mcial rrhltion~. H1~ anal~·,;i~ of thC:' nationwide ban on literacy tr;;t~;, al;;o 
pre::;entrd in Oregon v. Mitchell, howrver, it< ron~istent with a remedial 
intrrprPt n1 ion of t ho:-e power,;. 
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requires the judiciary to cede far more of its power to interpret 
and enforce the Constitution than ever envisioned. The in-
trusion is all the more offensive to our constitutional system 
when it is recognized that the only values fostered are debat-
able assumptions about political theory which should prop-
erly be left to the local democratic process. 
